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WELCOME ADDRESS 
 
We are pleased to welcome you at the Fifth International Conference on Game 
Theory and Management (GTM2011) which is held in St. Petersburg University and 
organized by the Graduate School of Management (GSOM) in collaboration with the 
Faculty of Applied Mathematics & Control Processes and the International Society of 
Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter). 
The Conference is designed to support further development of dialogue between 
fundamental game theory research and advanced studies in management. Such 
collaboration had already proved to be very fruitful, and has been manifested in the last 
two decades by Nobel Prizes in Economics awarded to John Nash, John Harsanyi, 
Reinhard Selten, Robert Aumann, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson and few other leading 
scholars in game theory. In its applications to management topics game theory 
contributed in very significant way to enhancement of our understanding of the most 
complex issues in competitive strategy, industrial organization and operations 
management, to name a few areas. 
Needless to say that Game Theory and Management is very natural area to be 
developed in the multidisciplinary environment of St. Petersburg University which is the 
oldest (est. 1724) Russian classical research University. This Conference was initiated in 
2006 at SPbU as part of the strategic partnership of its GSOM and the Faculty of 
Applied Mathematics & Control Processes, both internationally recognized centers of 
research and teaching. 
We would like to express our gratitude to the Conference’s key speakers – 
distinguished scholars with path-breaking contributions to economic theory, game theory 
and management – for accepting our invitations. We would also like to thank all the 
participants who have generously provided their research papers for this event. We are 
pleased that this Conference has already become a tradition and wish all the success and 
solid worldwide recognition. 
 
Co-chairs GTM2011 
Professor Valery S. Katkalo,  Professor Leon A. Petrosyan 
Vice-Rector, Dean, Faculty of Applied Mathematics & 
St. Petersburg University Control Processes 
St. Petersburg University 
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WELCOME 
On behalf of the Organizing and Program Committees of GTM2011, it gives us 
much pleasure to welcome you to the International Conference on Game Theory and 
Management in the Graduate School of Management and Faculty of Applied 
Mathematics & Control Processes of St. Petersburg University. This conference is the 
fifth of the St. Petersburg master-plan conferences on Game Theory and Management, 
the first one of which took place also in this city fife years before. It is an innovated 
edition as to investigate the trend and provide a unique platform for synergy among 
business and financial systems, on one hand and industrial systems, on the other, in 
game-theoretic support of national economies in the recent process of globalization. 
Mathematical and especially game-theoretic modeling the globalized systemic structure 
of the world of the future, and managing its conduct towards common benefits is 
becoming a primary goal today. 
This conference held in new millennium is not unique as the Fifth International 
Conference on Game Theory and Management since parallel to the conferences 
GTM2007, GTM2008, GTM2009 and GTM2010 other international workshops on 
Dynamic Games and Management were held worldwide. Because of the importance of 
the topic we hope that other international and national events dedicated to it will follow. 
Starting our activity in this direction fife years before we had in mind that St. Petersburg 
University was the first university in the former Soviet Union where game theory was 
included in the program as obligatory course and the first place in Russia where 
Graduate School of Management and Faculty of Applied Mathematics were established. 
The present volume contains abstracts accepted for the Fifth International 
Conference on Game Theory and Management, held in St. Petersburg, June 27-29, 2011. 
As editors of the Volume V of Contributions to Game Theory and Management we 
invite the participants to present their full papers for the publication in this Volume. By 
arrangements with the editors of the international periodical Game Theory and 
Applications the conference may recommend the most interesting papers for publication 
in this journal. 
St. Petersburg is especially appropriate as a venue for this meeting, being 
“window to Europe” and thus bridging the cultures of East and West, North and South.  
Acknowledgements. The Program and Organizing Committees thanks all 
people without whose help this conference would not have been possible: the invited 
speakers, the authors of papers, all of the members of Program Committee for referring 
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papers, the staffs of Graduate School of Management and Faculty of Applied 
Mathematics & Control Processes. 
We would like to thank Maria Dorokhina, Margarita Gladkova, Anna Tur, 
Tatyana Grigorova and Andrew Zyatchin for their effective efforts in preparing the 
conference. 
We thank them all. 
 
Leon A. Petrosyan, GTM2011 Program Committee 
Nikolay A. Zenkevich, GTM2011 Organizing Committee 
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Computation of Stationary Nash Equilibria  
in General-Sum Discounted Stochastic Games 
 
 
Natalia Akchurina 
 
TU Darmstadt 
Germany 
anatalia@mail.upb.de 
 
 
 
Keywords: Algorithmic game theory, Stochastic games, Markov games, Nash equilibria 
 
 
Numerous economic problems in the field of capital accumulation, advertising, 
pricing, marketing channels, macroeconomics, warfare, resource economics and 
pollution can be modeled as general-sum discounted stochastic games. In these 
environmments where every economic agent tries to maximize its cumulative profit 
Nash equilibrium is generally recognized as the optimal solution concept. In Nash 
equilibrium each agent's policy is the best-response to the other agents' policies. Thus no 
agent can gain from unilateral deviation. 
In this paper we present a replicator dynamics based algorithm that allows to 
calculate stationary Nash equilibria of general-sum discounted stochastic games with a 
given accuracy. The experiments have shown that with the use of our algorithm much 
higher percentage of general-sum discounted stochastic games could be solved than with 
the use of the existing methods: nonlinear optimization [2] and stochastic tracing procedure 
[3]1. The developed algorithm is based on the approach we first proposed for multi-agent 
reinforcement learning [1]. We also extend theoretical basis for our approach. 
Four nonlinear optimization algorithms: CONOPT, KNITRO, MINOS, SNOPT 
are compared with stochastic tracing procedure (TP)2 and the developed Nash-RD 
algorithm. 
                                                 
1 To the best of our knowledge there are no other approaches to solve general-sum discounted 
stochastic games. 
 
2 We are infinitely grateful to P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters who were so kind as to 
render their original stochastic tracing procedure. 
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The percentage of games for which we managed to find Nash equilibria with the 
use of the above approaches with given accuracy 0.001ε =  (relative accuracy 
510 %ε −= ) is presented in the corresponding columns of table 1. The percentage is 
calculated for 100  games of each class that differs in the number of states, agents and 
actions. The games are generated with uniformly distributed payoffs from interval 
[ 100,100]−  and transition probabilities. Discount factor 0.9γ = . As it can be seen from 
the Table 1, the developed algorithm showed the best results for all game classes. The main 
reason is that nonlinear optimizers are inclined to get stuck in local optima, whereas only 
global optima constitute Nash equilibria. As for stochastic tracing procedure, if we had set 
internal parameter to less than 810− , we would very probably have got solutions to higher 
percentage of stochastic games with given accuracy 310ε −=  but there were some games 
(``–'' in the table) whose processing has taken us 5  hours already1. 
Table 1: Results of Experiments  
States Agents Actions CONOPT KNITRO MINOS NOPT TP Nash-
RD 
2 2 2 58% 65% 66% 67% 83% 100% 
2 2 3 39% 39% 41% 46% 86% 98% 
2 2 5 16% 30% 19% 20% 79% 90% 
2 2 7 12% 18% 12% 12% 67% 93% 
2 2 10 8% 10% 5% 2% – 90% 
2 3 2 44% 47% 51% 43% 82% 92% 
2 3 3 22% 33% 28% 27% 81% 92% 
2 3 5 21% 25% 17% 13% – 90% 
2 3 7 7% 13% 5% 5% – 92% 
2 5 2 34% 44% 27% 39% 82% 93% 
2 5 3 20% 26% 11% 21% – 94% 
2 7 2 21% 31% 15% 33% – 87% 
5 2 2 36% 37% 41% 40% 83% 100% 
5 2 3 17% 15% 15% 20% 59% 97% 
5 2 5 1% 5% 2% 1% 44% 91% 
5 2 7 1% 7% 0% 0% – 82% 
5 3 2 18% 20% 11% 12% 77% 85% 
5 3 3 2% 4% 4% 6% 66% 79% 
5 5 2 9% 13% 9% 8% – 72% 
10 2 2 12% 16% 24% 23% 68% 100% 
10 2 3 2% 3% 3% 1% 35% 98% 
10 3 2 5% 7% 1% 1% 70% 82% 
 
                                                 
1 Intel Celeron, 1.50GHz, 504 MB of RAM. 
14 
 
References  
 
[1] Natalia Akchurina. Multiagent reinforcement learning: Algorithm converging to Nash 
equilibrium in general-sum discounted stochastic games. In AAMAS'09: Proceedings of 
The Eighth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 
volume 2, pages 725732. IFAAMAS, 2009.  
[2] Jerzy Filar and Koos Vrieze. Competitive Markov decision processes. Springer-Verlag, 1996.  
[3] P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald J. A. P. Peeters. Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: 
structure, selection, and computation. Journal of Economic Theory, 118(1):3260, 2004.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journals in Game Theory 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW 
 
 
 
Editors 
Steffen Jorgensen 
Leon A. Petrosyan  
David W.K. Yeung 
 
 
WORLD SCIENTIFIC 
 
 
15 
 
Nash Equilibrium Scenarios for Russian Automotive 
Market Development 
 
 
Georgy Alexandrov1 and Nikolay Zenkevich2 
 
1,2Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University 
Russia 
1aleksandrov.bm2012@edu.gsom.pu.ru 
2zenkevich@gsom.pu.ru 
 
 
 
Keywords: Car industry, Extensive form of the game, Nash equilibrium, Pareto equilibrium 
 
 
In this paper the problem of equilibrium scenarios for Russian automotive 
market development and its substantial interpretation is considered. Scenarios of present 
situation development are examined on the basis of a game theory model, early applied 
in [1].  
For this purpose retrospective analysis of car industry’s state of affairs in 
Russian Federation was conducted from interested parties’ points of view. To create a 
model of interested parties’ interaction on this market we defined three players: Russian 
government, foreign and Russian automotive companies. Next step in analysis is 
determination of players’ strategies. There are a lot of studies have been written about 
ways of Russian car industry development. On the basis of these papers main players’ 
strategies have been conducted. There are different regulation measures for government, 
ways of penetration Russian market for foreign companies and actions of native 
carmakers. 
By virtue of defined strategies an extensive three-step form of dynamic game 
was built [3]. Each tree path determines the scenario that leads to particular outcome 
with different for each player payoffs. Quantitative appraisal of these payoffs was 
identified by the method of expert evaluations. For this purpose raw information from 
interviews and surveys was collected. Multiplicity of information sources ensures 
relevant results of data gathering. 
Nash and Pareto equilibrium scenarios of the game were found. Besides 
interpretation of results from individual point of view, there are also offered possible 
ways of cooperation that lead to equilibrium outcomes alteration. 
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Cost sharing problems arise in many real life situations, which include the 
production of private goods by a group of people using a jointly owned production 
facility, the allocation of overhead expenses of a company among its divisions or 
charging individuals for any service that may be provided for groups of people. In all 
such situations each of the individuals involved demand a quantity of the output and the 
cost of producing the whole demanded amount, input, has to be paid by the individuals. 
A cost sharing rule associates each demand profile with a sharing of the overall cost. 
Cost sharing problems have received a great attention and many cost sharing 
rules have been proposed so far. When the returns to scale of the production technology 
are constant, that is, when the cost function is linear the average cost sharing method is 
widely accepted as the most reasonable rule. However, when the returns to scale are not 
constant the choice of an appropriate mechanism is far from obvious. In case of 
increasing returns to scale the serial cost sharing rule proposed by Moulin and Shenker 
(1992) is especially interesting given its appealing properties. On the other hand, when 
the returns to scale are decreasing several rules have been proposed as counterpart of the 
serial cost sharing rule, see for instance de Frutos (2009) and Albizuri and Zarzuelo 
(2010). Nevertheless, the cost function may be piecewise concave and piecewise convex. 
In such a situation the aforementioned rules loose most of their appealing properties. 
Several generalizations of the serial cost sharing rule may fit in such a situation, see for 
instance Albizuri (2009) and Albizuri (2010). In this work we take one step beyond and 
propose the family of a-serial cost sharing rules which generalizes the α-serial cost 
sharing rule (Albizuri, 2010), which in turn generalizes the dual serial cost sharing rule 
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(Albizuri and Zarzuelo, 2010), the self-dual serial cost sharing rule (Albizuri, 2009), and 
the serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and Shenker, 1992). 
The characterization of cost sharing rules by means of reasonable sets of 
properties is a main topic in the literature since it helps on deciding which rule is more 
appropriate in a given context, see for instance Moulin and Shenker (1994) and 
Hougaard and Østerdal (2009). The serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker 
(1992) is characterized by means of two properties. The first one, Anonymity, states that 
the labeling of the agents should not affect the cost sharing and is a basic property any 
cost sharing rule should satisfy. The second one, the so called Independence of higher 
demands requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on demands which are 
higher than his own. The α-serial cost sharing rule of Albizuri (2010) is characterized by 
means of three properties, the aforementioned Anonimity, a-Independence of higher 
demands, and scale invariance. The a-Independence of higher demands property is a 
modification of the Independence of higher demands and is based on the a function that 
maps positive real numbers to positive real numbers. Finally, the Scale invariance 
property states that the scale by which the good is measured should not affect agents’ 
payoffs. When a-Independence of higher demands and Scale invariance are considered 
together the a function has to be linear, moreover a(t)=α(t) for every positive real number t. 
A main feature of our a-serial cost sharing rule is the fact that the function a 
may not be linear. Therefore, the family of α-serial cost sharing rules is included in our 
family. The a-serial cost sharing rule is characterized by means of two properties, 
Anonimity and a-Independence of higher demands. 
Finally the new family of cost sharing rules is illustrated by means of an 
example. 
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In this paper we model the role of the World's Forests as a major carbon sink 
and consider the impact of forest depletion on the accumulation of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. Forest exploitation brings economic revenues in the form of timber and 
agricultural use of deforested land, while at the same time exacerbates the problem of 
excessive accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. In this paper we consider two types 
of agents: Forest owners who exploit the forest and draw economic revenues from it, and 
Non-Forest owners who suffer the externality of having a decreasing forest stock. We 
retrieve the cooperative solution for this game and implement the economic transfers that 
allow us to reach a sustainable and time-consistent use of the forest. 
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Static game theoretic models of corruption in two-level and three-level 
hierarchical control systems based on the concept of sustainable management [1] are 
considered. A model of administrative (compulsive) corruption in a control system of the 
principal-agent type has the form 
0
1
( , , ) max,0 1;
( , , ) max, 0 1 1, 0 1;
g q u b q q
g q u b u q b b
→ ≤ ≤ ≤
→ ≤ ≤ − ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
0 0 0 1 1 10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;
g g g g g g
u b q u b q
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂≥ ≥ ≤ ≥ ≤ ≤∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
q  is a quota (compulsion control variable); q is a maximal admissible quota; 0q is a 
legally established quota; u is an action of the agent; 0 u a≤ ≤ is the condition of 
homeostasis; b is a bribe; b  is a maximal admissible bribe. 
A function ( )q b describes bribery if it does not increase on [0,1] and 
0 0 00 : ( ) .b q b q∃ > <  Then, a connivance takes place if 0(0)q q= and an extortion 
takes place if 0(0) .q q>  The bribe-taker’s behavior is characterized by tractability and 
greed. The parameter of tractability is a quantity min 0 1
min ( ),
b
q q b
≤ ≤
= and the parameter of 
greed is a quantity min min min: ( ) .b q b q=  
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The following model is investigated as an example: 
0
1
( , , ) ( ) max, 0 1;
( , , ) (1 ) ( ) max, 0 1 , 0 1,
g q u b bf u q q
g q u b b f u u q b b
= → ≤ ≤ ≤
= − → ≤ ≤ − ≤ ≤ ≤  
where ( )f u is a production function. As far as ( )f u does not decrease then the optimal 
agent’s action is * 1u q= − and the problem of compulsion is reduced to the Germeyer 
game 2Γ  in the form 
0
1
( , ) (1 ) max, 0 1;
( , ) (1 ) (1 ) max, 0 1
g q b bf q q q
g q b b f q b b
= − → ≤ ≤ ≤
= − − → ≤ ≤ ≤  
with the coincident interests on q and antagonistic interests on b [3]. 
Assume that ( )f u u= then the optimal strategy of the principal has the form 
0, 1 1 ,
* ( )
, .
b q
q b
q otherwise
ε⎧⎪ = − − −⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
  
So, min 0q = (maximal tractability), min 1 1 .b qε= − − −  For example, if 
1 / 2b q= = then 0, 1 2 / 2,* ( )
1 / 2, .
b
q b
otherwise
ε⎧⎪ = − −⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
  Therefore, for a little bribe 
0.15b ε≅ −  the bribe-taker is ready to take away the restrictions of homeostasis 
completely. 
An application of models of the described type to the problems of real estate 
development [2] is considered. Compulsion and impulsion in the three-level hierarchical 
systems as well as their dynamic versions are also presented. 
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It will be considered the simple motion differential game when the maximal 
speed ρ  of Pursuer P is less than the maximal speed σ  of Evader Q but there is the 
phase constraint Q K∈  where K  is connected subset of dR  being a union of finite 
number of r -dimensional simplexes ( 1r d≤ − )called briefly quasiedron. (We will 
denote this game Γ  .) 
Let x  be the radius-vector of P and y  be the same for Q. Put =z x y−  and 
= / | |z zξ . Consider the equation 
2 2 22 , = 0,v vλ ξ λ α− 〈 〉 − +  
where ,vξ〈 〉  is the scalar production of the vectors v  and .ξ  It has the positive 
root ( , ) = , ( , )G Gz v v D z vλ ξ〈 〉 +  if and only if 
2 2 2( , ) := , | | 0.(1)GD z v v vξ α〈 〉 + − ≥  
Definition. The function  
( , ) = ( , )G Gu z v v z vλ ξ−  
defined on the region (1) is called the strategy of parallel pursuit in the G -
game or briefly GΠ -strategy. 
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 GΠ -strategy was introduced in [6] for the case >ρ σ  and applied to solve the 
problem of R.Isaacs [4] about the game with the ball as survival zone in essential general 
situation where a survival zone was arbitrary convex set (see also [7]). Later GΠ -
strategy for the case =ρ σ  was used to solve the simple motion game with several 
number [8] and arbitrary family [12] of pursuers. 
In [1] it was given another application of GΠ -strategy for the case <ρ σ  
when Evader should move along the boundary of convex subset of the plane 2R  with at 
list one angle point. (About other applications of GΠ -strategy see [1, 5, 12].) In report 
the new application of GΠ -strategy will be exposed for the same case < .ρ σ  
Consider the pursuit problem is a phase constraint Q K∈  where K  is a 
connected subset of dR  being a union of a finite number of r -dimensional symplexes, 
1r d≤ − . Remind that r -dimensional symplex is a convex hull of 1r +  affine 
independent points of .dR  
Take some unit vector dn ∈ S . Let Σ  be one of the symplexes constituting K  
(such relation will be written as KΣ  ) and [ ]Σ  is the affine hull of .Σ  Obviously 
[ ] , = 1vmax n v∈ Σ 〈 〉  if n  is directed in parallel to [ ]Σ , otherwise [ ] , < 1vmax n v∈ Σ 〈 〉  all 
the more , < 1.vmax n v∈Σ〈 〉  Thus if n  is not parallel to any of planes [ ], KΣ Σ   then  
, < 1.vmax max n vΣ ∈Σ〈 〉  
This implies  
:= , < 1.(2)d vn
min max max n vδ Σ ∈Σ∈ 〈 〉S  
Note that δ  can be calculated be linear programming. 
 Theorem. If / >ρ σ δ  then in the game Gamma  pursuer is able to win. 
 P r o o f is provided using GΠ -strategy twice – first 'to catch' the projection of 
the point Q to subspace , = 0n x〈 〉  and afterwards approaching to Q in parallel way to 
the vector .n  (n  is denoted the value of n  supplying the minimum in (2). 
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Performance appraisals have become standard practice in organizations. Since 
the early 1980's, between seventy-four and eighty-nine percent of American businesses 
have used them, see Murphy and Cleveland (1991). Informing agents about how well 
they are performing relative to their peers, in other words, by providing workers with 
relative performance feedback information, is a common way in which performance 
appraisals are implemented. Given its widespread use, it is important to understand the 
consequences of providing relative performance feedback information. Managerial 
economics and social psychology has devoted quite a lot of attention to the study of 
performance appraisals (see Bretz et al., 1992, and Levy et al., 2004, for reviews). 
Research on Economics, however, has paid little attention to relative performance 
feedback information and to all of its potential effects. 
This paper empirically studies the provision of relative performance feedback 
information under both piece-rate and flat-rate incentives on two important measures: 
agents' performance and agents' affective response. Affective response includes 
measures of agents' emotional state, such as happiness (subjective well-being or 
experienced utility), arousal (or motivation) and feeling of dominance. In addition, given 
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that in practice the relative performance feedback information is rarely provided just 
once, we investigate the dynamic effects of its provision on both, performance and 
affective response. Furthermore, to understand if men and women react differently to 
relative performance information, we analyze the gender differences. By exploring all of 
these dimensions, we provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of the 
provision of relative performance feedback information, which, so far, have not been 
addressed. 
Our study makes two important contributions. First, we go beyond the study of 
the effect of relative performance feedback information on individual performance by 
also analyzing the effect on individuals' affective response. Second, we compare the 
effect of relative performance feedback under two commonly used incentive schemes, 
piece-rate and flat-rate, allowing us to disentangle between the effect of relative income 
feedback and the relative performance feedback on both, performance and affective 
response. 
We propose a controlled laboratory setup, where subjects perform a real effort 
task and are rewarded according to piece-rate or flat-rate incentives. There are four 
working periods. Between periods, the control subjects are provided with their absolute 
performance, while the treated subjects are provided with their absolute performance and 
with the average performance in the session. Once feedback is provided, both control 
and treated subjects' affective response is elicited, that is, they are asked to rate their 
happiness, arousal and dominance levels. See Figure 1 for a graphical description of the 
experiment. 
With respect to performance, under piece-rate incentives, consistent with the 
mainstream of previous findings, we find that the provision of relative performance 
feedback information had a strong and positive effect on individual performance, even 
after controlling for individual characteristics, such as ability. Those subjects who 
received relative performance feedback information increased their performance by 17 
percent compared to those who did not. With regard to the dynamic effects of providing 
relative performance feedback information, we find that in all periods, the treated 
subjects outperform the untreated, although the effect becomes weaker over time. In 
addition, the content of the feedback information (i.e., positive (negative) feedback when 
agents are informed that they are performing above (below) the average) does not affect 
subjects' subsequent performance differently, since all subjects increase their 
performance. This is consistent with a theoretical framework in which individuals get 
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extra utility when performing better than others and get disutility when performing 
worse than others, i.e. individuals have competitive preferences. Finally, we find a 
strong gender difference in the reaction to the treatment, such that solely male subjects 
drive the overall treatment effect. This is a new and interesting result that adds to the 
recent literature on gender differences in relevant economic environments. In particular, 
this finding shows that gender differences are important not only in competitive or 
tournament-like environments, but also when competition is rather symbolic. 
With respect to the affective response, under piece-rate incentives, we find that 
the provision of relative performance feedback information had strong effects on both 
happiness and dominance levels. Contrary to the findings on performance, we show that 
the treatment had very different effects on those who are receiving positive versus 
negative feedback. We find that receiving positive (negative) feedback affects subjects' 
happiness and dominance levels positively (negatively), such that when we only consider 
the overall treatment effect, the opposite signs cancel out. With respect to the happiness, 
the relative feedback leads to an increase in the gap (or inequality) of subjects' 
happiness, between those performing above and below the group average, by 8 
percentage points. With respect to the dominance levels, the treatment leads to an 
increase in the inequality of subjects' feeling of dominance between those performing 
above and below the group average, by 6 percentage points. Moreover, the inequality in 
both happiness and dominance increases over time with the cumulative information. 
Finally, unlike the effect on performance, we find no gender differences in the affective 
response to the feedback treatment. 
To disentangle the relative performance from the relative income effect, we 
replicate our experiment under flat-rate incentives. Regarding individual performance, 
we find that individuals react when relative performance information has consequences 
in terms of relative income (i.e. strong effect under piece-rate but insignificant effect 
under flat-rate incentives). Interestingly, we still find large gender difference in 
performance; while men continue to react positively to the relative performance 
feedback, where the magnitudes are much smaller than under piece-rate, women react 
negatively to it. In addition, we do not see any effect of relative performance feedback 
information on affective response under flat-rate incentives. These findings are 
important in two ways. First, relative performance feedback affects individuals' 
emotional state (increasing inequality in happiness and in the feeling of dominance) only 
when this information has consequences in terms of relative income (i.e., under piece-
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rate). Second, it also rules out the concern for potential experimental "demand" effects in 
the elicitation of subjects' affective response (i.e., subjects react to the information 
because they feel they are expected to by the experimentalist). Given the inequality in 
happiness and feeling of dominance is only found under piece-rate incentives and not 
under flat-rate incentives, this effect is less likely to be driven purely by experimental 
demand effects. 
The findings from this paper have important implications for understanding 
whether or not an organization would choose to provide relative performance feedback 
information. We have shown that there are very strong effects on performance, when 
performance is rewarded, and this implies strong incentives for an organization to 
employ this mechanism, especially because its implementation has a negligible cost. 
However, we have gone beyond conventional thinking on this issue and we have 
highlighted that this mechanism, while being very effective on increasing performance, 
has important consequences on individuals' affective state. Overall, any organization, 
only after understanding all the consequences of providing agents with relative 
performance feedback information can evaluate the appropriateness of such a policy. 
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Consider a social network consisting of n  agents which form a finite set 
= {1, , }N n… . Consider the diffusion of a new product on the market characterized by 
the network. 
The following states of the network are possible: (0, )n , (1, 1)n − , ... , ( , 0)n . 
Pair ( , )i n i− , = 0,i n , is a state of the network, where i  is a number of active agents 
and ( )n i−  is a number of susceptible agents. The active agent has the product, the 
susceptible agent doesn't have the product. The network can move from one state to 
another. 
Suppose there is some factor of influence on the network agents. For example, 
it could be advertising of the product. Denote the level of advertising as = ( )f cλ , 
where c  is the amount of money invested in advertising of the product. 
Denote the probability of transition from susceptible to active as = ( , )p p Aλ , 
where A  is a number of active agents. 
Consider the case where the reverse transition isn't possible. 
The diffusion process can be described using the Markov chain with the finite 
state space {(0, ),(1, 1), ,( , 0)}n n n− …  and matrix of transition probabilities:  
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…
 
Let ()f ⋅  and ( , )p Aλ  be known. Suppose there is one firm on the market and its 
task is to maximize profits in the long run; i.e. profits of the firm is ( , , , )b f c A r , where 
0>r r  is a price of the product, 0r  is a cost price of the product. 
The strategy of the firm is {( , )}j jr c , = 1,2,j … , where ( , )j jr c  is a strategy 
of the firm at stage j , = 1,2,j …  
The optimal strategy of the firm, i.e. the strategy maximizing the total profit of 
the firm, is found. 
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Introduction 
Fundraising activities for charitable purposes have become increasingly 
popular. One reason is the growing number of non-governmental organization with 
humanitarian or social purposes. Another one is the decrease of government participation 
in culture, education and related activities. The purpose of these associations are either 
the development and promotion of culture or aid and humanitarian services. Even in 
France, a country without any fundraising tradition, some organizations began to appear, 
such as the French Association of Fundraiser1 in 2007. 
Commonly used mechanisms to raise money are voluntary contributions, 
lotteries and auctions. Even though most of the fundraisers still use voluntary 
contributions2, auctions are increasingly used. Indeed, for some special events or 
particular situations, auctions provide a particular atmosphere. The popularity of 
auctions for charity purposes can also be observed by the increase in internet sites 
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offering the sale of objects and donating a part of their proceeds to charity. Well-known 
examples include Yahoo! and Giving Works of eBay. Many others have been created, 
such as the Pass It On Celebrity Charity Auction1 in 2003, where celebrities donated 
objects whose sale revenue contributed to a "charity of the month". We can also cite 
cMarket Charitable Auctions Online2 created in 2002 and selected as a charity vehicle 
by more than 930 organizations. 
In charity auctions, bidders make their bid decisions taking into account two 
parameters: Their valuation for the item sold and their altruism or sensitivity to the 
charity purpose. In this paper we consider valuations drawn with the same distribution in 
an independent private values model. Then, we introduce asymmetry in the altruism 
parameter with complete information. As in Bulow et al. (1999) and Wasser (2008), this 
framework has the advantage of avoiding the complexity and the narrow results of 
asymmetric auctions with incomplete information. In the usual asymmetric auction 
literature, valuations are drawn from different distributions. Changing these distributions 
could change the ranking of the revenue among different auction designs (for example, 
see Krishna (2002)). Maskin and Riley (2000), de Fru- tos (2000) and Cantillon (2008) 
succeed in determining the revenue ranking between first-price and second-price 
auctions under some conditions that the distributions should satisfy. Consequently, in 
this literature, distributions of the bidders' value are crucial elements. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine which of the two auction designs - all-
pay auction or first-price auction - is better at raising money for charity when bidders are 
asymmetric in their altruism parameters with complete information and values are drawn 
in a independent private values model. As in the case with symmetric bidders (Goeree et 
al., 2005, Engers and McManus, 2007) we conclude that the all-pay auction is better than 
the first-price auction.These results show that different auction designs are better for 
different environments. Indeed, in a complete information framework Bos (2009) shows 
that when the asymmetry among bidders is strong enough, the ranking of revenues is 
reversed. In particular, winner-pay auctions outperform all-pay auctions. 
Our result confirms the one of Goeree et al. (2005) and indicates that all-pay 
auctions should be considered seriously to raise money for charity purposes. Yet to the 
best of our knowledge, all-pay auctions have never been implemented in real life for 
                                                 
1 http://www.passitonline.org/ 
2 http://www.cmarket.com/ 
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charity purposes. However, it seems easy to do it. For example, every bidder could buy a 
number of tickets simultaneously as in a raffle. Contrary to a raffle, though, the winner 
will be the buyer with the highest number of tickets in hand. 
This paper is closest the spirit to Bulow et al. (1999). They compare first-price 
and second-price auctions in an independent private signals model with common values 
and two bidders. The signals are drawn from the uniform distribution and some 
parameters, that could be interpreted as altruism parameter to the charity purpose, are 
asymmetric under complete information. Although they apply this framework to 
toeholds and takeovers, it is well suited for charity. In their paper, they determine that 
when these parameters are asymmetric and small enough, the revenue ranking could be 
reverse so that the first-price outperforms the second-price auction. Unlike them, we 
compare first-price to all-pay auctions in an independent private values model. The only 
other papers on asymmetric auctions with this kind of externalities are de Frutos (2000) 
and Wasser (2008). de Frutos (2000) compares first-price and second-price auctions with 
altruism parameters equal to 1/2 and bidders' values drawn from different distribution. 
Her framework is quite different to ours as she does not investigate all-pay auctions and 
the asymmetry concerns bidders values and not altruism parameters. However, dividing 
our all-pay auction by 1 minus the bidder's altruism parameter leads to study the all-pay 
auction in her framework with uniform distributions1 Thus, in a technical way, our 
papers are connected. Wasser (2008) investigates k + 1-price winner-pay auctions with 
asymmetry on the altruistic parameters. Yet, he does not compare the expected revenue 
among the auction design but focuses on the performance of auctions as mechanisms for 
partnership dissolution. Thus our papers are complements as they are related thanks to 
the existence and uniqueness of the first-price auction but differs on economic problems 
raised and results. 
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There are several mathematical models describing the agent’s behavior of 
conformity, i.e. an agent follows the behavior of the others. Among them there is a 
bunch of models that have been investigated since [0] was published by M. Granovetter. 
They are called threshold models of collective behavior. These models are developed for 
situations where an agent has two alternatives one of which she chooses according to her 
utility function (so called binary decisions). This utility function depends upon the 
number or the proportion of the others that chose particular alternative. If this number or 
proportion is greater than the threshold that characterizes the agent, she chooses the same 
alternative. Otherwise she chooses the opposite one. This is done in order to maximize 
her utility. 
The classic example is the decision to join a riot or not. Here the agent’s 
threshold is the proportion of the group he would have to see join before he would do 
also. The cost of joining a riot declines as the riot size increases, since the probability of 
being arrested decreases as the riot size increases. Each agent has her own level of cost 
or threshold she is willing to pay for taking part in a riot. According to this behavior it is 
important to investigate the size of the riot in equilibrium. 
There are other of binary-choice situations where threshold models can be 
applied [1]: diffusion of innovations, rumors and diseases, strikes, voting, educational 
attainment, leaving social situations, migration and experimental social psychology. 
Many of these applications have been developing recently. 
In the proposed work, the game-theoretical model of a binary-choice threshold 
behavior is considered (see also [0,0]). This generalized version includes the influence 
matrix, describing the level of influence among the agents and multi threshold behavior, 
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where decision of agents may alter according to two or more thresholds. For example, a 
company would choose to be involved on a particular market if there are enough other 
companies are also present (first threshold). However, if the number of companies on the 
market exceeds the upper level (second threshold), then the company quits. One can 
include more than one threshold into a model if there are reasons for the utility function 
to be altered. 
Let’s    {1, , }N n= …  be a set of agents and describe the threshold models of 
collective behavior as a strategic form game   ({ } , { ()} , )i i N i i NG X u N∈ ∈= ⋅ , where the 
set of binary strategies of a player i  is   {0,1 },iX =  and her utility function 
 
:i i
i N
u X
∈
→∏ R  is defined below. 
Define a binary strategy of a player i  as {0;1 }ix ∈ , where choice “1” means, 
that the player is active, whereas choice “0” – the player is inactive. Define strategy 
profile, i.e. vector of all strategies, as ( )1  , , n i
i N
x x x X X
∈
= … ∈ = ∏ . Conditions of the 
game for player i  is described with the help of the following  – 1n  dimensional vector 
of strategies:  
1 1 1    ( , , , , , )   i i i n i j
i j
x x x x x X X− − + −
≠
= … … ∈ = ∏ . 
To define conformity behavior let’s consider social pressure as an external 
condition for the player. Social pressure is the summary action of other players with 
consideration of trust or, more commonly, influence among players. Level of influence 
of player j  at player i  is denoted by [0,1]ijt ∈ . In order to normalize influence 
suppose that 1ij
i j
t
≠
=∑ . Thus the conditions for player i  can be defined as 
( )
i
i ij j
j i
x t x−
≠
=∑ ∑ . This value can be considered as social pressure. Matrix 
,{ }ij i j NT t ∈=  is named influence matrix. Diagonal elements of this matrix are defined 
below. 
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The Anonymous binary behavior is characterized by the fact that the player 
doesn’t differentiate its opponents and uniformly subjected by their influence, 
i.e. 1 / ( 1),ijt n i j= − ≠ . 
Suppose that the behavior of player i  is defined by the following utility 
function: 
( ), ( ) ,ij j i ij j i i
j i
u x x t x xθ−
≠
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
where iθ  is some non-negative number 0 1iθ≤ ≤ . If social pressure ( )i ix−∑  is 
greater than iθ , then the player gains more profit of being active, if it is less than iθ , 
then the player gains more profit of being inactive. The player is indifferent under the 
(neutral) condition ij j i
j i
t x θ
≠
=∑ . Number iθ  characterizes the threshold of “switching” 
the player from inactivity to activity. We denote it as autonomy of agent. Autonomy can 
be appropriately interpreted as a negative influence of the player in a reflective sense. 
That’s why self-influence we denote with negative threshold value .ii it i Nθ= − ∀ ∈   
In similar way utility function for multi-thresholds game can be defined. 
Let’s consider Nash’s equilibrium of this game. Nash’s equilibrium in pure 
strategies ([4]) for game G  is strategy profile Nx , if and only if for all  i N∈  and 
i ix X∈  the following inequality is valid: 
( )( ) ( )( ), ,N i N i Ni i i i i iu x x u x x− −Σ ≥ Σ . 
It was proved that in multi-threshold models the search of Nash’s equilibrium is 
equivalent (necessary and sufficient) to certain (knapsack type) linear programming 
solving. This method is more optimized than an exhaustive search. 
For the anonymous behavior game, with one threshold per player, the structure 
of Nash’s equilibrium is very simple. Let’s arrange thresholds by their value in 
increasing order. The structure of Nash equilibrium is as follows. All the payers whose 
thresholds are on the left of the value of common action i
i
x∑  are active, the rest are 
inactive. The structure for non-anonymous game is more sophisticated, but can be 
described with the help of special algorithm of ordering defined in the proposed work. 
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We consider a brand owner who decides to enter a fashion licensing contract in 
a complementary business in order to introduce a new type of product with his brand on 
it. 
It may be the case of a famous fashion brand owner who creates a perfume with 
his brand logo on it. We assume that the advertising effects of the licensor in terms of 
brand sustainability are well known by himself such that we may consider them as a 
deterministic function of advertising effort. 
On the contrary he does not know how well the licensee’s advertising campaign 
will work, so that we represent its effect on the brand goodwill as a random variable.  
In the licensing agreement, the licensor has a twofold objective: on one hand he 
wants to maximise his own profits coming from the licensing contract, on the other hand 
he wants the advertising campaign to improve the final value of the brand goodwill. 
We formulate a Stackelberg differential game where the owner of the brand acts 
as the leader, while the licensee is the follower. We assume that the effects of the 
advertising campaign of the licensee may be affected by some uncertainty and we 
compare the optimal advertising strategies we have found in both deterministic and 
stochastic scenarios. 
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A typical planning mechanism met in business is centralized, i.e. the plan is set 
by a principal to her agents on the basis of historical data, current circumstances, and 
corporate strategy (see, for instance, Lewis & Sappington, 1997). A disadvantage of such 
approach is that detailed private information available to agents is missed. A counter 
planning mechanism where agents are asked for their plans provides an alternative.  
Counter planning mechanisms for individual employees were introduced in the 
late 60th of the XX century in Soviet economy to motivate employees’ “enhanced 
obligations”. The responsibility for the plan quality in the process of counter planning is 
supported by a system of penalties. Now, fees for deviations from the planned 
consumption level are typical in wholesale energy and natural gas contracts, but are less 
common within organizations. 
Counter planning mechanisms were first studied from the game-theoretic point 
of view by Burkov (1977). Linear penalties were shown to be enough to achieve any 
specific desired plan stringency (the probability of plan underfulfilment), which is 
determined by the ratio πO/(πU + πO), where πU and πO are the penalty rates for plan 
underfulfilment and overfulfilment respectively. Surprisingly, in the linear case the 
principal need not even know the probability distribution of output to implement the first 
best. In last decades the counter planning mechanisms were implemented in several 
industries and demonstrated their applicability and high effectiveness.  
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Unfortunately, the classic theory fails to explain the absolute values of the 
optimal penalty rates. In this paper we equip the model of counter planning with agent’s 
planning costs and efforts and immerse it into the moral hazard framework. The aim of 
the analysis is to develop the policy recommendations on penalty strength. The policy 
must be simple enough to be used in management consulting projects under time 
pressure and lack of statistics. 
Additional information arrives in the process of plan execution by an agent. 
When agent’s output expectations change during the planning period the principal is 
interested in plan adjustment. To motivate timely re-planning requests the agent is faced 
with another system of re-planning penalties of smaller strength, as compared to the plan 
failure penalties (the idea of early replanning from Burkov, 1977).  
From the point of view of the principal-agent theory the counter planning 
mechanism belongs to the class of hidden-action models. Alike adverse selection 
framework, agent’s private information is not related to his performance. Instead, agent 
knows the probability distribution of output z given his productive action y, and 
environment θ ∈ {θL, θH} (the cumulative probability function is denoted by F(z, y, θ)). 
Initially, the agent knows p := Prob(θ = θL) and can resolve uncertainty about the value 
of θ with probability Δ ∈ [0, 1] at cost cp(Δ) (Dowd, McGonigle, & Djatej, 2010). Then 
the agent reports plan x to the principal. After that the agent chooses productive effort y 
and incurs cost c(y). Then he gets know the exact value of θ and reports adjusted plan x'. 
Finally, output z is realized. 
Efforts y and Δ are not observed by the principal. The principal instead builds 
the incentive scheme σ(z, x, x') for the agent basing on initial plan x, adjusted plan x', 
and output z.  
The payoff of the principal is  
1 2( , ', ) ( ) ( , ', ) ( , ') ( ', )x x z H z x x z x x x zσ λ λΦ = − − − , 
where H(⋅) is the profit function, λ1(⋅) are plan adjustment expenses, and λ2(⋅) are losses 
from the plan failure. Typical incentive scheme is combined from constant payment σ0, 
bonus σ1(z), plan adjustment penalties –π1(x' – x), and plan failure penalties –π1(z – x'). 
Accordingly, the agent’s payoff is 
( , , , ', ) ( ( , ', )) ( ) ( )pf x y x z u x x z c y cσΔ = − − Δ , 
where u(⋅) is the utility of money (strictly concave for risk-averse agent). 
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Analogous to the simplest moral hazard model (Harris and Raviv, 1977) no 
problem arises in the case of a risk neutral agent, when u(σ) = σ. The optimal combined 
mechanism replicates principal’s profits and costs to an agent, while constant payment 
σ0 is chosen to fulfill individual rationality. In the more realistic situation of a risk-
averse agent (including the important case of guaranteed payment constraints) a number 
of biases arise from principal’s efforts to maximally secure an agent. We perform the 
detailed analysis of these biases to justify the following extensively used policy 
recommendations: 
• When H(z) is monotone, the incentive function σ(z, x, x') is also monotone in z. 
• Any desired plan stringency can be implemented by the principal. 
• Plan failure penalties π1(z – x') never exceed λ2(⋅) and increase when λ2(⋅) 
increase. 
• π1(z – x') increase when planning costs increase. 
• Productive and planning efforts are complementary. 
• Plan adjustment penalties increase when plan adjustment expenses λ1(⋅) increase. 
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We consider the case when each agent can estimate the probability of different 
output levels and the minimum payment he needs to agree with the certain level of 
output (and, thus, the efforts).  
Contemporary contracts theory (see for example, Laffont & Martimort, 2002) 
offers quite good incite for solution of adverse-selection and moral hazard problems for 
principal-agent(s) setting. At the same time, these results are based on the proposition 
that cost functions of agents are known by agents themselves and a principal except for 
some parameters, which are private information of agents (and are not observable by the 
principal). These functions are quite difficult to identify in real life in order to implement 
the effective incentive scheme in practice. In the theory of control in organizations (see, 
for example, Goubko, Novikov, 2008) a number of results were obtained, allowing to 
build incentive schemes in which plans (contracts) for agents are determined on the basis 
of information they report to the principal. Sometimes this information has quite simple 
structure. To solve the considered problem, we combine two basic mechanisms: transfer 
prices mechanism and counter planning mechanism. Initial game-theoretic study of these 
mechanisms was performed by Burkov (1977, 1989), and then extended by Novikov 
(2007). 
For the experimental study we design a management game to be played by 
students. Each participant (of the total number N) receives its own randomly generated 
profile represented in following way: 
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output increase y1 … ym 
minimal cost to 
increase 
c1 … cm 
probability of output 
increase 
p1 … pm 
such that for any participant: 0 0y = , 0 0c = , 0 100%p = , [1, 1]i m∀ ∈ −  
1i iy y+ > , 1 1 1 1( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )i i i i i i i ic c c c y y y y+ − + −− − ≥ − − , 1i ip p+ ≤ .  
The principal announces the mechanism (how this data will be utilized in order 
to create the incentive scheme for each participant j N∈ ): 
( ),
( , ) ( )
( ),
j j j j
j j j j
j j j j
z x z x
x z x
x z z x
πσ σ π
+
−
⎧⎪ ∗ − >⎪= − ⎨⎪ ∗ − <⎪⎪⎩
, 
where jx  – the planned output increase to be chosen by agent j, max( , )j j jiz x y= , 
[1, ]
: max ikk m
i p r
∈
≥  – the final output increase, implemented by a participant taken in 
account the external probability r . The first part of the incentive scheme is a uniform 
rule ( )jxσ  where values jx  and ( )jxσ  are determined from the table: 
desired output 
increase 
x1 … xm 
incentive to be paid 
1σ  … mσ  
The table is constructed by the principal basing on the information provided by 
participants. Two approaches are used during the experiments. The first one is the linear 
approach – i ixσ λ= , where λ  is the “transfer” price. The second one is more 
complicated, which utilizes the solution of an adverse selection problem. The second 
part of the incentive scheme is intended to stimulate agents to choose such jx , that the 
probability of its overfulfuilment is greater or equal than the desired plan stringency P 
(which is also determined by the principal) – ( )jp x P≥ . According to Burkov (1977) 
/ ( )P π π π+ + −= + . 
After receiving this rule the participants report to the principal their private 
information (possibly, untruthfully). 
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The goal of the principal is to choose 1( , )mx x x= , ( )jxσ , π+  to maximize 
0 ( ( , ))j j j j
j N
u E z z xσ
∈
= −∑ . 
The goal of each participant is to maximize his utility function 
( ( , ) )j j j j ju E z x cσ= − . Materialization of incentives in case of students is realized 
through the dependency of scoring points they receive during study from their games’ 
payoffs. 
In our report we analyze the results of this management game played by 
students.  
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We present an overlapping generation dynamic model of intentioned cultural 
transmission of preferences to analyze which are the sources of cooperation (and 
efficiency) in a non-repeated incomplete contract scenario. 
Trust and trustworthiness play an essential role in the development of the 
economic activity, particularly in order to achieve efficiency (see Arrow (1972), Putnam 
(2000), Tabellini (2008), Algan and Cahuc (2007), etc…). But, what are in turn, the 
determinants of trust? Why the level of trust is so different among societies? Is there any 
relation between the levels of trust and institutions? 
To analyze this problem in a theoretical framework, we analyzed, in a previous 
work (Olcina and Calabuig, 2010), an extended trust game with a costly punishment 
phase in an intergenerational dynamic setting. 
In fact, many real life economic situations are trust games with a team of 
investors. Moreover, punishment itself is also a team decision problem. The workers' 
capacity for punishment in this situation is endogenous, depending on the number of 
workers adhering to this activity. Therefore, in addition to institutions, it seems crucial 
for the effectiveness of punishment, the ability of different groups to overcome the 
collective action problem that is at the core of almost any form of collective punishment. 
Why and how do different societies succeed in solving this coordination 
problem? 
And what is the relation, if any, with the strength of the punishment 
institutions? 
We present an overlapping generation dynamic model of intentioned and costly 
cultural transmission of preferences in order to analyze this team trust game with 
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collective punishment. We are interested in the influence of punishment institutions on 
the long-run distribution of preferences and behaviour, especially in the collective 
punishment coordination problem. 
Our main results are the following. Trust evolves only if there is enough 
punishment capacity in the society and individuals are able to solve the collective action 
problem faced in the punishment phase. There is some kind of strategic 
complementarity. In particular, strong punishing institutions facilitate the solution to the 
coordination problem in the punishment stage and vice versa. 
Different institutions generate different behaviors and what is, probably, more 
important, they influence the long run incentives to socialize on particular preferences 
that affects norms of negative reciprocity (punishment). 
The only long-run outcomes of our dynamics are the Fully Cooperative Culture 
and the Non-Cooperative Culture. The fully cooperative culture is only feasible for high 
values of the institutional capacity of punishment. Its basin of attraction is larger, the 
higher is the institutional capacity of punishment, the higher is the degree of peer 
pressure and the smaller is the individual cost of collective punishment. However, 
uniqueness is not achieved. Our model shows hysteresis: initial conditions matter, 
because they can lead the society to a different steady state. 
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Introduction. 
Increased global competition faced by today's companies has strongly affected 
the business cycles as well as the life cycles of products and underlined the advantage of 
being the first one to bring out an innovation. In many markets such as technology and 
pharmaceutical markets, the speed of innovation determines who primarily gets the 
market share. Consequently, firms involved in such markets have to continuously 
consider the nontrivial problem of selecting R&D projects to invest in and the amount of 
investment in each of the selected projects. In this work, we formulate this problem as a 
race among several agents who compete over the development of a certain product, 
project or process. Each firm decides whether to enter the race and if so, how much to 
invest in the development. The investments of the firms are assumed to be one-time 
payments made at the beginning of the planning horizon and cannot be retrieved 
regardless of the actual length of the project. The competition is characterized as a 
winner-takes-all mechanism, since the revenue of the project is acquired by the firm that 
completes the project first while all other firms earn nothing. The completion time of the 
project for each firm is assumed to be random with an exponential distribution whose 
rate parameter is proportional to the investment of the firm. These completion times are 
assumed to be independent across firms. The costs and revenues are subject to 
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continuous discounting. The technological and marketing efficiencies of a firm 
differentiate it from the other firms. The main contributions of this work are the explicit 
representations of a unique Nash equilibrium and of a unique globally optimal solution 
as functions of the system parameters. 
Nash Equilibrium. 
The computation of the unique Nash equilibrium involves ranking of the firms 
according to the product of their two parameters (specifically their technological and 
marketing efficiencies) and computing a breakpoint for each firm. A firm invests a 
positive amount in a given project if and only if the market interest rate is below its 
respective breakpoint. Hence, two consecutive breakpoints that capture the market 
interest rate between them determine the set of firms that invest positive amounts in the 
Nash equilibrium. Our analysis provides closed-form expressions for these amounts and 
their utilities. 
The simple representation of the Nash equilibrium also leads to a variety of 
insights regarding the sensitivity of the market activities, the utilities and the 
expenditures in the equilibrium to changes in firm-specific and environmental 
parameters. Among these, we show that the equilibrium expenditure of a firm is bounded 
above by 25% of its revenue from the project, independently of all other parameters of 
the problem. Our analysis also suggests that the regulation of the interest rate by a 
centralized decision maker (e.g., offering of loans at reduced interest rates by a 
governmental agency) does have a certain impact over the set of firms actively involved 
in the race. In particular, such actions can always assure that two leading firms invest 
positively. The criterion for positively investing becomes tighter in the presence of 
competition for all firms but the leading one, whose breakpoint is the same whether or 
not there is competition. 
Global Optimum. 
The problem of maximizing the sum of the firms' utilities, which we refer to as 
global utility, always has a solution in which at most one firm invests a positive amount. 
In other words, a globally optimal solution consists of either lack of activity or a 
monopoly. We provide an explicit representation for the optimal investment amount of 
the optimal monopoly and the resulting utility. Our analysis indicates that the globally 
optimal solution exhibits concentration of effort even when full diversification is present 
in the unique Nash equilibrium. The criterion to rank the firms for constructing the Nash 
equilibrium is different from the one for choosing the optimal monopoly. Consequently, 
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the Nash equilibrium can be substantially different from the globally optimal solution. 
We illustrate through an example that the unique monopoly of a globally optimal 
solution does not necessarily invest a positive amount in the unique Nash equilibrium. In 
contrast to the globally optimal solution, the equilibrium solution can induce a full 
competition in the market. As a means to compare the equilibrium and globally optimal 
solutions, we explore the efficiency of the system, which we define as the ratio of the 
utility of the unique Nash equilibrium to the globally optimal utility. 
Extensions. 
Our results apply to a rent-seeking model that is fundamental in the public 
choice literature and to an instance of the well-known Cournot model in economics. 
These results can be partially extended to the problem where the dependence of the 
completion time rates on the investments is nonlinear. 
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In this note we discuss a psychological trait that under certain conditions can be 
associated to the notion of Nash equilibrium: that of voluntariness. To what extent is the 
equilibrium outcome of a game what players wanted it to be? The exposition is initially 
framed in the simplest possible setting, one-shot bimatrix games with payoffs known to the 
players. It is assumed that rationality is exhaustively captured by players’ optimizing 
behaviour in terms of best reply to an opponent’s expected strategy. The mechanism by 
which expectations are formed is not assumed to be an ingredient of rationality, i.e. 
expectations may or may not be rational, consistent or inconsistent. It is shown that the set 
of outcomes arising from these assumptions may contain a Nash equilibrium even when 
expectations are inconsistent. We term involuntary such an equilibrium. When we remove 
the assumption of knowledge of the opponent’s payoffs, the performance of a learning 
algorithm in presence of two pure-strategy equilibria, one voluntary one involuntary, 
shows - surprisingly - the prevalence of the latter. Our discussion dispels a common 
misconception present in the literature - the identification of Nash equilibrium to consistent 
alignment of expectations. Besides consequences in econometrics, specifically in the sort 
of statistical inference used to x-ray agents’ psychologies, the question involves deeper 
epistemology aspects. The possibility of involuntary equilibria is akin to whether 
Knowledge could be assimilated to ’Justified True Belief’, a thesis denied in the classical 
paradox of [5]. Furthermore, involuntary equilibria provide substantive support to the 
compatibilist view in the debate over free will vs determinism [3]. 
 
                                                 
∗ HYCON support aknowledged. Work partially supported by European Commission 
under STREP project TREN/07/FP6AE/S07.71574/037180 IFLY 
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We apply the methodology of information economics in an intra-person 
multiple-self setting to model the relation between one's economic well being and state 
of consciousness, including amnesia and delusion, that may underpin some categories of 
mental (dis-)order. We posit the notion of semi-conscious choice in which the individual 
habituates, through long-term intra-personal interactions, into being "strategically" 
forgetful or delusional to enhance the motivation of one's future selves in making 
decisions. We endogenize the individual's habituated state of recall error proneness in 
equilibrium from his attitude towards intertemporal discounting, including present bias. 
We further study the ex ante welfare of the decision maker in relation to his equilibrated 
state of consciousness and oer it as an economic measure of his mental well being. 
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In our model the economy consists of two countries, “Home” ( H ) and 
“Foreign” ( F ), one production factor - labour - and one differentiated sector including 
continuum of varieties or brands. In our notation, 
L  is the total population in the economy; 
[0,1 ]s∈  is the share of population in country H  (so 1 s−  is the share of 
population in country F ); 
HN  and FN  are masses of firms in country H  and country F  
correspondingly; 
( )H Hc c F=  and ( )F Fc c F=  are the marginal costs in country H  and country 
F  (we assume that ' ( ) 0c F < ); 
HF  and FF  are fixed costs in countries H  and F ; 
Hw  and Fw  are wages in countries H  and F , normalized as Hw = w  and 
1Fw = . 
Each consumer's total utility in country k H= , F  from consuming domestic 
varieties and varieties imported from ,l F H=  is 
1 1
( ) ( ),       
k lN N
k kk lk
i j
i j
U u x u x
= =
= +∑ ∑  
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where ( )u ⋅  is an increasing and concave elementary utility function, 0Hkix ≥  is the 
individual consumption in country { ,  }k H F∈  of a commodity produced by i th−  firm 
in country H . Similarly, Fkjx  is the consumption in country { ,  }k H F∈  of the 
commodity produced by j th−  firm in country F . 
Two budget constraints in countries H  and F  are, respectively, 
1 1
Π
H FN N
HH HH FH FH H
i i j j
i j
p x p x w
= =
+ ≤ +∑ ∑ , 
1 1
1 Π
H FN N
HF HF FF FF F
i i j j
i j
p x p x
= =
+ ≤ +∑ ∑ , 
where Hkip  is the price for , 
Hk
ix , while 
Fk
jp  is the price for 
Fk
jx , whereas Π
H  and ΠF  
are the total profits (actually this term is excessive because Π Π 0H F= =  at the 
equilibrium due to free-entry condition). 
The profit maximization by i -th producer in country H  means 
, , 
( ( ) ( )) (1 ) ( ( ) ( )) max ,
HH HF H
i i
HH HH H HH HF HF H HF H
i i i i i i
x x F
sL p x wc F x s L p x wc F x wF− + − − − →  
while similarly program of j -th producer in country F  is 
, ,  
( ( ) ( )) (1 ) ( ( ) ( )) max .
FH FF F
j j
FH FH F FH FF FF F FF F
j j j j j j
x x F
sL p x c F x s L p x c F x F− + − − − →  
Here ( )Hk Hki ip x  is the inverse demand function for the commodity produced by 
i -th firm in country H  for consumption in country { ,  }k H F∈  , and ( )Fk Fkj jp x  is it 
counterpart in F . 
The symmetric equilibrium can be characterized through several equations. 
First, using the maximization of klx  by consumers and producers, 
 
' '
' '
1 ( ) 1 ( )( ) ( ),         
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
FH HFHH H FF F
u u
FH F HH HF H FF
u u
r x r xu x wc u x c
u x c r x u x c w r x
− −= ⋅ = ⋅− − , (1) 
where, as in [1],  
''
'
( )( ) .
( )u
u x xr x
u x
= −  
Second, free entry or zero-profit conditions entail 
 ( ) ( )1 ( ) 1 ( )( ) ( ),       
1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
HF HF FF FFHH HH H FH FH F
u uu u
HH HF H FH FF F
u u u u
s r x x s r x xsr x x F sr x x F
r x r x c L r x r x c L
− −+ = + =− − − − . (2) 
Third, producer's cost optimization implies 
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( ) ( )( )' '1 1,      ( )( (1 ) ) 1,H HH HF F FH FFc F sLx s Lx c F sLx s Lx+ − = − + − = −  (3) 
Fourth, the balance in labour markets give us  
( (1 ) ) ,H H H HH H HFN F c sLx c s Lx sL+ + − =   (4) 
( )( (1 ) ) 1 .F F F FH F FFN F c sLx c s Lx s L+ + − = −   (5) 
Finally, consumer's budget constraints in the symmetric equilibrium take the form 
,         1,H HH HH F FH FH H HF HF F FF FFN p x N p x w N p x N p x+ = + =  (6) 
where  
,         ,         ,         .
1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )
H H F F
HH HF FF FH
HH HF FF FH
u u u u
wc wc c cp p p p
r x r x r x r x
= = = =− − − −   (7) 
Thus, the symmetric equilibrium is determined by the system (1)-(7). 
Our goal is to find the relative market size ( s ) affects all market outcomes: 
investments, prices, outputs, etc. So far only the results for some particular utility 
functions and technologies are obtained. In particular, under CES -function, when the 
elasticity of marginal costs is monotone with respect to fixed costs, then in equilibrium 
,H FF F=  i.e. the market size does not affect the technology used, which is important 
for trade theory. 
 Our preliminary results show that this result need not hold true in general case.  
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In recent years, considerable research interest was focused on social networks – 
for example, authors of the survey [1] or the monograph [3] demonstrate the large 
number of studies on the formation of networks and their dynamics. 
Term social network describes social structure, consisting of elements or agents 
(the actors - individual or collective: individuals, families, groups, organizations, for 
example) and a set of relations between them (such as dating, friendship, cooperation, 
communication and etc.). Social network as mathematical object can be defined as a 
finite weighted graph, where weights of edges depend on interaction of agents. 
In the modeling of social networks it is usually assumed that the main 
characteristic of its element (his opinion on any issue or contamination in spreads of 
epidemics and etc.) changes in time according to some specified law on the basis of 
characteristics of neighboring elements. In these models a network element is assumed 
to be passive. Let’s call them models of the first type. 
In some models a network element chooses the characteristics (e.g, to act or 
not) on the basis of their abilities and interests. In such models, in contrast with models 
of the first type, network element is active and is considered to have its own interests 
(formalized in the form of the objective function) and freedom of choice. These ones are 
models of the second type. 
This work is devoted to investigation of an example of a combined model and 
takes into account both types of models: let’s characterize each element by some 
parameter that can vary under the influence of other agents and which can influence the 
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governing body - the center. At the same time, each agent has an objective function and 
chooses his action from the set of feasible actions. 
Formally speaking we suppose that there is a finite set of agents, N = {1, 2, ..., 
n}, each of which could be characterized by a parameter – type – ri (where 0 <ri <1), the 
objective function fi and selects the action xi (where xi is a nonnegative real number). In 
this example we use the following objective function of i-th agent:  
 
2
1 1( ,..., ) ( ... 1) .
i
i n i n
i
x
f x x x x x
r
= + + − −   (1) 
Interpretation of (1) is the following: agents are making actions xi to make 
some joint action that is successful (increase the objective function of an agent) if the 
amount of action exceeds a certain threshold, which could be taken equal 1. If the action 
was successful, the gain of the agent (the first part of the objective function) depends on 
his action: the greater action the greater gain. On the other hand, action of the agent, by 
itself, decrease its objective function (second part of the objective function), which 
depends on the type ri – the larger its type the less are his costs to make action (for 
example, it can be explained if we consider type as experience or skill of agent).  
Structure of equilibrium of this game is described in [4]. It was shown that a set 
of actions (0, 0, ..., 0) to be always a Nash equilibrium, and while the condition  
 1
2
i
i i
r
r
>−∑   (2) 
is true there is also a non-zero equilibrium. 
Now let us consider external center, which seeks to control the types of agents 
to bring them into the most desirable for him Nash equilibrium and assume that the goal 
of the center is to find the set of network states (sets of types of agents), in which his 
objective function reaches its maximum value. 
Some possible options for the objective functions of the center are discussed in 
details in [2]. In this work we choose the following objective function: 
 .j
j
F x= −∑  (3) 
It describes the situation when any non-zero actions of agents for the center are 
undesirable, and its objective is to minimize their total actions. An example would be the 
reaction of security systems to the actions of intruders. 
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In this model any situation when actions of agents are zero actions is beneficial 
for the center. It means that it is optimal for him to find the way to exclude a non-zero 
Nash equilibrium by making it impossible for agents (the models of influence on the 
types of agents in social networks are described, for example, in [1, 2, 4]). In this case, a 
non-zero Nash equilibrium does not exist for non-compliance with condition (2).  
So, by now we obtained a condition on the types of agents, under which the 
center achieves its goals. Under this condition, the system does not have any nonzero 
Nash equilibrium and, thus, the only equilibrium is zero, in which the objective function 
of the center reaches its maximum value.  
Let’s consider the possibilities to implement the control by changing the initial 
opinion (types) of the agent. Being in a social network, agents communicate to exchange 
views. Agents in the network affect each other, and the degree of influence given by the 
direct trust matrix A of dimension n×n, where aij ≥ 0 means the degree of confidence in 
the i-th agent's j-th agent. 
Here we may speak about influence, and about trust, and assume that these two 
concepts are opposite in the following sense: the expression «degree of confidence i-th 
agent is equal to the j-th aij » identity within the meaning of the expression «degree of 
influence of the j-th agent on the i-th equal to aij». 
Exchange of views leads to exchange of types of agents according to the types 
of agents, which he currently trusts. In the case of agent interaction lasts long enough, 
their types, stabilize (stabilization condition is described in detail in [1]) and is fully 
determined by initial types and the resulting matrix of influence 
lim ( ) .A A τ
τ
∞
→∞
=  
If we define the initial vector of types r0 types vector r becomes (in the absence 
of any effects of the center) as follows: 
0.r A r∞=  
If the center’s information management characterized by the vector u, thus 
reducing their types in the initial time (from (2) it is clear that the center goal would be 
to reduce the types of agents) and the result vector ru = (r1, ..., rn) takes the form : 
 0( ).ur A r u∞= −   (4) 
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Thus, the question of the existence of an information management center, 
providing the absence of non-zero equilibrium, is reduced to the existence of control u, 
allows the simultaneous fulfillment of relations  
 1
2
i
i i
r
r
≤−∑   (5) 
and (4). In general, the analytical verification of the existence of such management is 
equivalent to solving an optimization problem of minimizing the left side (5) (under 
appropriate restrictions on the vector u). 
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The problem of selfish routing in wireless network is considered. The problem 
is presented as a game, where players are mobile connection devices, which choose radio 
stations to connect to the network. Strategies in the game are probabilities, which players 
use to choose stations. Players act selfish. Each device chooses a station trying to 
maximize its ratio “signal/noise” (SNR), which depends on: 1) the distance between the 
device and the station, 2) connections of all devices on the station. In this model signal is 
inversely as the square of his distance to chosen station, and noise is a sum of all signals 
at the station and some constant noise (white noise). Nash equilibrium in this model is an 
object of the research. 
As an example consider the 1-dimensional game with 2 players moving on 
interval [0,1] . Two identical radio stations (“0” and “1”) with white noise levels c  are 
situated at the corresponding ends of the interval. At each time moment first player's 
coordinate is some [0.1]x ∈ , second is some [0,1]y ∈ . Each player in each situation 
( , )x y  must determine which of two stations is better to connect. Players define 
following strategies: p  is a probability that first players chooses the station 0, q  is a 
probability that second players chooses the station 0. For station 1 probabilities are 
correspondingly 1 p−  and 1 q− . Payoff function for each player is an expectation of 
his SNR:  
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Although experimental evidence supports the predictions of standard economic 
theory about the outcomes of social interactions in several competitive situations (Davis 
and Holt, 1993), it usually does not corroborate the theory in cases of cooperative 
situations. In two-player zero sum games, when there is a Nash equilibrium, subjects 
usually play according to that strategy (Lieberman, 1960) and even exploit the non-
optimal responses of their partner in order to maximize their benefits (Kahan and 
Goehring, 2007). Conversely, in mixed-motive game experiments, subjects often 
cooperate more than they should. Despite the wide disparity in the experimental results 
and protocols on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), meta-analysis shows that, on average, 
about 50% of subjects cooperate (Colman, 1995; Ledyard, 1995; Sally, 1995). Similar 
anomalies related to Nash predictions have been documented in studies of the chicken 
game (CG), where cooperation is the dominant outcome observed (Rapoport and 
Chammah, 1965), and in trust or investment games, where trust and reciprocity are often 
more significant than predicted by subgame perfect equilibrium (see e.g. Berg et al., 
1995; Bolle, 1998). 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Kurzban and House (2005) observe that in public 
good experiments, not all subjects play in the same fashion. In their experiments, more 
than 50% and up to 65% of subjects contribute on condition that others do the same, less 
than 30% are pure free riders, and the rest adopt a mix of these two behaviors. This 
illustrates the heterogeneity of behavior rules: individuals have types and are likely to 
adapt their behavior to their immediate environment (see also Boone et al., 1999; 
Brandts and Schra, 2001; Keser and Winden, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). 
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Experiments also show that individuals may change behavior according to the situation 
of their play. For example, Zan and Hildebrandt (2005) found in a school experiment 
that children adopt different behavior rules according to the type of game they are 
playing, with cooperative games involving more reciprocal interactions than competitive 
ones. Players may also adopt different behavior rules according to their life situations 
and to the society in which they live. Henrich et al. (2004, 2010) for example, observe 
that fairness and mutually beneficial transactions are more frequent in integrated 
societies. Their interpretation is that subjects conform less to Nash predictions, as if they 
were being motivated by social norms reflecting moral preferences. This conclusion is 
confirmed by other experimental studies such as Engelmann and Normann (2010). These 
authors have found that levels of contribution in a minimum-effort game vary across 
countries and, more interestingly, between natives, former immigrants, and new 
immigrants within the same country. 
The formal literature often considers moral preferences in games as other-
regarding payoff transformations, a concept first mooted by Edgeworth (1893). The key 
to this approach is the assumption that a player’s utility is a twofold function, related to 
individual welfare and to the welfare of the other. Individuals are found to care about 
how payoffs are allocated, depending on the partner, the game situation, and how the 
allocation is made. To redefine the utility function in this way allows for rationalizing 
behaviors. The Nash behavior rule is safe and players are supposed to choose the actions 
that maximize their individual redefined utility, given that others do the same. However, 
to include moral preferences in the utility function leads us to assume that moral agents 
are concerned only with outcomes rather than with actions, which is a peculiar 
interpretation of moral preferences. As Vanberg (2008: 608) contends, “moral principles, 
standards of fairness, justice,[...] are codes of conduct that require persons to act in fair, 
just, or ethical ways. They tell them not to steal, not to lie, to keep promises, etc. They 
are typically concerned not so much with what a person wants to achieve but with how 
she seeks to achieve what she wants”. In other words, moral preferences are also 
preferences for acting morally, following a moral rule of conduct. 
Our principal motivation in this paper is to examine whether complementary 
behavior rules and equilibrium may be intertwined with the Nash rule, leaving the payoff 
matrix unchanged. In line with Pruit and Kimmel (1977), we confer on individuals the 
capacity to adapt their behavior rules to the situation. In some games, such as zero-sum 
situations where self-oriented maximization is sufficient to drive action, the Nash rule 
65 
 
would tend to be adopted. In others, such as games involving collective action, 
complementary rules embedding moral preferences would potentially drive the action. 
This situational perspective has analogies with the rule-following behavior approach 
proposed by Vanberg (2008), and is more generally inspired by the situational approach 
in social psychology, according to which personality is construed not as a generalized or 
a contextual tendency but as a set of “If ...then” contingencies that spawn behaviour of 
the “If situation X, then behavior Y” type (Mischel and Shoda, 1995, 1999). 
We focus on how to play usual game situations such as PD, CG or trust games 
and posit one possible complementary behavior rule to Nash and its associated 
equilibrium concept. Keeping the utilitarian perspective and building on the 
experimental observation that the majority of subjects are reciprocal in public good 
games, we focus on specific forms of reciprocity that may well illustrate collective 
decision-making. Our behavioral hypothesis is that choice in many interactive situations 
requires that each player make the welfare of the other a key feature of his or her 
reasoning. Individuals would choose to play this way because this is a common rule-
following behavior that improves social welfare in many situations. This is mutual 
support and leads us to posit that in some game situations, individuals care about the 
welfare of others if they believe that others reciprocate. Real life examples are numerous 
and are related to savoir vivre, a set of rules of conduct such as respect for others, 
politeness or courtesy. 
To examine mutual support in social interactions, we exploit an old concept, the 
Berge equilibrium. We think this concept is appropriate for two main reasons. The first 
is that mutual support is a possible interpretation of Berge equilibrium. Playing under 
Berge rules, agents choose the strategy that maximizes the welfare of others. The second 
is that, theoretically, the Berge behavior rule and Berge equilibrium are good 
complements for Nash: Berge equilibrium is defined in a non-cooperative game 
theoretical setting but is not a refinement of Nash; it explains some cooperative 
situations while Nash explains many competitive ones; and it has some common 
theoretical properties with Nash, making it particularly appropriate and easy to handle in 
a type-based perspective. 
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In this work we deal with hierarchical games with one (and in general N) 
players acting as leader(s) in a two level leader-follower model where the rest of players 
play a noncooperative game and react to the optimal decision taken by the leader(s). 
When we deal with more that one leader, we assume that the leaders also play a 
noncooperative game between themselves. 
The leader(s) takes into account the followers' best reply and solve an 
optimization problem (a Nash equilibrium problem). In this model the uniqueness of the 
Nash equilibrium of the follower players has been supposed. 
We present a computational methodology to reach a Stackelberg - Nash 
solution for the hierarchical game via genetic algorithm (GA). 
The idea of the Stackelberg-Nash GA is to bring together genetic algorithms 
and the leader-follower strategy in order to process a genetic algorithm to build the 
solution. The follower players make their decisions simultaneously at each step of the 
evolutionary process, solving a Nash equilibrium problem. 
This methodology is moreover extended to a hierarchical L-level (or multi 
level) game in which more than a leader hierarchy (and so strategy strenght indeed) 
could be modelled, a very common situation in field such as engineering, economics and 
social problems. 
Applications in simple mathematical functions would emphasize the algorithm 
capability of explore and describe variuos phenomena with a good agreement between 
results precision and computation time. 
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At the Cold War epoch the game theory used to be a corner stone of the global 
deterrence policy. Nowadays the shift towards multipolarity in international relations 
makes this method of research of IR actual again. In the article the evolution of 
applications of games theory in IR including modern period is given as well as principal 
causes on why the game theory hasn't received a wide circulation in Russian and Soviet 
international studies. A list of classical games which are used to analyse modification of 
international regimes is provided. Finally, application of game-theoretic approach to 
international regimes is illustrated in detail by global ecological issues case. 
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We investigate a model of one-stage bidding between two stockmarket agents 
where one unit of risky asset (share) is traded. Before bidding starts a chance move 
determines the "state of nature" and therefore the liquidation value of a share. This value 
is equal to the integer positive m  (the state H ) with probability p  and 0 (the state L ) 
with probability 1 p− . Player 1 (insider) is informed about the "state of nature" , Player 
2 is not. Both players know probabilities of a chance move. Player 2 knows that Player 1 
is an insider. 
Both players propose simultaneously their bids, t.e. they post their prices for a 
share. Any integer bids are admissible, but the reasonable bids are 0,1, , 1m −… . The 
player who posts the larger price buys one share from his opponent for this price. If the 
bids are equal, no transaction occurs. The described model of one-stage bidding is 
reduced to zero-sum game 1 ( )
mG p  with lack of information on the side of Player 2. It is 
the one-stage case of n -stage bidding game ( )mnG p  with incomplete information 
investigated in Domansky (2007). For the first time this model with arbitrary admissible 
bids was introduced in De Meyer, Saley (2002). 
The bidding game ( )mG p∞  of unlimited duration was solved in Domansky 
(2007). But the solution of n -stage games ( )mnG p  is an open problem. It is obtained for 
the case of three admissible bids only ( = 3m ), see Kreps (2009). We give the complete 
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solution for the one-stage bidding games 1 ( )
mG p  with arbitrary integer m  and with any 
probability (0,1)p ∈  of the high share price. 
It follows from the theory of games with incomplete information that the value 
1 ( )
mV p  of the game 1 ( )
mG p  is a continuous concave piecewise linear function over 
[0,1]  with a finite numbers of domains of linearity. The optimal strategy of the 
uninformed Player 2 is constant over any linearity domain. 
Proposition 1. The set of peak points of value function 1 ( )
mV p  over the interval 
(0,1)  is the unification m m m mP Q S T∪ ∪ ∪ , where 
a) 1 1= { , , }
m
mP p p −… , 1 10 < < < mp p −… :  
1 2 2
1 2
1 = , 1 = , 1 = (1 ) .
1 1k k
m m m k
p p p p
m m m k−
− − −− − − −− − +  
b) 0 2= { , , }
m
mQ q q −… , 0 2 11 > > > =m mq q p− −… :  
1
0 1
11 1
1 = , 1 = , 1 = .
1
k
k
p
q q q
m m m k
−−− − −− −  
c) 2 2= { , , }
m
mS s s −… , where 2 2 3 2 2 1< < , , < < .m m mp s p p s p− − −…  
d) 1 3= { , , }
m
mT t t −…  ,where 1 1 2 3 3 2 1> > , , > > = .m m m mq t q q t q p− − − −…  
For any peak points p  the inequality  
1 ( ) (1 )(1)
mV p m p p≤ ⋅ −  
holds and for any m mp P Q∈ ∪  it turns to be the equality. 
Remark 1. As the value of one-stage bidding game with arbitrary bids is equal 
to (1 )m p p⋅ − , see De Meyer, Saley (2002), the inequality (1) implies that this value 
exceeds the value of one-stage bidding game with discrete bids. For points 
m mp P Q∈ ∪  the value 1 ( )mV p  coincides with the value of one-stage bidding game 
with arbitrary bids. 
Corollary 1. As the set m mP Q∪  is everywhere dense over [0,1] , then  
1 ( ) / = (1 ).lim
m
m
V p m p p
→∞
−  
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Here we restrict ourselves to a description of solutions of game 1 ( )
mG p  for 
1 2(0, = )m mp p q− −∈ , the left part of the interval (0.1) . The solution for the right part 
2( ,1)mq −  is analogues and (non strictly speaking) mirror-like with respect to the point 
1 2= =m mp p q− − . 
Obviously, if the share price is zero (the state L ) that Player 1 (insider) posts 
the zero bid for any probability p . Thus, the problem is to describe the optimal strategy 
of Player 1 for the high share price (the state H ) and the optimal strategy of the 
uninformed Player 2. 
The following Proposition 2 describes the supports of optimal strategies over 
the intervals of linearity of value function 1 ( )
mV p . For Player 1 it is the case of state H . 
Proposition 2. For 10 < < = 1 /p p m  Player 2 uses the bid 0 . Player 1 
uses the bid 1 . 
For 1 2< < = 1 / ( 1)p p p m −  Player 2 uses the bids 0  and 1 . Player 2 
uses the bids 0 , 1  and 2  for 2= = 1 / ( 1)p p m − . 
For 2 2< <p p s  Player 2 uses the bids 0  and 2 . 
For the double interval 1 2< <p p s  Player 1 uses the bids 1  and 2 . 
For 1< <k ks p p + , = 2, , 2k m −…  Player 2 uses the bids 
0,2, 3, ,( 1)k +… , if the number k  is even and Player 2 uses the bids 0,1, 3, ,( 1)k +…  
if k  is odd. Player 2 uses the bids 0,1,2, 3, ,( 1)k +…  for = lp p . 
For < <k kp p s , = 3, , 2k m −…  Player 2 uses the bids 0,1, 3, ,k…  if the 
number k  is odd and Player 2 uses the bids 0,2, 3, ,k…  if k  is even. 
For the double interval ,1 ,2k k∪  Player 1 uses the bids 0,1,2,, ,k… . 
For any = 3, , 2k m −…  there are two linearity intervals over 1(0, )mp −  
where the maximal bids of the Player 2 optimal strategy is k . One interval has the form 
1( , )l ls p +  and we denote it ,1k . The other interval has the form 1 1( , )l lp s+ +  and we 
denote it ,2k . We write 2,1  and 2,2  for the intervals 1 2( , )p p  and 2 2( , )p s . 
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Consider the best reply of Player 1 to the optimal strategy of Player 2 for 
,p k i∈ , = 1,2i . Let ,Hk iv  ( ,Lk iv ) be the corresponding payoff of Player 1 for the state H 
(for the state L). 
The following Theorem provides the recurrent description of value function 
1 ( )
mV p  for any linearity domain. 
Theorem. For the interval ,k i , = 3, , 2k m −… , = 1,2i   
1 , ,( ) = (1 ) ,
m L H
k i k iV p v p v p− +  
where payoffs ,
H
k iv  and ,
L
k iv  are given by the recurrent formulas  
2
, , 1, 1
1, 1 1, 1
( )
= , = ( ) ,H L Lk i k i k iH H
k i k i
m k m k
v v v k k
v v
− +
− + − +
⎛ ⎞⎟− −⎜ ⎟⎜− +⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 
with the initial payoffs 2,1 = 1 / ( 1)
Lv m − , 2,1 = 2Hv m − , 2,2 = 2 / ( 1)Lv m − ,  
2
2,2 = ( 2) / ( 1)
Hv m m− − . 
The study was partially supported by the grant 10-06-00368-a of Russian 
Foundation for Basic Research.  
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1. We investigate the model of multistage bidding where n  types of risky 
assets (shares) are traded. Two agents take part in the bidding having different 
information on liquidation prices of the traded assets. These prices are random values. 
They are determined by the initial chance move for the whole period of bidding 
according to a known to both players probability distribution p  over Rn . Player 1 
knows prices of shares. Player 2 does not have this information but he knows that Player 
1 is an insider. 
At each step of bidding both players make simultaneously their bids, i.e. they 
post their prices for each type of shares. The player who posts the larger price for a share 
of given type buys one share of this type from his opponent for this price. Any integer 
bids are admissible. Players aim to maximize the values of their final portfolios, i.e. 
money plus obtained shares evaluated by their liquidation prices. For the first time the 
model with arbitrary bids is introduced by De Meyer and Moussa Saley (2002). 
The described model of multistage bidding is reduced to the zero-sum repeated 
game with lack of information on one side. Here we give solutions to such games of 
infinite duration ( )G p∞  with arbitrary distributions p  with finite variances. To describe 
the optimal strategy of Player 1 we construct the symmetric representation of n -
dimensional probability distributions ( )p y∈ Θ  with a fixed expectation vector y  as 
convex combinations of extreme points of the set ( )yΘ , i.e. distributions with not more 
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than ( 1)n + -point supports. This is sufficient to give such representation for the set 
(0)Θ . 
This representation is a straight generalization of the analogous representation 
for distributions over two-dimensional integer lattice obtained in Domansky and Kreps 
(2010). 
We construct optimal strategies of Player 1 for bidding games with arbitrary 
distributions ( )p x∈ Θ  as convex combinations of his optimal strategies for games with 
distributions having not more than ( 1)n + -point supports, i.e. the elements of the 
symmetric representation of the initial distribution. 
For each type of assets optimal strategies of Player 2 reproduce his optimal 
strategies for games with one asset, see Domansky and Kreps (2009). 
2. Let 0Δ  be the set of ( 1)n + -point sets 1 1( , , )nx x +… , 0ix ≠ , such that 
the point 0  belongs to the simplex 1 1( , , )nx x +Δ … . Let 0IntΔ  be the set of ( 1)n + -
point sets from 0Δ  such that the point 0  belongs to the interior of the simplex, and let 
0k∂ Δ , = 1, ,k n…  be the set of ( 1)n + -point sets from 0Δ  such that the point 0  
belongs to the ( )n k− -face of the simplex. 
For Rnx ∈ , 0x ≠ , let 0( )xΔ , 0Int ( )xΔ  and 0( )k x∂ Δ  be the sets of n -
point sets 1( , , )nx x…  such that the set 1( , , , )nx x x…  belongs 0Δ , 0IntΔ  and 0k∂ Δ  
correspondingly. 
For a distribution (0)p ∈ Θ  and a point Rnx ∈ , 0x ≠  set  
1 1
0Int
( , ) = det[ , , ] ( ) ( )
( )
n np x x x p dx p dx
xΔΦ ∫ … …  
1
1 1
0
=1
1
det[ , , ] ( ) ( ).(1)
( )1
n
n n
k
k
x x p dx p dx
xk
−
∂+ Δ+∑ ∫ … …  
Theorem 1. For any distribution (0)p ∈ Θ  the amount ( , )p xΦ  does not 
depend on x , i.e. this is an invariant ( )pΦ  of the distribution (0, 0)p ∈ Θ . 
This fact is the base for constructing the symmetric representation of probability 
distributions over Rn  with fixed expectations as convex combinations of distributions 
with not more than ( 1)n + -point supports and with the same expectations. 
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Theorem 2. Any distribution (0)p ∈ Θ  has the following representation as a 
convex combination of distributions with not more than ( 1)n + -point supports:  
1
1
0 1 1=1
0 1 1Int (
det[ , , ]
0= (0) ( ) ( )
, , )( )
n
i i n
ni
nx
x x
p p p p dx p dx
xp
δ
+
+ +
+
+Δ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅Φ
∑
∫
…
……
1
1
1
1 1=1
0 1 1(
=1
det[ , , ]
1 0 ( ) ( ),
, , )1 ( )
n
i i n
n
ni
k nx
k
x x
p p dx p dx
xk p
+
+ +
−
+
+∂+ ⋅ ⋅Δ+ Φ
∑
∑ ∫
…
……  
where (0)p  is the atom of distribution p  at 0 , and ( )pΦ  is given by (1). All 
arithmetical operations with subscripts are fulfilled modulo 1n + .  
3. Now we construct optimal strategies for Player 1 making use of the 
developed above decomposition for the initial distribution p . 
a) If the state chosen by chance move is 0 , then Player 1 stops the game. 
b) Let the state chosen by chance move be 0x ≠ . Player 1 chooses a number 
of points by means of lottery with probabilities  
Int ( , ) ( , )
( ) = ; ( ) = .
( ) ( )
kp x p x
P n P n k
p p
Φ ∂ Φ−Φ Φ  
c) If a number of points n  is chosen, then Player 1 chooses a set of n  points 
1 0( , , ) Int ( )nx x x∈ Δ…  by means of lottery with probabilities  
1
1 1
1(
det[ , , ]
( ) ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( ).
, , ) ( )
n
n n
nx
x x
p p dx p dx p dx p dx
x p
α ⋅ ⋅Φ
…… ……  
and further plays his optimal strategy *( | )xσ ⋅  for the state x  in the ( 1)n + -point 
game 
1
0( )
, , ,nx
G p
x x… . 
d) If a number of points n k−  is chosen, then Player 1 chooses a hyperplane 
n kh −  containing the point x  by means of lottery with probabilities  
1 1
0 det[ , , ] ( ) ( )( , )
.
( , )
n n
k n k
k
x x p dx p dx
x h
p x
−∂ Δ
∂ Φ
∫ … …
 
e) If a hyperplane n kh −  is chosen, then Player 1 chooses a set of n k−  points 
1( , , )n k n kx x h− −∈…  by means of lottery with probabilities  
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1 1
1 1
0Int
det[ , , ] ( ) ( )
,
det[ , , ] ( ) ( )
( , )
n k n k
n k n k
n k
x x p dx p dx
x x p dx p dx
x h
− −
− −
−Δ∫
… …
… …
 
and further plays his optimal strategy *( | )xσ ⋅  for the state x  in the ( 1)n k− + -point 
game 
1
0( )
, , ,n kx
G p
x x−… . 
As the optimal strategies *σ  ensure Player 1 the gains equal to one half of the 
sum of component variances in the ( 1)n k− + -point games and as the sum of 
component variances is a linear function over 2(0) MΘ ∩ , where 2M  is the class of 
distributions with finite second moments, we obtain the following result: 
Theorem 3. For any distribution 2(0)p M∈ Θ ∩  the compound strategy 
depicted above ensures Player 1 the gain 
=1
1
[ ]
2
n
p ii
D x∑  in the game ( )G p∞ .  
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In this paper we give a technology to solve the problem of scheduling several 
jobs on a single machine with late/early penalties and a common due date. This requires 
at least two algorithms belonging to discrete optimization and game theory, respectively; 
a third algorithm for solving a sequence of linear optimization problems would solve 
better the problem. It is well known that the problem of scheduling n jobs on a single 
machine with a common due date can be solved in the most simple case by the algorithm 
due to J.J.Kanet (1981). Given such a problem by a list of completion times with the sum 
smaller than, or equal to the due date, the total deviation from the due date will be 
minimized for every coalition of customers, generating a cooperative TU game. Now, 
the total worth of the penalties, given by the worth of the grand coalition, should be 
divided "fairly" to the customers, providing the individual penalties. An efficient value, 
like the Shapley value would give the individual penalties; however, if the number of 
jobs is large, the Shapley value should be computed by an algorithm due to the author, 
based upon a so called Average per capita formula, which allows a parallel computation, 
(Dragan,1992). If we still consider that the results provided are unfair, we can use an 
algorithm providing the nucleolus of the game, which is asking for solving a sequence of 
no more than n linear optimization problems. We give a four customers example how the 
three stages of the technology, and the corresponding algorithms will work. The 
algorithm for computing the nucleolus may be the Kopelowitz algorithm (1967), or the 
algorithm due to the author (1981). If the scheduling problem is more complex, then 
other algorithm may be needed to generate the scheduling game. 
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This paper broadens the game theoretic approach to the data sharing situation 
initiated by Dehez and Tellone (2010). The origin of their mathematical study is the data 
and cost sharing problem faced by the European chemical industry. Following the 
regulation imposed by the European Commission under the acronym “REACH” 
(Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and restriction of CHemical substances), 
manufacturers and importers are required to collect safety information on the properties 
of their chemical substances. There are about 30,000 substances and an average of 100 
parameters for each substance. Chemical firms are required to register the information in 
a central database run by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). By 2018, this 
regulation program REACH requires submission of a detailed analysis of the chemical 
substances produced or imported. Chemical firms are encouraged to cooperate by 
sharing the data they have collected over the past. To implement this data sharing 
problem, a compensation mechanism is needed.  
This data sharing problem can be specified as follows. A finite group of firms 
agrees to undertake a joint venture that requires the combination of various 
complementary inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non-rival but excludable 
goods, i.e., public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents 
or copyrights (the consumption of which by individuals can be controlled, measured, and 
subjected to payment or other contractual limitations). In what follows we use the 
common term data to cover generically these goods. Each firm owns a subset of data. No 
a priori restrictions are imposed on the individual data sets. In addition, with each type of 
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data there is associated its replacement cost, e.g., the present cost of duplicating the data 
(or the cost of developing alternative technologies). Because these public goods are 
already available, their costs are sunk. In summary, the data sharing situation involves a 
finite group of agents, data sets owned by individual agents, as well as a discrete list of 
costs of data.  
In the setting of cooperative attitudes by chemical firms, the main question 
arises how to compensate the firms for the data they contribute to share. The design of a 
compensation mechanism, however, is fully equivalent to the selection among existing 
solution concepts in the mathematical field called cooperative game theory. In fact, the 
solution part of cooperative game theory aims at solving any allocation problem by 
proposing rules based on certain fairness properties. For that purpose, the data and cost 
sharing situation needs to be interpreted as a mathematical model called a cooperative 
game by specifying its fundamental characteristic cost function. We adopt Dehez and 
Tellone’s game theoretic model in which the cost associated to any non-empty group of 
agents is simply the sum of costs of the missing data, i.e., the total cost of data it does 
not own. In this framework, no cost are charged to the whole group of agents. The so-
called data cost games are therefore compensation games to which standard cost 
allocation rules can be applied, such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, the core and so 
on. The determination of these game theoretic solution concepts may be strongly 
simplified whenever the underlying characteristic cost function satisfies, by chance, one 
or another appealing property. The main purpose of this paper is to reveal the so-called 
1-concavity property for the class of data cost games. The impact of the 1-concavity 
property is fundamental for the uniform determination of particular solution concepts 
like the core and the nucleolus. 
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Carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns are some of the main reasons 
why a global environmental agreement is lacking to fight climate change. Many studies 
discussed the adoption of a border tax adjustment (BTA) to allow countries that would 
like to implement a carbon tax to level the playing field with imports. The big issue with 
these CGE type papers is that the other country is not allowed to react by adopting itself 
a carbon tax to avoid being punished with the BTA. The model proposed in this paper 
looks at the optimization of two different governments and their respective firms. A 
BTA parameter is modelled which takes a value between 0 and 1 and represents the 
possible value of the BTA depending on both countries environmental policy allowing 
countries to have different policies. Optimal tax rates and quantities are derived for many 
potential scenarios. For given parameter values and a BTA parameter above 0.25 we 
have found it optimal for both countries to tax where the two taxes reach equality at 
0.72. In addition, a BTA parameter of 0.5 yields the highest total welfare. This finding 
could give significant insight on the role the WTO with respect to BTA. 
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We study a economy in which a fixed finite set  of economic agents exchange 
commodity bundles or contingent claims, in order to maximize their own utilities. 
Important instances which are relevant to management of energy and resources comprise 
exchange of natural resources or user-rights to such, transfers of fish quotas, production 
allowances, pollution permits, or rights to water use. The exchange of contingent claims, 
in which case, what comes into focus is mutual insurance or security exchange, is also an 
important economy of that type. 
In that setting, it is well known that when transferals are costless and 
multilateral trades can be arranged at no expense, and when some technical conditions 
are fulfilled, voluntary trade will lead inevitably to Pareto optimality. However, when 
transferals are costly and multilateral trades difficult or impossible, optimality is 
problematical. In that case, this paper asks: Can equilibrium - whence Pareto efficiency - 
obtain merely via repeated, bilateral exchange?1 And, most importantly: may traders 
dispense with optimization? Moreover, while exchange still remains in swing, can 
parties proceed without announcement of prices? That is, might market equilibrium - 
and the attending prices - emerge as final outcomes, identifiable only after all desirable 
transactions are completed? 
We propose a repeated bilateral barters process between owners of commodity 
bundles or contingent claims, where the focus is on feasible, free, but constrained 
exchanges, driven by differences in margins. Presuming transferable utility, we provide 
sufficient conditions for convergence to market equilibrium. It facilitates transactions 
                                                 
1 Several studies consider links between pairwise, t-wise, and overall Pareto optimality; see e.g. 
Feldman (1973), Madden (1975), Goldman and Starr (1982), Fisher (1989). 
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that some parties make strictly feasible choices - and have continuously differentiable 
objectives. In quite common, most convenient cases each constraint set is polyhedral. 
In addressing these issues the paper relates to production games and price-
supported core solutions (Flå m (to appear), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)). Unlike 
most studies, it plays down the importance of agents' experience, their information, 
rationality and skills. Rather, since real parties often are short on some of such desirable 
requisites - and because the goods exchanged are diverse and divisible - what we 
propose is an agent-based, dynamic (but fictitious) experiment, driven by myopic traders 
(Smith (1982), Tesfatsion and Judd (2006)). Presumably, trade proceeds until no two 
agents can improve their joint lot. When stable, the resulting process provides some 
micro-foundation for market equilibrium. 
Numerous studies have offered strategic underpinning of such equilibrium. 
Many deal, however, with anonymous trading posts, or merely with two-sided markets - 
or with indivisible goods, to be transferred from sellers to buyers. One line of inquiry let 
agents meet pairwise, maybe randomly, to bargain. Other approaches evoke auctions 
(Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky (1990)). 
In contrast, the market we consider isn't composed of pure buyers and sellers; 
diverse parties may demand some goods but offer others. Goods are divisible and 
numerous. Encounters could occur periodically, even in fixed order. Bargaining isn't 
precluded, but never made explicit. Similarly, although permitted, no auction, market 
maker, or price mechanism need ever come into play. Also, at no intermediate stage 
must choice be efficient, optimal or stable somehow.1 And finally, agents can come with 
general feasible sets and non-smooth objectives. 
                                                 
1 For these and related issues, see Madden (1975), Shapley and Shubik (1977), Saari (1985), 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Ghosal and Morelli (2004), Gintis 
(2006). 
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In the literature several approaches have been proposed to ensure the 
sustainability over time of an agreement reached at the starting date of a differential 
game. One of the approaches appropriate for two-player differential games is to support 
the cooperative solution by incentive strategies, [2], [3]. Incentive strategies are 
functions of the possible deviation of the other player and recommend to each player to 
implement his part of the agreement whenever the other player is doing so. The 
equilibrium incentive approach allows embodying the cooperative solution with an 
equilibrium property. Therefore, by definition each player will find individually rational 
to stick to his part in the coordinated solution. One important property that should be 
checked is the credibility of these incentive strategies, [3], [4]. These strategies are 
credible if each player will implement his incentive strategy and not the coordinated 
solution if he observes that the other one has deviated from the agreement. Recently 
some papers, [5], [6], have provided conditions to check for the credibility of incentive 
strategies for the class of linear-state and linear-quadratic differential games. To preserve 
the special structures of the games the analyses have been restricted to linear incentive 
strategies that are not always credible. 
The focus of this paper is the characterization of non-linear incentive 
equilibrium strategies for two-player differential games. The aim of the study is to check 
if the definition of less restricted incentive strategies in terms of the permitted deviation 
from the coordinated solution facilitates the credibility and implementation of these 
strategies. To this end, we consider a class of incentive strategies that are defined as non-
linear functions of the control variables of both players and the current value of the state 
variable. We show that it is possible to chose the incentive strategy functions in such a 
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manner that, in the long run, the optimal state path is arbitrary close to the corresponding 
cooperative state trajectory. 
The non-linearity of the incentive strategies does not usually allow the 
analytical characterization of the feasible set which ensures their credibility. We resort to 
numerical algorithms to carry out this analysis. We illustrate the use of these strategies 
on a well-known example drawn from environmental economics, [1]. 
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We analyze price-fee (or non-linear pricing) competition on a market for a 
homogenous good. The good is produced against constant marginal costs and supplied 
through an endogenous infrastructure, where bilateral links are costly to build. For a 
given infrastructure, we define stable market outcomes that take into account the 
endogenous expansion of the existing infrastructure. In every such outcome, each buyer 
exclusively trades with one supplier, the one with whom he can reach maximal bilateral 
welfare. The price equals marginal costs and the nonnegative fees are bounded from 
above by the buyer threat to switch suppliers, taking into account building costs for 
nonexisting links. The maximal stable fees also arise as equilibrium outcomes of a 
negotiation model that naturally extends oligopolistic price competition. Then, 
competition in prices and fees is Pareto efficient, because the suppliers capture the 
deadweight loss from traditional price competition. Depending upon the parameter 
values, the consumer is either worse of or equally well off compared to traditional price 
competition. 
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A model differential game [1] with two pursuers and one evader is studied. 
Three inertial objects moves in the straight line. The dynamics descriptions for pursuers 
1P  and 2P  are 
 
1 1 2 2
1 21 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
0 01 2
= , = ,
= ( ) / , = ( ) / ,
| | , | | ,
( ) = 0, ( ) = 0.
P P P P
P P P P P P
P P
z a z a
a u a l a u a l
u u
a t a t
μ μ
− −
≤ ≤
 
 
 (1) 
 Here, 
1P
z  and 
2P
z  are the geometric coordinates of the pursuers, 
1P
a  and 
2P
a  
are their accelerations generated by the controls 1u  and 2u . The time constants 1P
l  and 
2P
l  define how fast the controls affect the systems. 
The dynamics of the evader E  is similar:  
 
0
= , = ( ) / ,
| | , ( ) = 0.
E E E E E
E
z a a v a l
v a tν
−
≤
 
 (2) 
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Let us fix some instants 1T  and 2T . At the instant 1T , the miss of the first 
pursuer with the respect to the evader is computed, and at the instant 2T , the miss of the 
second one is computed:  
 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
( ) =| ( ) ( ) |, ( ) =| ( ) ( ) | ., , , ,E EP P P Pr T z T z T r T z T z TE E E E− −  (3) 
Assume that the pursuers act in coordination. This means that we can join them 
into one player P  (which will be called the first player). This player governs the vector 
control 1 2= ( , )u u u . The evader is counted as the second player. The result miss is the 
following value:  
 1 2
1 2
= min{ ( ), ( )}., ,P Pr T r TE Eϕ  (4) 
At any instant t , all players know exact values of all state coordinates 
1P
z , 
1P
z , 
1P
a , 
2P
z , 
2P
z , 
2P
a , Ez , Ez , Ea . The first player choosing its feedback control 
minimizes the miss ϕ , the second one maximizes it. 
Relations (1)—(4) define a standard antagonistic differential game. One needs 
to construct the value function of this game and optimal strategies of the players. 
Now, let us describe a practical problem, whose reasonable simplification gives 
model game (1)—(4). Suppose that two pursuing objects attacks the evading one on 
collision courses. They can be rockets or aircrafts in the horizontal plane. A nominal 
motion of the first pursuer is chosen such that at the instan 1 2T T≠ t 1T  the exact capture 
occurs. In the same way, a nominal motion of the second pursuer is chosen (the capture 
is at the instant 2T ). But indeed, the real positions of the objects differ from the nominal 
ones. Moreover, the evader using its control can change its trajectory in comparison with 
the nominal one (but not principally, without sharp turns). Correcting coordinated efforts 
of the pursuers are computed during the process by the feedback method to minimize the 
result miss, which is the minimum of absolute values of deviations at the instants 1T  and 
2T  from the first and second pursuers, respectively, to the evader. The passage from the 
original non-linear dynamics to a dynamics, which is linearized with the respect to the 
nominal motions, gives [2] the problem under considerations. 
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In the paper [3], a case of ``stronger'' pursuers is considered and analytically 
methods are applied to the problem of solvability set construction in the game with zero 
result miss. For 1 2=T T , an exact solution is obtained; if , then some upper 
approximation for the set is given. In general case, the exact analytical solution cannot 
be got, in the authors opinion. 
A previous paper [4] of the authors is dedicated to a numerical investigation of 
the problem in two marginal cases (of ``strong'' pursuers and ``weak'' pursuers). This 
work deals with cases of other ratio of players' capabilities. 
The numerical study is based on algorithms and programs for solving linear 
differential games worked out in the Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics (Ural 
Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, Ekaterinburg, Russia). The central procedure is 
the backward constructing level sets (Lebesgue sets) of the value function. Optimal 
strategies of the players are constructed by some processing of the level sets. 
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In mixed-flow network formation model (possible applications include urban 
transportation network), a player can choose to create one-way links, two-way links or 
not to create any link. As far as we know, this mixed-flow model was proposed by 
Gao[1] for the first time. On the basis of one-way and two-way flow network model [2-
8], the existence of Nash networks in mixed-flow model can generally be guaranteed, 
but the number of Nash networks in mixed-flow network far exceeds the former two 
models’. For example, the number of Nash networks in these three types of network with 
4 nodes is 58, 128 and 810. 
We study the existence of Nash network and compile corresponding programs. 
If we take the four types of the simplest equilibrium network structure (two-way link, 
one-way link with bilateral cost, minimal cycle and multiple nodes) as the basic elements 
of the mixed-flow equilibrium network, any mixed-flow equilibrium network with finite 
nodes would be composed of these four elements. At the same time, the role of cycle is 
equivalent to two-way links’. 
In this paper, we give a specific example with regard to the nonexistence of 
Nash network in mixed-flow network with 5 nodes under the conditions of B&G 
function [2] to prove that Nash network in mixed-flow network with homogeneous 
profits and heterogeneous link costs doesn’t always exist. Moreover, we give a specific 
example on the nonexistence of Nash network in mixed-flow network with negative 
profits. 
This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China 
(70871064, 70971070, 71003057), the International (Regional) Joint Research Program 
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Bandwidth resource management is an important issue in wireless networks, 
such as WiMAX, UMTC, etc. The quality of service (QoS) reached by a user, which 
transmits a signal, depends very strongly on the value of spectrum band provided by a 
spectrum holder. From economic point of view, holders and users form a spectrum 
market, within which spectrum bands are considered as a resource flowing from owners 
to consumers regulated by market mechanisms. Users are able to rent the spectrum band 
purchased from the holders. Thus, for holders it is important to find the optimal price to 
sell the bandwidth spectrum, whereas users try to find balance between using the 
bandwidth resource for its own needs and renting unused bandwidth capacity for profit 
gain. 
In this paper, we introduce the following hierarchical Stackelberg game with 
three players: a spectrum holder (provider), a primary and a secondary user. The 
Provider assigns the price for bandwidth resource to maximize its own profit. The 
primary user buys a license for using frequency bandwidth from a provider to transmit 
signals. The primary user can also earn some extra money giving unused frequencies 
capacity for rent to the secondary user charging him by assigned tariff for interference so 
that the quality of the primary user transmission was not worse than a threshold value. 
The secondary user can either buy the frequency bandwidth or he can choose the service 
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of the other provider based on comparing of the suggested QoS and prices which is set 
for the network access. 
The provider's payoff provπ  is the profit obtained by selling the bandwidth 
resource to the primary user:  
( ) ,prov W WC C Wπ =  
 where W  is the spectrum bands bought by the primary user and WC  is its price 
assigned by the provider. 
The primary user allows the secondary user to use the spectrum band so that his 
throughput would be not worse than a threshold value Pπ , i.e. the presence of the 
secondary user does not have to spoil the transmission's quality for the primary user. The 
payoff of the primary user Pπ  is his throughput plus profit he gets by giving access to 
the network for the secondary user minus how much it costs to buy the bandwidth 
resource. We assume that the primary user charges the secondary user proportional to 
interference power:  
2
( , ) log 1 ,PP PP S W S PS S
PS S
h P
W C W C W C g P
W g P
π σ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= + − +⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 
 where PPh  and PSg  are the fading channel gains, 
2σ  is the background noise, PP  is 
the total power employed by the primary user, SP  is the power employed by the 
secondary user and SC  is the tariff for access to the network to the secondary user. Let 
us assume that [0, ]S SP P∈ , where SP  is the total power employed by the secondary 
user. 
The secondary user payoff is his throughput minus expenses, i.e.  
2
( ) log 1 ,SS SS S S PS S
SP P
h P
P W C g P
W g P
π σ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= + −⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 
 where SSh  and SPg  are the fading channel gains. This QoS has to be at least Sπ  which 
is a QoS the secondary user can gains from the other provider. 
For this three level Stackelberg game the optimal strategies of the players are 
found in closed form. Numerical modelling demonstrates how the equilibrium strategies 
and corresponding payoffs depend of network parameters is performed.  
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In this paper stochastic ,  y R -models of material stocks operating control are 
treated. We consider two types of oligopoly of N  firms (distributors): quantitative and 
price competition. We assume that each firm has a warehouse. Demand for goods which 
are in stock is stochastic. Distributors are considered as players in two level non-
cooperative game. At the high level optimal solutions of distributors about quantities of 
supply or selling prices are based on rational solution at low level and form Nash 
equilibrium. We describe the quantitative competition in the context of model of 
Cournot and price competition in context of modified model of Bertrand. Thus at the low 
level each player i  chooses internal strategy ( ),  i iy R  as an optimal reaction to 
competitive player’s strategies which are called external, 1,...,i N= . Here iy  is order 
quantity, iR  is maximal (threshold) inventory level of distributor. Optimal strategy 
( ),  i iy R∗ ∗  player i  appears to be a value on border of the set of internal strategies or it is 
the solution of a system of transcendental equations. The iterative method is developed 
to solve this system. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium in 
pure strategies are formulated.  
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In this paper three game-theoretical models of quality level choice under 
competition are analyzed. We consider the case when firms are assumed to produce 
homogeneous products (or services) differentiated by quality on some industrial market. 
The models are an extension of the basic game-theoretical model of quality choice under 
competition described in [10].  
The game-theoretical models are presented as dynamic games which consist of 
the following stages: 
At first, each firm i  chooses its product (or service) quality levels is ; 
At the second stage firms compete in price ip . Assume that both consumers and 
companies know the quality level is .  
Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. Consumers differ in their 
willingness to pay for quality level s , which is described by the parameter 0,bθ ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . This 
parameter is called “taste for quality”. The utility of a consumer with a willingness to pay 
for quality θ  when buying a product (or service) of quality s  at a price p is equal to:  
,
( )
0,
s p p s
U p
p sθ
θ θ
θ
⎧ − ≤⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ >⎪⎩
. 
In this paper we suggest three models which is differ in the distribution of 
consumers’ willingness to pay for quality θ : the situations with uniform, symmetric 
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triangular and exponential distribution are analyzed. The investigated industrial market 
is considered to be partially covered. 
The payoff function of the firm i  which produces the product (provides a 
service) of quality is , where [ , ]is s s∈ , is the following: 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( , ) ( , , , )i i iR p p s s p s s D p p s s= , 1,2i = , 
where 1 2( , )ip s s is the price of the product (or service) of the firm i , 1 2 1 2( , , , )iD p p s s  − 
the demand function for the product (or service) of quality is , which is specified. 
The problem of equilibrium estimation is solved using backward induction. The 
strong Nash equilibrium in the investigated game was obtained in the explicit form 
which allowed us to evaluate prices, market shares of companies and revenues in the 
equilibrium. 
The theoretical models are described for the situation when there are two 
players on the market and this model is extended for the oligopoly. 
Three suggested models cover various possible market conditions: 
There is same number of consumers who are ready to pay differently for higher 
quality level (uniform distribution).  
The majority of consumers will choose average quality level and a minority are 
willing to pay for the critical quality levels (symmetric triangular distribution). 
The majority of consumers have the willingness to buy products (or services) 
with the critical level of quality (exponential distribution). In this paper the situation 
when consumers are eager to buy the lowest level of quality is considered, but it may be 
extended to the situation when consumers are willing to pay for the highest level of 
quality. 
As well as theoretical investigation the paper includes empirical part.  
For the empirical study the mobile industry is analyzed and the comparative 
analysis of the two markets is done. Here the Russian and Portuguese markets are chosen 
with 5 and 3 mobile operators correspondingly.  
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Individual social capital refers to the network of relations that an actor posses 
conferring him the ability that, for our proposal, we will consider of social or economic 
kind, of obtaining advantages and benefits. The approach we present here suppose a set 
of actors whose interests are modelled by a cooperative game. A priori, in such a 
situation, each player has the possibility of directly communicate with all the others. 
However, as time goes by, typically, there is a tendency to stick the existing linkages so 
that, at a fixed instant, the remaining links among players will be given by a graph. The 
social or economic possibilities of different actors change, then, from the original 
situation to this last one, in which there are restrictions in the communication. As a 
consequence of the relations that they still conserve, some of them will improve their 
control, influence and power and thus their economic possibilities. On the other hand, 
those actors that have broken a lot of links with the others will be, foreseeable, in a 
worse position, which will affect negatively their expected results. 
Our proposal is to consider that variation as a measure of individual social 
capital. Formally, we will define the social capital for a player in a communication 
situation, as the difference between the economic result for this player (measured as his 
Shapley value) in the graph restricted game and in the original one. This measure 
satisfies several relevant properties to be considered as a social capital one. 
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Static coalitional multi-criteria game model in mixed strategies implies finding 
a compromise route (one or several) on a network graph, which would "suit" all 
participants-players, which provide movement along the existing routes under condition 
of their coalitional interaction. Positive and negative recommendations for maintaining 
motion at a particular route are players’ strategies. Their payoffs are determined 
according to the recommendations. Since we have the presence of coalitional partitions 
between the players, it is necessary to determine the "optimal" coalitional partition. 
The problem is demonstrated with the example of the interaction between 
participants of several innovative projects. 
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Considered a two-level hierarchical coalition game. On the first level - the 
distribution center on the second level - production centers. Distribution center sends 
goods to production centers, each production center has own technological matrix. Also 
production centers have the opportunity to join a coalition.  
 Suggested that the technological matrix of the centers of production depends on 
the of coalition it belongs. The main task of this game is to find the best payoff of 
manufacturing facilities and distribution center and optimal coalition structure.  
Also considered case with two distribution centers. 
Proposed the agorithm for finding players' best payoff and optimal coalition 
structure 
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The main purpose of this work is constructing evolutionary model of the 
influenza epidemic evolution in one risk-group in the urban population, focusing on 
SEIR model. In current model we select one risk group and divide it into four 
subpopulations Susceptible (S), Latent (E), Infected (I), and Resistant (R) individuals. In 
well-mixed population individuals from the each group randomly interact, hence during 
season epidemic Susceptible individuals become Latent or Infected and then become 
Resistant. Latent individuals we define as individuals, which are already infected, but 
who may not have clinical symptoms, moreover Latent individuals can transmit infection 
to Susceptible individuals. Consequently we consider evolution of the epidemic process 
as a sequential changing states from Susceptible individuals to Latent or Infected 
individuals and finally to Resistant. 
One of the most important problem is the protection of population during 
annual influenza epidemic season. To protect population there exists a system of the 
preventions that reduce sickness rate. One of the most effective procedures to avoid the 
epidemic is vaccination. The influenza epidemic is a fast spreading process, involving 
the large part of total population. However, in addition to influenza, other forms of 
respiratory viral diseases circulate in the population, and individuals, vaccinated against 
the influenza can be infected by one of these forms, which reduces the effectiveness of 
vaccination. Hence the society should focus on the organization of preventive measures. 
Especially we have to focus on some risk-groups from the total population, because 
vaccination of total population is not effective and very expensive. Previous research 
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proofed that about 70% of population should be vaccinated to avoid epidemic of 
influenza before the epidemic season. 
In this paper we take into account social aspect of influenza epidemic and 
choose vaccination as a control action in the risk-group. In the model we consider two 
situation and estimate state changing in the risk-group during epidemic of influenza: in 
the Situation 1 all individuals in the risk-group are unvaccinated and in Situation 2 total 
amount of individuals in risk-group are vaccinated. Vaccination procedures occur before 
season epidemic of influenza begins, to avoid repeated infection of vaccinated 
individuals. It is necessary to take into account regulation of individual's immune system 
after vaccination, because failing health after vaccination not allow to resist against 
another viruses. Unfortunately influenza vaccines are effective only for one season 
owing to mutation of pathogens and waning immunity. Influenza epidemic continues 
until there are no more newly infected individuals. 
Dynamics of risk-group states in evolutionary game, describing an epidemic 
process is constructed, based on social aspect of vaccination and infection expenses. 
Numerical simulation are also presented in the paper. 
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The optimization problem of encashment process in the ATM network can be 
considered as the prediction problem of ATM refusal and construction optimal routes for 
the money collector teams. We focus on the modified algorithms for the Vehicle Routing 
Problem with Time Windows and statistical methods to compile the requests from the 
ATM network for processing center. Moreover we estimate the upload value using 
statistical analysis of cash withdrawal data. A numerical example is considered. 
In this work we consider a problem in which a set of geographically dispersed 
ATMs with known requirements must be served with a fleet of money collector teams 
stationed in the depot in such a way as to minimize some distribution objective. This 
problem is combined with the problem of composition service requests from the ATM 
network. We assume that the money collector teams are identical with the equal capacity 
and must start and finish their routes at the depot within a certain time interval. 
To enhance the operating efficiency of the ATM we propose to analyze the 
upload value – the sum of money uploaded in ATM while its servicing. The statistical 
analysis of cash withdrawal by one client for one operation helps to estimate the upload 
value and moreover the face value and amount of each bank note. 
Thereby we define the necessity of servicing each ATM and predict the future 
requests for the money collector teams, based on the statistical data and restrictions. The 
optimal routes to load ATMs depend on the current requests and predictable requests. 
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The purpose of this work is to optimize encashment process in the ATM 
network in case of the prediction of ATM refusal. To solve the problem we base on 
some modified algorithms for the Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows which 
imply that there are time windows at the stops for servicing ATMs and time windows for 
each route. Each ATM is visited only once by exactly one collectors team within a given 
time interval, all routes start and end at the depot also within a certain time interval, and 
the total demands of all ATMs on one particular route must not exceed the capacity of 
the money collectors vehicle. A numerical example is considered. 
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Introduction 
This research is based on results proving the existence of a non-empty K -core, 
that is, the set of allocations acceptable for the family K of all feasible coalitions, for the 
case when this family is a set of subtrees of a tree. A wide range of real situations in 
resource management, which include optimal water, gas and electricity allocation 
problems can be modeled using this class of games. The present research is pursuing two 
goals: 1. optimality and 2. stability. Firstly, we suggest to players to unify their resources 
and then we optimize the total payoff using some standard LP technique. The same 
unification and optimization can be done for any coalition of players, not only for the 
total one. However, players may object unification of resources. It may happen when a 
feasible coalition can guarantee a better result for every coalitionist. Here we obtain 
some stability conditions which ensure that this cannot happen for some family K. Such 
families were characterized in Boros et al. (1997) as Berge’s normal hypergraphs. Thus, 
we obtain a solution which is optimal and stable. From practical point of view, we 
suggest a distribution of profit that would cause no conflict between players. 
Rationale 
Optimal performance of multi-agent economic systems is a pivotal problem of 
the modern economics. Performance quality of such systems can be described by a set of 
numerical characteristics reflecting the way these systems operate. These characteristics 
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could include profit, cost, gross margin, quantity or number of produced commodities, 
and will be referred to henceforth as Objective Functions (OF). The primal managerial 
task is to optimize (maximize or minimize) these OF. Without loosing the generality, the 
maximization formulation will be considered. 
There are two possible approaches to selecting the optimal strategy. The first 
one (henceforth ‘collective’ approach) is used when an overall system performance is 
considered and individual agents’ performances are not the main focus of the research. 
In this case, the most common tool employed for the system optimization is the non-
linear or linear programming, usually integer or mixed. The second approach implies 
optimization considered from each of the agents’ point of view (henceforth referred to as 
‘individual’). With this approach, the system optimization tool is the game theoretic 
methods. The fist approach (overall optimization) is equivalent to the second approach 
(game) when all agents form one large coalition. The value of overall maximized OF is 
not less than the sums of the individual OFs obtained by individual players or coalitions 
as solutions of a game. It is tempting to suggest that agents form one coalition and then 
divide the total payoff between them. However, some players (or coalitions of players) 
might be better off pursuing strategies different from the strategy formulated for the 
overall optimization for ‘one large coalition’ game. Moreover, players or coalitions of 
players, which are better off playing separately, exist in the general case. 
This paper describes quite a wide range of systems for which the non-
conflicting distribution of optimal ‘collective’ OFs between a system’s agents is 
possible. These systems belong to the class of the so-called network systems and are 
characterized by the existence of carriers connecting individual players who are located 
in nodes. The performance of such systems can be optimized using the network LP 
methods, containing a set of very specific constraints, related to the capacity of the 
carriers and the existence of paths between different nodes. A wide range of real 
economic systems (water supply networks, electricity and gas supply networks, 
telecommunications, etc.) can be described as such network systems, which makes the 
results of the reported research highly demanded by managerial practices in these areas. 
The fundamental result employed in this paper states that for such systems there exists a 
non-conflicting redistribution of total income between the players.  
Mathematical formulation 
We consider the situation when a group of agents I that has an access to the set 
of limited resources R has a goal to optimize some objective function. P is the set of 
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products (industries). We ask the following question: what optimal cooperation strategy, 
or coalition structure, should be chosen by the agents in order to optimize their economic 
outputs. The linear case appears when for each player i∈ I his strategies xi are the shares 
of his activities in industry (product) p∈P. Let  
rpA a=  
be a matrix representing the amount of resource r∈R needed for producing a unit of 
product p∈P, and 
1 2( , ,..., )
i i i i
Rb b b b=  
be a vector of resources available for player i.  
Then we can formulate the production strategy choice for each player as a LP problem: 
Maximize the revenue function ( ) p p
p P
f x c x
∈
= ∑  
Subject to ,  0Ax b x≤ ≥ , where b is a vector of available resources.  
This formulation can be settled for each player i I∈ or coalition K I⊆ . Respectively, 
we replace b by bi or bK. For each coalition K vector bK is additively defined: 
K i
i K
b b
∈
= ∑  
The corresponding LP solution will be denoted x*.  
Let us define function v on the set of coalitions as:  
*( ) ( )Kv K Cx b=  
 This function is superadditive, that is, for each two disjoint coalitions K1 and K2  
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )v K K v K v K+ ≥ +  
This result was proven by Gomory and Johnson (1973) and further developed 
by Blair and Jeroslow (1977) and Schrijver (1980). It is referred in the literature as 
superadditive (or subadditive) duality. We can combine it with BGV theorem (see Boros, 
Gurvich, Vasin (1997) and the originating paper of Gurvich and Vasin (1977)) stating 
that family of coalitions K.⊆ 2I is stable (that is the K -core ( ,C v  K.) is not empty for 
any superadditive characteristic function v ) if and only if K is a normal hypergraph, 
according to Berge (1970).  
Concluding remarks 
Let us consider a network LP optimization problem for an acyclic graph. 
Referring to the results mentioned in Section 3, we can state that a family of coalitions is 
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stable if and only if it is a normal hypergraph. In particular any family subtrees of a tree 
form a stable family of coalitions. Thus, there exists an allocation corresponding to the 
optimal LP solution, which is stable. It means that there is a distribution of the total 
income among players which is acceptable for all feasible coalitions. 
In nutshell, this paper suggests a new approach to optimization and fair distribution 
of total payoff among players. This method is based on integration of two fundamental 
results, which are  
1. Superadditive duality for LP optimization, and 
2. The BGV theorem claiming that a family of coalitions K is stable (that is the K 
-core ( ,C v  K.) is not empty for any superadditive characteristic function v ) if 
and only if K is a normal hypergraph. 
Then BGV theorem can be applied for acyclic network systems. The following two 
assumptions are crucial: 1. acyclicity of corresponding graph and 2. superadditivity of 
the optimal value. It allows us to conclude that some ‘natural’ families of coalitions are 
stable, that is, admit a non-empty core. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that a fair 
distribution of payoff among the payers is possible. Thus, the existence of an optimal 
and stable solution for such class of games is proven. It should be also mentioned that 
the "superadditive duality" holds not only for LP but for integer programming as well. 
Hence, the same analysis of stability is applicable for these, more general, models. 
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Consider an organization or Corporation composed by a Principal (or a leader) 
and by a finite group of agents (or followers). The Principal has some ideal organization 
composition or vector of preferred actions one for each agent and can invest in costly 
socialization trying to instil this "corporate culture" in all the agents of the organization. 
Each agent has as well her ideal action. When an agent makes a decision each period her 
behavior is driven by two competing motives: she wants her behavior to agree with her 
personal ideal action and she wants also her behavior to be as close as possible to the 
average behavior of her peers. Ideal actions or preferences evolve over time. There are 
two sources of preference (and therefore, action) change. On the one hand, there exists a 
costly corporate socialization effort exerted by the Principal trying to transform the ideal 
action of each agent into his own ideal action. On the other hand, each agent's ideal 
action changes in the direction of actual behavior (self-persuasion or cognitive 
dissonance). We are interested in the long-run outcomes of this situation and in 
particular in the ability of the Principal to fully instil the corporate culture in the 
members of the organization. 
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Consider a two-person non-zero-sum differential game 0 0( ,[ , ))x tΓ +∞  starting 
from the initial state 20x ∈ \  at moment 10t ∈ \ and duration 0[ , )t +∞ . The motion 
equations have the form 
2
1 2 0
0 0
( , , ), , , 1,2, [ , )
( )
i ix f x u u x u U i t t
x t x
= ∈ ∈ = ∈ +∞
=
i \
 
Here i iu U∈ is the control variable of player i  and iU  is a compact set. 
The payoff of player i  is given by: 
0
0
( )
0 0 1 2 1 2( [ , ), (), ( )) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) , 0, 1,2
t t
i i i
t
K x t u u e g x t u t u t dt g iρ
+∞
− −+∞ ⋅ ⋅ = ≥ =∫  
where ρ is the discount rate. Suppose that payoffs are nontransferable. 
If players agree to cooperate, they play an open-loop strategy pair 
* * *
1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ))u t u t u t=  which generates a Pareto-optimal payoff vector. 
The stringent requirement for solutions of cooperative differential games is 
time-consistency. Time-consistency of cooperative solution guaranties optimality of 
chosen optimality principle along the optimal trajectory. Time-consistent solution to 
nontransferable payoffs requires 1) Pareto optimality throughout the game horizon, 2) 
individual rationality throughout the game horizon. 
For time-consistency of solution the notion of Payoff Distribution Procedure 
(PDP) was introduced. 
Suppose that player may use irrational acts acts to extort additional gains if later 
circumstances allow. Consider the case where the cooperative scheme has proceeded up 
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to time t  and some players behave irrationally leading to the dissolution of the scheme. 
A condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the 
concerned player would still be performing better under the cooperative scheme is the 
irrational behavior proof condition (Yeung, 2006), which also called the D.W.K. Yeung 
condition. 
The D.W.K Yeung condition for the differential game with infinite duration 
0 0( ,[ , ))x tΓ +∞  is described by following inequality:  
0 0
0
( ) ( ) *
0 0( ,[ , )) ( ) ( ,[ , )),
t
t t
i i i
t
w x t e d e w x tρ τ ρ τβ τ τ− − − −+∞ ≤ + +∞∫  
where *x  is the cooperative optimal trajectory, ( ,[ , ))iw x t +∞ is noncooperative payoff 
and ( )iβ τ  is time-consistent payoff distribution procedure. 
It is proved that if the PDP proposed in [1] is used the D.W.K Yeung condition 
for any Pareto-optimal solution in the cooperative differential game with nontransferable 
payoffs is satisfied.  
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Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to characterize the Nash equilibria, NE, of 2 2×  
games where each player can be of wo different types, I and II, knows the type of her 
opponent, but ignores her own. Let us describe informally in three steps the approach 
followed in this paper. 
Players interact bilaterally giving rise to the following kind of encounters or 
states of nature: ( , ), ( , ), ( , )I I II I I II  and ( , )II II . which occur under certain probabilities 
denoted by ( , ), ( , ), ( , )P I I P II I P I II  and ( , )P II II . 
A two-person strategic game with two actions and complete information, the 
surface game1, is assumed to be played in every encounter. The presence of two 
different types allows players to condition their strategies on the type of opponent she 
might face. For instance, if each player has two actions to choose then the same or a 
different action in front of players of type I and players of type II could be played. Of 
course players may also randomize between actions. The payoff of a player to be 
maximized will be the expected payoff conditioned on the type of her opponent. 
With these ingredients at hand, in this paper we propose a way to play a 2 2×  
matrix game within this set-up. Then we solve it by using the NE solution concept. We 
find that: ( )i  Every NE in the surface game can be extended to heterogenous game. 
Moreover, games that have only one mixed strategy profile and games with only one NE 
in pure strategies do not generate additional NE equilibrium strategy profiles. ( )ii  
Games with common interest, coordination and anticoordination games, do always 
                                                 
1 See Binmore and Samuelson (2001) 
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generate additional NE. We characterize all the NE strategy profiles. We also 
characterize the NE strategy profiles for degenerate games. 
Summarizing, the solution of heterogeneous 2 2×  matrix games is a superset of 
the NE of that game. The new NE equilibria, if any, are equilibria which depend on the 
given probability distribution over the type of the players and the payoffs of the surface 
game. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls a brief and usual 
classification of 2 2×  games according to the number and kind of NE they have. Section 
3 contains the probabilistic modelling of the heterogenous game and some rules that will 
govern player's behaviour within this set-up. In Section 4, the NE strategy profiles for 
heterogenous games are determined. Section 5 contains a discussion of the results and 
some examples. Some ideas and futures developments conclude. 
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Introduction 
Consider the social network built by n  agents. An opinion of the i -th agent in 
the time t  defined by the [0,1]tix ∈ , = {1,2,..., }i N n∈ , = 0,1,2,...t . An 
information impact of agent i  to agent j  defined by value 0ija ≥ , ,i j N∈ . The 
impact matrix = ij N NA a ×& &  is non-negative and stochastic by rows: . The agents 
have initial beliefs 0 0= ( )i i Nx x ∈ . At each step the agent i  changes her opinion in view 
of opinions of the other agents:  
1= , = 1,2,...; .t ti ij j
j N
x a x t i N−
∈
∈∑  (1) 
Interactions of the agents repeat until they have the common opinions [2]:  
0= , = ( ) .lim
t
t
x A x whereA A∞ ∞
→∞
 (2) 
There are two players who can lobby in the social network. The lobbying ,
k
t iu  
of the player {1,2}k ∈  at the step t  is the affecting on the agent's i  opinion: 
1
1,=
t t k
i i t ix x u
−
−− , 1, [ 1,1]kt iu − ∈ − ; i N∈ ; = 1,2, 3,...t . The overall price for lobby 
is {1,2} 2{1,2} ,
=0 =1
( ) = ( )
n
kt
k t i
t i
C u uδ
∞
∈
∈ ∑∑ . 
The payoff function is ( ) = ( ) ( )k k kH u M x C u− , {1,2}k ∈ . The player aims 
to maximize her payoff. 
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We consider following optimal double-stopping problem on trajectories. Suppose 
that we have an urn containing m  minus balls and p  plus balls. We draw from the urn 
sequentially one at a time without replacement. The value 1−  is attached to minus ball and 
value 1+  to plus ball. Determine sequence 0 = 0Z , 
=1
=
n
n k
k
Z X∑ , 1 n m p≤ ≤ + , 
where kX  is the value of the ball chosen at the k -th draw. Each time a ball is drawn, we 
observe the value of the ball and decide either to stop or continue drawing. The problem of 
this paper is to stop with maximum probability at the first on the minimum of the trajectory 
formed by =0{ }
m p
n nZ
+  and then on the maximum. We find the optimal stopping rule in this 
problem, i.e. we derive the optimal stopping times ( *, *)σ τ  such that 
* *
0 0
0 0( , ) , <
{ = , = }min max
= { = , = },sup min max
n l
n m p l m p
n l
n m p l m pC
P Z Z Z Z
P Z Z Z Z
σ τ
σ τ
σ τ σ τ
≤ ≤ + ≤ ≤ +
≤ ≤ + ≤ ≤ +∈
 
where C  is the class of all double-stopping times. 
The work is supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project 10-
01-00089-a and by the Division of Mathematical Sciences (the program "Mathematical 
and algorithmic problems of new information systems"). 
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We consider a system that consists of a major electrical power producer player 
(Public Power Corporation – PPC) playing in infinite time horizon, and minor players 
(power producers and consumers) remaining in the system for finite time durations, 
which time durations are overlapping. We study how they interact among themselves 
(horizontal interaction), and with the major player respectively (vertical interaction), via 
their decisions/strategies. We study a deterministic LQ version of the problem in discrete 
time. In our previous work we employed the Nash equilibrium and we studied the 
behavior of the system. In this paper we use the Stackelberg equilibrium with the long-
term players in the role of the Leader. 
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The network ( , )G X D  is considered, here X  is the set of vertexes 1{ ,..., }nx x , 
D  is the corresponding set of edges. 
The cost matrix ,{ }i jC c=  is also given. 
Denote by { , 1, }lS s l k= =  the set of so called "warehouses" and by 
{ , 1, }lT t l k= =  the set of so called "shops". 
Consider players iA  as pairs ( , ), 1,...,i is t i k= . The strategy set of each player 
iA  is the set of all possible routes connecting is  and it . Denote this set by { }i iαΑ = . 
Consider the situation 1( ,..., ),k i iα α α α= ∈ Α . The total cost in this situation 
is equal to 
( , )
ij
i j L D
c
∈ ⊂
∑ , where L  is the subset of edges from the routes connecting 
"warehouses" and "shops" in situation α . 
The cooperative game setting is considered. To compute the value of 
characteristic function for each coalition 1{ ,..., }kM A A A⊂ =  it is necessary to find 
an optimal communication plan minimizing the payoff of coalition M . 
As an optimality principle the Shapley value is chosen. The example with 40 
nodes and 3 players is computed. 
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The traditional assumption in cooperative game theory is that every coalition is 
feasible and can be formed in a game. However, in many real life situations not every 
group of players has the opportunity to cooperate and to collect their own payoff. We say 
that we deal with cooperative games with restricted cooperation when (may be) not all 
coalitions can be formed. 
Each solution for games with restricted cooperation is a generalization of some 
solution for classic TU games. This paper deals with one more generalization of the 
Shapley value. 
It is well-known that the Shapley value for a classic TU game can be considered 
as the solution of an optimization problem. Such a problem also can be formulated and 
solved in a case of restricted cooperation and it is possible to consider the result as a 
solution for the class of games with restricted cooperation. 
We describe a class of solutions which can be defined by a similar way, and we 
give axiomatization of all these solutions, including one for the new modification of the 
Shapley value. 
For this purpose we define a new property with the name "set consistency". A 
solution satisfies this property if this solution has no changes when we add one coalition 
to the collection of feasible coalitions (and define the characteristic function for this 
coalition as the sum of the solution values for elements of the coalition).  
The main fact is that:  
If some solution for games with restricted cooperation  
1. satisfies the set consistency property and  
2. coincides with some least square value for games with full cooperation 
then this solution is the least square value for each game with restricted cooperation. 
118 
 
Web Values and the Average Web Value for Cycle-Free 
Directed Graph Games 
 
 
Anna Khmelnitskaya1 and Dolf Talman2 
 
1Saint-Petersburg State University 
Russia 
a.khmelnitskaya@math.utwente.nl 
 
2Tilburg University 
Netherlands 
talman@uvt.nl 
 
 
 
Keywords: TU game, Cooperation structure, Cycle-free directed graph, Tree and sink values. 
 
 
For arbitrary cycle-free directed graph games web values are introduced 
axiomatically and their explicit formula representation is provided. The web values may 
be considered as natural extensions of the tree and sink values studied in A. 
Khmelnitskaya and D. Talman (2010) “Tree-type values for cycle-free directed graph 
games” in case when management in a directed network is located at any level. Any anti-
chain of a given digraph may be chosen as a management team. The main property for 
the web value is that every player being a successor of the management team receives 
the worth of this player together with all his successors minus what these successors 
receive and every player being a predecessor of the management team receives the worth 
of this player together with all his predecessors minus what these predecessors receive 
while every manager receives the worth of himself together with all of his successors 
and predecessors minus what these successors and predecessors receive. Simple 
recursive algorithms for calculation the web values are provided. Afterwards we define 
the average web value as the average of web values relevant to all feasible management 
teams in a given digraph. The efficiency of web values and the average web value is 
studied. 
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Matching problem with preferences was first stated in the Gale and Shapley’s 
pioneering paper. [4]. Let us briefly describe it. There are two groups of agents: students 
and colleges, and students should be admitted to colleges. Agents on each side of the 
market have preferences over agents on the opposite side. Furthermore, each college can 
admit more than one student and has quota (maximum number of seats).The following 
question arises: does such matching exist, that is stable, i.e. all agents will agree to 
follow this matching according to their preferences? 
Gale and Shapley introduced the following definition of matching's stability: 
1. Individual rationality. No student should be admitted to the college, if she 
prefers staying unmatched to studying in this college; the same rule applies to 
colleges. 
2. Pairwise stability. Does not exist college-student pair such that simultaneously: 
student prefers this college to those that she has under matching, and college 
admitted other student under matching, which is less preferred that this student. 
3. Empty seats. Does not exist college-student pair such that simultaneously: 
student prefers this college to those, which she has under matching; and college 
finds this student acceptable and has empty seats. 
Gale and Shapley [4] made following assumptions about agents' preferences: 
1. preferences of students over colleges are linear orders; 
2. preferences of universities are linear orders over individual applicants; 
3. preferences over sets of students are responsive to the preferences over 
individuals. 
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They proved that in case of such preferences set of stable matchings is not empty. 
Furthermore, constructive proof was proposed: so called "Deferred Acceptance 
Algorithm", which always find such a stable matching, was described. 
It was shown, that in case of such strict preferences all stable matchings are Pareto-
efficient (taking into account preferences of both sides of the market).  
Much further research was based on this pioneering paper. 
In this paper we're especially interested in the models, allowing indifferences in 
preference profile. One of the first papers, investigated matching problem with 
indifferences in preference profile, was [1]. In this paper, preferences of universities over 
individual applicants are considered as weak orders. This problem statement follows 
real-life example: preferences of municipal schools in American cities. [1] analyzed 
situation in Boston and NYC school districts. Mechanism, which was used in this 
districts, did not produce stable matching of applicants and schools, so it was in some 
sense unfair. Authors proposed the following admission procedure: first indifferences in 
schools' preferences are broken randomly; second, deferred acceptance mechanism is 
applied to the admission problem with strict preferences. 
Two new definitions of stability were introduced: weak stability and strong 
stability. Existence of strongly stable matching is not guaranteed , while existence of 
weakly stable matching is proved for weak order college preferences. 
However, [3] show that matching, produced by the procedure described above, may not 
be Pareto-efficient. For the matching problem, where preferences of applicants over 
universities are strict and universities have weak order preferences over individual 
applicants, Erdil and Ergin propose algorithm, which provides Pareto-efficient stable 
matching. This algorithm is based on so-called Stable Improvement Cycles. 
In this paper, we introduce many-to-one matching problem, in which students have 
linear order preferences over colleges, and colleges have simplest semi-order preferences 
over students [2].  
Let us show en example of simplest semi-order preferences. Assume college b 
and three applicants a1,a2,a3. The following preference relation over these students is an 
example of simplest semi-order: 
a1≈a2, a2≈a3 but a1>a3 
Below we will briefly describe main results of our paper. 
Observation 1. Stable matching in case of such preferences always exists. 
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It’s easy to show, as indifferences in preference profile can be relaxed to form linear 
order preference. We know from [4] that in this case stable matching exists. Such 
matching will also be weakly stable under original simplest semi-order preferences. 
Theorem 1. For each matching, which is weakly stable in problem with simplest semi-
order preferences there exists relaxation of indifferences to linear order form, such that 
matching remains stable. 
We introduce modified (compared to [3]) definition of Stable Improvement 
Cycle 
Definition 1. Stable Improvement Cycle in matching µconsists of distinct students such 
that 
1. Each student is admitted to a college under µ 
2. Each student prefers college of his “cycle neighbor” to his own college under µ 
Let Ab be the set of all students, who prefer college b to their colleges under µ. 
Then Db will denote the set of most preferred students in Ab. (Note that students 
which are “half of step” below the best ones in simplest semi-order preference, 
are not included in Db) 
3. Each student belongs to Db of his cycle neighbor’s college. 
Theorem 2. Weakly stable matching µ is Pareto-dominated by another stable matching 
(according to students’ preferences) iff it admits a Stable Improvement Cycle. 
So, this theorem allows us to extend results of the weak order case to the wider class of 
problems.  
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Consider the following repeated three-person game with finite number of 
strategies. Let Player 1 (P1), Player 2 (P2), and Player 3 (P3) have l , m  and n  
strategies, respectively. Let ijkf , ijkg and ijkh  be payoffs of P1, P2 and P3, respectively, 
for a strategy triple ( , , )i j k , where {1, , }i L l∈ = … , {1, }j M m∈ = …  and 
{1, }k N n∈ = … .  
Let the players choose their strategies sequentially in rounds 1,2,…. Assume 
that in each round P1 and P2 act in the class of mixed strategies. A 
collection 1 2( , , , )lp p p p=
G … , where 0ip ≥ , 1 1
l
ii
p= =∑ , is a mixed strategy of P1, 
and a collection 1 2( , , , )mq q q q=
G … , where 0jq ≥ , 1 1
m
jj
q= =∑ , is a mixed strategy 
of P2. So, the ( 1)l − -dimensional simplex 1lS −  and ( 1)m − - dimensional simplex 
1mS −  are the sets of mixed strategies of P1 and P2, respectively. Assume also, that P3 
uses only pure strategies from the set N . 
Let the set 1 1l mS S S N− −= × × be a state space of the repeated game. At a 
state ,( , )t t tp q k S∈
G G  the expected payoff for P1 is defined by formula 
, ,1 1
( , , )
t
l m
t t t i t j t ijki j
f p q k p q f= == ∑ ∑G G . The expected payoffs of P2 and P3 are defined 
by means of replacement of the symbol f by symbols g  and h , respectively. 
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Consider non-cooperative dynamics. Assume that in each round t  the players 
know the current state ( , , )t t tp q k
G G  and choose a state 1 1, 1( , )t t tp q k+ + +
G G  for next round 
from the following set 
, 1 1 , ,( , ) {( , ) : , , , },t t l m i t i j t jU p q p q S S p p q q i L j Mα β α β− −= ∈ × − ≤ − ≤ ∈ ∈
G G G G  
 where α and β  are positive, sufficiently small numbers. The transition 
1 1 1( , , ) ( , , )t t t t t tp q k p q k+ + +⇒
G G G G  is realized under keeping the principle of non-decrease 
of players’ payoffs during the game. The proposed approach is the following one.  
Let ( , , )t t tp q k
G G  be a current state in the game and *1tk N+ ∈ be a fixed strategy 
of P3. Consider two problems. 
Problem 1. Find 1pG  maximizing the function *1( , , )t tf p q k +
G G over the set 
, ( , )t tU p qα β
G G  under the condition * *1 1( , , ) ( , , )t t t t tg p q k g p q k+ +≥
G G G G . 
Problem 2. Find 2qG  maximizing the function *1( , , )t tg p q k +
G G  over the set 
, ( , )t tU p qα β
G G  under the condition * *1 1( , , ) ( , , )t t t t tf p q k f p q k+ +≥
G G G G . 
Problems 1 and 2 have solutions. 
Consider the auxiliary bimatrix game * *( , )A B  with the matrices 
* 2 *
1 1*
1 * 1 2 *
1 1
( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , )
t t t t t
t t t
f p q k f p q k
A
f p q k f p q k
+ +
+ +
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
G G G G
G G G G  
* 2 *
1 1*
1 * 1 2 *
1 1
( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , )
t t t t t
t t t
g p q k g p q k
B
g p q k g p q k
+ +
+ +
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
G G G G
G G G G  
In this bimatrix game strategy 1 is repeating tp
G  for P1 and repeating tq
G for P2, 
and strategy 2 is switching from tp
G  to 1pG  for P1 and switching from tq
G  to 2qG  for P2. 
To obtain 1 1 1( , , )t t tp q k+ + +
G G  the players find Nash equilibria. It is proved that the 
bimatrix game * *( , )A B  has at least one Nash equilibrium in the class of pure strategies. 
Thus, the pair 1 1( , )t tp q+ +
G G  is determined; it depends on *1tk + . After that the 
strategy 
1t
k
+
of P3 is chosen from the condition 1 1 1( , , ) ( , , ) 0t t t t t th p q k h p q k+ + + − ≥
G G G G . If 
such strategy 
1t
k
+
is unique, then one chooses strategy giving the maximum to the left-
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hand side. Thereby the dynamics of the considered repeated game is completely 
determined.  
Besides mentioned above local criteria of players quite often there exist also 
global criteria evaluating the quality of the process wholly. And dynamics constructed 
above not always leads to a state which optimizes global criteria. It appears that the 
using so-called behavior types for players (normal, altruistic, aggressive and paradoxical 
ones) can be effective in this situation. 
An illustrating example when each of three players has only two strategies was 
considered. The corresponding trajectories were calculated. 
The report is supported by Russian Foundation of Basic Research, grant  
09–01–00313 and by the Program of the Presidium of RAS No.29 “Mathematical 
control theory”. 
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Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welsh (1992) showed that herding can be 
rational. Suppose have exogenous queue of agents making their Bayesian choices using 
their private signals and observable choices of other agents. At a certain round it will be 
rational for one of them to discard his or her own signal and follow the majority (the 
herd). This time point is a start of rational information cascade: agents ignore their 
signals according to the Bayes updating. Anderson and Holt (1997) presented first 
experimental results of cascades emerging in the laboratory. 
Bikhchandani et al (1992) stated that agents with high precision signals 
(“fashion leaders”) can break or reverse a cascade. Bayesian updating makes their 
opinion more influential than aggregated choice of “regular” agents. We present 
experimental results that try to capture this influence in a laboratory setting.  
We use basic design by Anderson and Holt (1997) with some modification. 
First (or control) session is a standard observational learning (cascade) game of the 
binary choice. Agents guess between two urns A and B containing white and black balls 
in different proportions. We have a 9-person queue with the signal precision of 0.6. In 
the second session we randomly picked one of the participants and presented him or her 
as an “expert” with 0.9 signal precision. 
Our results show that highly informed agents (or “experts”) tend to provoke a 
cascade: there were only 25% of cascade rounds in the first session and 73% in the second 
(expert) session. At the same time we had the same rate of errors in both session which can 
be explained by the high rate of incorrect cascades in the expert session. Econometric 
analysis using the logit error function proved that agents who made their choices before 
experts were more likely to follow Bayesian decision model, although we had no single 
cascade in expert session before expert’s choice (fig.1). Cascades provoked by experts 
were stable and “deep” (depth is a difference between A and B choices). 
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Fig.1. Logit Estimation of Errors 
Our results fit other experimental papers in the field. Those are first 
experiments (Anderson and Holt, 1997), experiments with different payoffs (Anderson, 
2000), institutional design experiments (Hung и Plott, 2001), market applications 
(Kurbler and Weizsacker, 2003), net structures (Choi et al, 2004) and some others. 
Alevy et al (2007) showed that professionals usually trust their private signals than 
others’ choice. We confirm experimenta results by Goeree et al (2007) that explain 
instability of cascades and their locality; authors prove that experimental results fit 
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models. Lat result is confirmed by (Choi et al, 
2004). Ziegelmeyer et al (2010) introduce two types of agents with high and low signal 
precisions. Low-informed agents tend to equilibrium choices, and high-informed 
“experts” usually deviate from the equilibrium and don’t break cascade (no more than 
15% of the game rounds). Sasaki conducted an experiment with declining and rising 
precisions. The first design participants tend to make more right choices. 
Also our experiment showed that Bayesian choice can’t be the best and even 
effective strategy in the real world due to irrationality of real people. These results fit 
meta-study presented by Weizsacker (2008). 
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Regularities of initiation and following development of large-scaleinvestment 
projects researches are becoming more and more important in the terms of modern 
economic situation. Such projects are quite often characterized with rather diverse 
participants’ structure concerning both scales, and organizational and legal forms. 
For the past years projects of government and public private partnership as well 
as that of intergovernmental kind, supposing various and multi-faceted investors’ 
involvement, have become of a special importance. In so called “classical” investment 
researches attention is firstly paid to evaluation problems likewise risk factors and 
uncertainties taking into account as soon as they do exist at all the stages of significant 
investment projects realization. 
At the same time, cooperative effects, inevitably arising during origination and 
following development of investors’ coalitions, appear to be of a particular interest, 
especially in situations when coalitionists have differences not only in organizational and 
property characteristics, but also in objectively owned economical interests systems. 
In this case mathematical models and methods, that give us an opportunity to 
analyze regularities of significant investors’ coalitions appearance, seem to be of current 
importance.  
When solving such problems, cooperative game theory implementation is 
becoming efficient and profitable enough. Within the primary case the situation 
analyzing investors consolidation possibility aiming realization of some large-
scaleinvestment project can be described with classical cooperative game with 
transferable utility ( , )I v , in which 
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( )v i  – incomes, that individual investors 1..i m∈  can rely on, provided they 
can act on their own;  
( )v S  – various participants’ coalitions ( 2 )IS ⊂  incomes. 
In the situation under consideration we need full (“large”) coalition of all 
potential participants ( {1.. }I m= ) to be formed to implement the project, and 
( )v I  will be a utility (income) received by results of the project. 
Among the “fundamental” disadvantages of this extremely abstract, limited and 
primitive model a prerequisite concerning a possibility of individual participants (as well 
as their various coalitions) incomes representation as determinate values. An assumption 
about these incomes being stochastic variables ( }v S  with some known distribution 
densities seem to be more plausible and thus more attractive. So we come to a 
requirement of classical cooperative games modification and taking into account the 
characteristic functions values randomness. Thereby a stochastic cooperative game we 
will understand in the sense of pair of sets ( , )I vΓ =  , where: 
{1.. }I m=  – set of participants; 
( )v S  – random variables, that have known distribution densities ( )( )v sp x , they 
are interpreted as income (utility, payments) of corresponding coalitions S I⊂ . 
Within this approach the concept of “sharing” becomes an interesting 
development. Particularly, we can consider the vector mx R∈  as sharing in stochastic 
cooperative game, if this vector meets the condition of individual  
 { ( )}ix v i α≥ ≥P   (or 1( )( ) ( )i v ix F v iαα−≥ = ) (1) 
and group 
 
1
{ ( )}
m
i
i
x v I α
=
≤ ≥∑P   (or 1( )
1
( ) ( )
m
i v I
i
x F v Iαα−
=
≤ =∑  ) (2) 
players’ rationality with probability α . 
It is important to emphasize that ({ })v Sα , defined from the condition 
{ ( ) }v S x α≤ =P  , is α –fractile random variable distribution ( )v S  – or, in risk 
management terms, VaR of income of coalition S  
1
( )( ) ( )v Sv S Fα α−=  . 
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It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that transition from “classical” 
determined cooperative games to their stochastic variant opens the entire row of 
interesting and perspective directions for research. For example, let’s take a notice of the 
characteristic functions of cooperative games construction problems. 
For stochastic cooperative games, as well as for determined ones, the concept of 
superadditivity may be considered. Under strict superadditivity we understand the game, 
in which for α∀  an inequation is fulfilled: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ).v S T v S v Tα α α∪ ≥ +  (3) 
The game is not strict superadditive (almost superadditive), if the condition (3) 
is true for all α , begun from some α′ . 
Whereas in case of determined cooperative games the effect of collateral 
payment is seen when we compare the amount of income ( ) ( )v S v T+  of two different 
coalitions S  and T , that are received separately, with the income ( )v S T∪  of coalition 
S T∪ , that arises from their association, in the case of stochastic cooperative games we 
deal with more complicated and versatile situation. 
Certainly, in stochastic cooperative game, as in analogue of determined game, 
the effect of collateral payment also can be generated by the transition (when the 
participants of coalitions S  and T  are associating in the only one coalition S T∪ ) to 
some new value of characteristic function ( )v S T∪ . 
However if we simply add the incomes of coalitions S  and T , that in 
determined game corresponds to insignificant cooperative game, we should take into 
account that VaR of stochastic amount of their incomes ( ) ( )v S v T+  , in general case, 
will not be equal the amount of VaR incomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( ).v S T v S v Tα α α+ ≠ +  (4) 
In addition, we should emphasize that both cases, in which coalitions’ revenues 
are independent variables, and cases conceding possible correlation between them 
deserve special consideration. 
All listed stochastic cooperative games’ properties can be widely used in the 
procedures of building characteristic functions. Indeed, the problem of determination of 
the potential coalitions’ income often seems to be hard-to-solve or unsolvable on 
practice, but the problem of finding probabilistic characteristics of variables’ sums with 
known cumulative distribution curves has standard solution. 
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Consider the set N = {1, 2, …, n} consisting of n agents. The agent i chooses its 
action xi ∈ ℜ1. The vector x = (x1, x2, …, xn) ∈ ℜn of the agents’ actions called the game 
situation determines their gains defined by the goal functions Fi(x), where 
Fi(⋅): ℜn → ℜ1. The rationality of the agent behaviour consists in striving to 
maximization of its goal function by choosing its own action: xi ∈ BRi(x-
i) = Arg 1maxy∈ℜ  Fi(y, x-i), i ∈ N, where x-i = (x1, …, xi–1, xi+1, …, xn) ∈ ℜ
n–1 is the game 
environment for the i-th agent, BRi(⋅) is the best response of this agent, i ∈ N. Let us 
suppose that the functions Fi(⋅) are such that for any agent in any game environment 
there exists a unique best response. 
Define ℵ = {N0, N1, …, Nm} as the partitioning of the agents set N, where Ni is the 
set of agents with i-th rank of reflexion, i = 0, m , m is the maximum rank of reflexion 
(Korepanov and Novikov, 2011). Let us call ℵ by the reflexive partition. Let us suppose 
that the agent with some rank of reflexion k reliably knows the sets of agents with all 
lower ranks k’ (where k’ < k – 1) and certainly considers all agents with equal or higher 
ranks (k’’ ≥ k) as possessing some ranks (for example, the rank less by unity than its own 
rank (i.e. k – 1)). It corresponds to the assumption about that the agent excludes 
existence of agents with the same or higher rank of reflexion that its own one. At that the 
agent can incorrectly estimate the sets of agents with (k – 1)-th, k-th, and higher ranks of 
reflexion. 
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Let the vector x0 of «initial» actions of the agents (or common priors as the 
probability distribution over ℜn) be given as common knowledge among the agents. The 
behavior of the agents with k-th rank of reflexion depends on his awareness structure. 
Let ℵjk be the subjective reflexive partition – this is the notions of the agent j with k-th 
rank of reflexion about the partition of all agents to reflexion ranks: 
ℵjk = (N0, N1, …, Nk-2, Nk-1 ∪ Nk ∪ … ∪ Nm \ {j},
k  
{j}, ∅ , …, ∅ ), j ∈ Nk 
m – k – 1
(*). Let us 
note that within the framework of this expression the agent possessing k-th rank of 
reflexion has the right notions about the reflexion ranks of all the agents with strictly 
lesser ranks of reflexion. The awareness structure is determined by the aggregate of the 
reflexion partitions of all the agents. Rationality of the reflexive agent consists in 
choosing his action as his best response under subjective reflexive partition. 
Thus, within the framework of the proposed reflexive model of collective behavior, 
the vector sequence of the agents’ actions is uniquely defined by specifying the tuple 
(N, {Fi(⋅)}i ∈ N, ℵ, x0) consisting of the set of agents N, their goal functions {Fi(⋅)}i ∈ N, 
and the reflexive partition ℵ. This concept generalizes models of strategic reflexion 
(Сhkhartishvili and Novikov, 2004), cognitive hierarchies and k-level models of 
collective behavior (see the survey in Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010). 
Consider the “game” model with homogeneous agents and aggregated influence of 
the game environment to the gain of each of them. Let: 
1) all the agents from the set N have equal goal functions (Fi(⋅) = f(⋅), i ∈ N); 
2) the goal function of i-th agent depends on its action xi (at that it is continuous 
and concave with respect to this variable) and on the aggregated situation Q(x), where 
Q(⋅): ℜn → ℜ1 is the symmetric function of its arguments; 
3) the agents make decisions once and simultaneously; 
4) the initial vector of actions x0 and the reflexive partition ℵ are fixed. 
The agents with the zero rank of reflexion will choose the actions 
xi = arg 1maxy∈ℜ  f(y, Q(y, 
0
ix− )), i ∈ N0. The agents with the first rank of reflexion will 
choose the actions x1j = arg 1maxy∈ℜ  f(y, Q(y, x-j)), j ∈ N1. The agents with the second rank 
of reflexion in accordance with expression (*) will choose the actions 
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x2j = arg 1maxy∈ℜ  f(y, Q(у, 0l Nx ∈ , 1 2 \{ }1l N N jx ∈ ∪ )), j ∈ N2. And so on. The agents with the 
m-th rank of reflexion will choose the actions 
xmj = arg 1maxy∈ℜ  f(y, Q(y, 0l Nx ∈ , 11l Nx ∈ , …, 1 \{ }[ 1] m ml N N jx m −∈ ∪− )), j ∈ Nm. 
The vector x*(ℵ) = (
0l N
x ∈ , 11l Nx ∈ , 22l Nx ∈ , …, ml Nxm ∈ ) of agents’ actions, which may 
be referred to as the reflexive partitioning equilibria, depends on the reflexive partition 
ℵ. Hence, modifying the reflexive partition one can modify the actions of the agents, i.e. 
realizes the reflexive control (see also the game-theory models of the reflexive control in 
(Сhkhartishvili and Novikov, 2004)). Examples of applications of this concept of 
equilibrium to economical, financial and organizational problems is given in (Korepanov 
and Novikov, 2011). 
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This paper presents the model of oligopolistic competition by advertising, as 
advertising is considered to be a main marketing instrument in modern industrial markets. 
Since markets usually change with time, it is reasonable to investigate 
competition as a dynamic process. This gives an opportunity to analyze 
interdependencies between competitors’ strategies and market changes. We research 
fashion market, which is a high-competitive oligopoly market and thus, the advertising 
strategy is essential for surviving on it. 
We use a game theory approach and rather, a differential game approach, to 
model the competition on fashion market. Proposed by Gary M. Erickson in 2009 
(Erickson 2009), the presented model has been successfully modified and adopted to 
fashion market. 
The model accepts main specifications of fashion market. And the first 
specification requires that the demand of the firm should decrease proportionally to the 
demand of the whole market. Then the second specification asks for advertising the 
products of the firm only for the potential customers. 
The model implies that there are n firms (players) on the market. It is assumed 
that each firm on the market has its maximum sales potential iN . The firms use 
advertising ( ), 1,2, ,ia t i n= …  as a strategic instrument with an effectiveness iβ  to find 
new customers and increase their sales ( )is t . Players want to maximize their discounted 
profit iV  over an infinite horizon: 
135 
 
2
0
0
max ( ) ,i
i
r t
i i ia
e q s a dt
∞
−
>
−∫  
where iq  is a unit contribution and ir  is a discount rate of firm i . The cost of 
advertising is intended to be quadratic. 
The model considers the dynamic demand as: 
1
, 1,2 ,
n
i i i i j
j
s N s s i nβ α ρ
=
= − − =∑ …  
where ρ is a decay rate. 
This model is a modification of the Vidale-Wolfe model and, as it was already 
said above, of the Erickson model as well.  
Using the models for iV  and is , we set the dynamic differential game: 
2
0 0
0
max max ( ) , 1,2, ,i
i i
r t
i i i ia a
V e q s a dt i n
∞
−
> >
= − =∫ …  
with the restrictions 
1
, 1,2, , .
n
i i i i i j
j
s a N s s i nβ υ
=
= − − =∑ …  
The Nash equilibrium and the expression for the optimal advertising strategies 
have been found for this problem: 
,
2
i
i i i ia D N s
β= −  
where 
2 2
2
2( )
.i i i ii
i
r r q
D
β
β
− + +=  
The further analysis of the solution, as well as the comparative analysis for the 
case of the symmetric competition has been performed.  
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A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production is studied. The process is 
modeled as cooperative differential game. In this paper the problem of allocation over 
time common cooperative benefit incurred by coalitions of firms in a coalitional game is 
considered. Coalitional solution is defined as follows: the Nash equilibrium in the game 
played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated 
according to some given mechanism between its members. In this paper the mechanism 
for allocation over time of total individual benefit so that the initial agreement remains 
valid for the whole duration of the game is proposed. We proved that the coalitional total 
stock of accumulated pollution is strictly less then the pollution under Nash equilibrium 
for the whole duration of the game. The numerical example is given. 
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The issues relevant to the most dynamic sector of native engineering innovative 
high-tech machinery enterprises are considered. Such enterprises are typical for industry 
of machine tools and specialized equipment production, for military-industrial complex. 
They are capable to respond quickly on the demands of consumption, to produce an 
equipment competitive on the local and world market. 
To operate effectively in the market of innovative equipment, the continuous 
modernization of enterprise production is an inevitable process involving significant 
risks. The only possible base for development of integrated modernization projects, for 
searching the most effective ways to reduce the intra-costs is investigations that 
determine the relationship between the type of machinery enterprise and management 
system structure. Enterprise management needs effective tools not only to assess the 
current efficiency of production, but also allows determine the direction of its continuous 
improvement. The challenge is to ensure coherent changes in the production 
management system and productive assets, i.e. precise technologies and technical 
equipment of production.  
The main topic under discussion in the paper is the essential features of 
modernization process in high-tech machinery enterprises producing an experimental 
and series products on the same equipment. The formalized description and results of 
economic and mathematical modeling are presented. The direct-costing technique is 
selected as a basis for modeling.  
The model under consideration reflects the following features of the high-tech 
machinery enterprises producing an experimental and series products on the same 
equipment. 
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1) There exist two parallel manufacturing flows of commercial products and 
experimental prototypes. The same metal-cutting equipment with numerical control that 
produce both flows of products reduces costs and improves the controllability, but also 
increases risks associated with uncertainties of the experimental design. It seems 
reasonable to use high-speed performance of management systems as the feature for 
such enterprises. That have to be considered in the process of reorganization of 
production management and the formation of motivation system of production workers 
and managerial staff.  
2) The manufacturing cycles of innovative products are longer than the lifetime 
of modernization projects. Standard technique for risk analysis of investment project on 
the basis of the breakeven point is oriented on the base period less in duration then the 
period of the life of the investment project. 
For high-tech machinery enterprises is common to work on forward contracts, 
fixing production volumes and prices of products for quite a long time (3-4 years). At the 
same time, inflation expectations cause the increase in cost of basic production factors. 
Rising prices for energy, raw materials, wages, utilities invariably leads to a limitation of 
profits. 
An efficient tool at the disposal of production managers is to reduce standard 
variable costs at the expense of upgrading and providing its administrative 
modernization. 
In the paper the technology determine the optimal date of purchase of 
equipment and design rationale for its composition, based on the coefficients of 
equivalence. The market competitiveness of machine-building enterprise depends on the 
level of productive capacity. However, the market competitiveness is mainly determined 
by the efficiency of the government and management for the production system and the 
whole enterprise. 
The proposed model allows us to consider two aspects of performance 
management systems.  
1) Priority measures to modernize the management in comparison with purely 
technological improvements in the productive capacity of the enterprise 
2) The comparison of two schemes of management organization on engineering 
enterprises. The scheme based on the separation of ownership and control is described in 
terms of game formalism. One consequence may be effects similar to an agency conflict. 
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Model comparison is made with the scheme of charging the costs to top management on 
fixed costs. Payment for top managers of state corporations set up this way. 
The presented results are used extensively when working with students and 
training specialists in the field of production modernization of high-tech innovative 
engineering plants and preparing the management reserve. 
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A model of tax auditing [1] in assumption, that tax authorities have some 
statistical information about the distribution of income among population, is considered. 
As in previous models [1, 4] there is an assumption in the model that the true 
tax liability i  of each taxpayer takes its value from finite set 0 1 1= { , , , }NM m m m −… , 
where 0 1 10 < < < = 1Nm m m −≤ … . The tax liability is a non-dimensional relative 
value, which can be defined as some possible payment of one taxpayer, measured in 
money units. Dividing the range of possible tax payments on N  intervals, we make a 
correspondence between each interval and some group of taxpayers. Along with i  the 
reported tax liability ( )r i  is considered. This function and its argument take values from 
the set M . 
If the evasion was revealed the taxpayer must pay the level of his evasion and 
penalty (1 )( )i r hπ+ − , where money coefficient h  and marginal penalty rate π  
assumed to be constants. There are different levels of rationality: risk averse, risk neutral 
and disposed to risk. First, let's consider risk neutral players and investigate tax evasions 
of the groups of taxpayers with the same level of income. 
The tax authorities assumed to get some statistical information, which can be 
considered as an indicator of the tax evasion of a taxpayer, who declared some level of 
r . The information, mentioned above, is called a signal s , as it was called in [4]. Signal 
s  can take two values { , }s d u∈ , where u  – is an information that the true income 
level is higher then declared, and d  – is an absence of this information. 
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A taxpayer's strategy is to make a decision to evade or not to evade, i. e. to 
declare his income level less or equal to his true level of income ( ( ) <r i i  or ( ) =r i i ). 
A tax authority's strategy is to choose the audit probability 1( | = )lP A r m − , where A  
is event, that the tax audit passed. 
A tax authority's net income R  consists of taxation preAT  (taxpayers' payments 
corresponding to their declared tax liability), taxes postAT  on the evasion level and 
penalties P  (as the audit results) less total audit cost C :  
= .preA postAR T T P C+ + −  
The following results were obtained for the risk neutral taxpayers:  
1. The theorem 1 about the optimal audit strategies for each income-level 
group, based on the condition  
0
1
2
1
( | = ) ,
1
1
( | = ) ,
1
1
( | = ) ,
1
1
( | = ) .
1
l
N
P A r m
P A r m
P A r m
P A r m
π
π
π
π−
≥ +
≥ +
≥ +
≥ +
……………
……………
 (3) 
2. The theorem 2 about the optimal audit strategies with consideration of 
the signals, based on the condition  
1
( | = , = ) ,
1 1 ( 1) { = | = }l l
P A r m s u
P s u r m
λ
π λ≥ ⋅+ + −  (4) 
 where λ  is the coefficient of trust to the signal, defined as  
( | = , = )
= .
( | = , = )
l
l
P A r m s u
P A r m s d
λ  
3. The theorem 3 about the optimal budget = ( | = )l l lB k P A r m c  for 
tax auditing in the l -th income group (where c  is the cost of one audit).  
This model also can be considered for other levels of rationality of the players. 
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We consider finite n -person extensive games with perfect (or incomplete) 
information [2, 3] where the player`s payoff is given by a vector instead of a scalar (so-
called multicriteria extensive games). 
Pure strategy combinations 1 =1= ( , , )
n
n jj
ϕ ϕ ϕ ∈ Φ∏…  provide to each player 
i  "payoffs" given by an ( )r i -vector valued function ( )
=1
:
n r i
i jj
H RΦ →∏ , i.e. player 
i  takes ( )r i  criteria into account. We denote by ( , , (1), , ( ))PMG n K r r n…  the class of 
all finite n -person multicriteria extensive games with perfect information (on the game 
tree K ). 
For all , tx y R∈  we will use the notation >y x  if and only if >i iy x  for all 
{1, , }i t∈ … . The strategy profile 1ˆ ˆ ˆ= ( ,..., )nϕ ϕ ϕ  is called (weak) equilibrium [4, 1] 
in multicriteria game ( , , (1), , ( ))PMG n K r r nΓ ∈ … , iff  
l l l: ( , ) > ( , )i i ii i i i ii N H Hϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ− −∀ ∈ ⎤∃ ∈ Φ  
The set of all equilibriums in multicriteria game Γ  denote by ME(Γ ). 
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Decomposition of Γ  at the position x  onto subgame xΓ  and factor-game DΓ  
generates corresponding decomposition of pure strategies 
( , ), = {1,..., }D xi i i i N nϕ ϕ ϕ→ ∈  and mixed strategies as well. 
As was established in [2] for n -person finite extensive unicriterium games if 
we find the Nash equilibrum xϕ  in the subgame xΓ  and the Nash equilibrum Dϕ  in the 
corresponding factor-game ( )xD ϕΓ , the composite strategy profile =1= {( , )}D x ni i iϕ ϕ ϕ  
forms the Nash equilibrium in Γ . This fact, in particular, allows to use the backwards 
induction procedure to construct subgame perfect equilibrium in unicriterium multistage 
game. 
Unfortunately, this basic result is not valid for equilibria in multicriteria 
extensive games (with perfect or incomplete information), and thus one can not use the 
backwards induction procedure (in the direct way) to construct subgame perfect 
equlibriums in multictiteria game ( , , (1), , ( ))PMG n K r r nΓ ∈ … . 
However, we prove that the set ( )SPME Γ  of all subgame perfect equilibriums 
(in pure strategies) in multicriteria game ( , , (1), , ( ))PMG n K r r nΓ ∈ …  in nonempty 
and propose the technique to construct this set of equilibriums. 
In addition, we prove that the set ( )ME Γ  in mixed strategies in a finite 
multictiteria n -person extensive game Γ  with incomplete information satisfies the 
time-consistensy property [3]. 
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Some problem of test design is a problem of appointment of items weights [1]. 
In many tests the items weights are equal. As the complexity of the test structure 
increases, it becomes necessary to determine the difficulty level of the test and its parts. 
It is especially important if we want to compare students who had different tests or if a 
time for solving of all test tasks is insufficiently. 
Definition. Let { }1,2, ,I n= …  be a set of test items. A complexity of the test 
I  is a nonnegative function that assigns a number ( )v K  to any aggregate K (K I⊆ ) 
of test items and possesses the following properties.  
1. ( ) 0v ∅ =  
2. If K K′ ⊂  then ( ) ( )v K v K′ < . 
The number ( )v K  is called the complexity of aggregate K. If a student can 
solve all tasks of a subset K I⊆  then we say that he has knowledge level K or he has 
test skill K . 
Thus, the complexity function v  should be defined on 2n  subsets of set I , and 
it is necessary to consider a incomplete and inconsistent understanding of intuitive 
complexity. In game theory the complexity function v  is called the characteristic 
function of a cooperative game ,I vΓ =< >  that characteristic function ( )v K  
possessing monotonic property [3]. 
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In practice, the function v  is additive and the complexity of any aggregate of 
tasks K  is ( ) i
i K
v K φ
∈
= ∑ , where iφ  is complexity (weight) of the i -th test item. 
An item weight can be found after a testing of a large group of pupils. The 
weight iφ  of item i is a proportion /iN N , in which the number iN  is the number of 
students solved the item i of test and N  is the total number of pupils participated in 
testing [1]. But such approach stimulates nonconventional methods of training because 
the less pupils solved a task the more weight get the task. However it is quite possible 
that time expended on preparation a student for solution of a rare task is short and the 
teacher begins to prepare students for a solution of rare tasks breaking logic of a teaching 
course.  
In this work, we first define complexity function v  and after we define items 
weights of the test I .  
The learning process usually can be represented as a tree of learning. In this 
graph vertices are knowledge levels and edges are training ways of student. Thus, 
complexity function v  can be defined from structure of a training course and from 
experience or program of learning. 
Let ( )v K  be a time for a pupil preparation to solve all items of aggregate 
K I⊆ . Then weight iφ  of the i -th item of the test I  can be find by the formula 
 ( ( { }) ( ))i K
i K
p v K i v Kφ
∉
= ⋅ ∪ −∑ , (1) 
where { }Kp  is a probability distribution on set all subset { }K  that don’t contain the i -
th item. 
The difference ( { }) ( )v K i v K∪ −  in the formula (1) is time for getting skill i  
if he can solve all tasks for subset K I⊆ . Hence iφ  is the expected time to prepare a 
student for the i -th item for various knowledge levels. 
If all sequences of training have equals probabilities then 
! ( 1)! !Kp k n k n= ⋅ − −  | |k K= , and iφ  becomes the expected time of training of 
the student. (We understand an arbitrary permutation of numbers 1,2, ,n…  as the 
program of training.). 
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If all knowledge levels have equals probabilities then 11 2nKp
−=  and iφ  
becomes the expected time of training of the student. In this case the number iφ  is called 
the weight of Banzafa in the test. 
Example. We assume that test items { }1,2, ,I n= …  are ordered so that it is 
impossible to get skill i  without getting skills with smaller numbers. Or the student 
can’t solve item i  if he can’t solve item 1i − . Suppose that the time for getting skill i  
is equal to ia . Thus { } { }( 1,2, , ) ( 1,2, , 1 )ia v i v i= − −… … . Hence, the time for 
getting skill K  is defined by the time for training the student for getting skill with the 
greatest number from subsetK  that is 
 
1
( )
m
i
i
v K a
=
= ∑ , maxm K=  (2) 
Now we have a theorem, which allows us to find the items weights for the test 
{ }1,2, ,I n= …  with characteristic function (2). 
Theorem. In a cooperative game ,I vΓ =< >  with characteristic function (2) 
the Shapley value 1 2( , , , )nφ φ φ φ= …  has the following coordinates 
1 1
i
k
i
k
a
n k
φ
=
= − +∑ , 1,i n= , 
And coordinates of the Banzhaf vector 1 2( , , , )nσ σ σ σ= …  of the game are the 
following 
1 2
i
k
i n k
k
aσ −=
= ∑ , 1,i n= . 
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This paper is to provide a theoretical foundation of incomplete contract in an 
extensive game of multi-agent interaction. It aims to explain why rational agents may 
agree upon incomplete contracts even though it is costless to sign a complete one. It is 
argued that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. If agents' attitudes 
toward uncertainty are not neutral, then an incomplete contract as final solution can be 
the consequence of common knowledge of rationality. This paper assumes that all agents 
are uncertainty averse in a sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); and that agents can 
form coalitions as part of strategic play. All these are embedded into the equilibrium 
solution concept. 
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A multi-agent interaction model on the derivatives market is formalized. The market 
state is influenced by the controls tiu  that are being chosen at the moment 
{ }0,1,2,...t T∈ =  by the investors 1,...,i I= . Agents 1,...,i I=  act on the 
market by diversifying their portfolios with stocks and bonds at the moment 
{ }0,1,2,...t T∈ = . The scheme based on the Bellman dynamic programming method 
for finding the guaranteed payoff of the investor considering issuing a call option on 
stocks is proposed. Numerical example is given. 
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Two level game theoretical model for sugar production is considered. On the first level 
we have one player A  (company responsible for sugar production) on the second level 
the players ( ),  1B i i n= …  representing sugar production facilities. The players B can be 
divided on two subsets (1)M  and (2)M . (1)M  - the set of players producing sugar for 
consumption and the set (2)M of players producing sugar for fuel production. The 
production costs of each facility is given (dependent of the belonging to one of the sets 
(1)M or (2)M ). The profit of each player B  and the player A  also depends from the 
fact for what purpose the sugar is produced. The constructed 1n +  person game gives 
the possibility to investigate Nash Equilibrium, in a factor 3 person game were (1)M , 
(2)M  and A  are considered as players. Having NE for three person game one can 
compute PMS-vector in the previously defined 1n +  person game. This gives the 
possibility of optimizing the partition of the set ( (1) ( ))B B B n= …  on two subsets (1)M  
and (2)M . 
152 
 
Centrality in Weighted Social Networks.  
A Game Theoretic Approach 
 
 
Conrado Manuel1, Enrique González-Arangüena2 and Mónica Pozo3 
 
1,2,3Complutensian University of Madrid 
Spain 
1conrado@estad.ucm.es 
2egaran@estad.ucm.es 
3mpozojuan@telefonica.net 
 
 
 
Keywords: Weighted networks, Centrality, probabilistic Myerson value, Generalized probabilistic 
Myerson value 
 
 
This communication deals with a key issue in network analysis: the problem of 
centrality of nodes in networks. Most of the work on this topic is about the case in which 
links are dichotomous. In the present work, we consider the case of networks in which 
ties are not just either present or absent, but have some weight attached to them. 
Following Granovetter (1973) we will interpret these weights as a function of duration, 
intimacy or intensity of the relations. Moreover, we will suppose that actors in the 
network are simultaneously players in a cooperative TU game representing the interests 
that motivate their interactions. Our approach is then a game theoretic one. We will 
propose as centrality measure for each node its probabilistic Myerson value (Calvo et al., 
1999 and Gómez et al., 2008) assuming that the game is a symmetric one and thus, no a 
priori differences among players exist. We will prove that this measure satisfies some 
relevant properties to be considered as a centrality one. 
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A Chinese Auction is one of the most popular mechanisms at charity or other 
fund-raising events. In a Chinese Auction, bidders buy lottery tickets, which are 
essentially chances to win items. Bidders may buy as many tickets as they like, and bid 
them on any item(s) they want by placing them in a basket or other container in front of 
the item(s) they are trying to win. At the conclusion of bidding, the winning ticket is 
drawn from the tickets bid on each item, and the item is given to the owner of that ticket. 
We consider a model where K bidders are competing for N items in the Chinese 
Auction. Bidders have to decide how to allocate their budgets across all the items. The 
main assumption of this paper is that the winner for each item is determined 
stochastically. 
We analyze four situations: bidders can have given, or costly budgets and aim 
to maximize the total prize, or maximize a chance to win the majority. 
We find a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the game in all four situations. It 
turns out that the players allocate their budgets in the same proportion and each player 
competes in each contest in the Nash equilibria. Moreover, the individual equilibrium 
strategy depends on the contests' values and the individual budget, but it is independent 
from the budgets of all other players. The equilibria have a monotonic property: a player 
with higher budget has higher chance to win each item. 
We consider also a situation when individual budgets are private information. It 
turns out that there exists a unique monotonic Bayesian equilibrium. 
There are many applications of our model, such as R&D, arm races, military 
conflicts, simultaneous rent-seeking activities, and so on. 
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An important part of the global environment stabilization problem relates to 
ensuring effective ecological regulation in transitional and developing economies. 
Usually researchers try to explain modest results of economic policy in Russia and other 
transition economies, in particular of environmental incentive regulation, by presence of 
inherited behavior and institutions, and also by conflicts between new formal and old 
informal institutes. The paper demonstrates another possibility: “new” economies may 
possess purely economic features which force serious distinctions in results of work of 
institutional mechanisms which have shown good results in developed countries. A 
model is built as a game between a politician (a regulator who may be interested or 
uninterested in rents of firms) and two types of firms (one of them is more interested in 
increasing pollution levels). 
Laffont (2000) has investigated a model, in which firms-monopolists have the 
following cost function:  
( , ) ( )C d K dθ θ= − , 
where 0K >  – is a constant common for all firms, 0θ >  is a cost parameter which is 
a private information for a firm (type of firm), 0d >  – is a pollution level permitted for 
a firm of that type (determined by the regulator or chosen by the firm from a menu of 
contracts offered by the regulator). If there are two types of firms, θ θ< , then, in 
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Laffont’s case, firm θ  is always efficient and receives information rent. Matveenko 
(2010) introduced a more general cost function:  
( , ) ( )C d dθ κ θ θ= − , 
where ( ) 0κ θ > . With two types of firms, it is natural to consider  
( ) ( )
K
κ θ κ θ
θ θ
−= −
  
as an index of relative economic efficiency. 
Let S be a social value of a project; ( )V d  is a social value of a harm from 
pollution, and (.) 0, (.) 0V V′ ′′> > . Welfare of consumers equals 
( ) (1 )S V d tλ− − + . 
The factor 1 λ+  may be interpreted as return factor, which characterizes the 
gain of using in other projects means which the society loses making transfer t.  
With the generalized cost function, information rent is received by a relatively 
efficient firm. For “small” values of K , the firm of type θ  proves to be relatively 
efficient firm, while for “high” value of K  – the firm of type θ  does. For 
“intermediate” values K  no type of firm is able to capture a rent. The concepts of 
“small” and “large” K  are made precise in dependence on which type of regulator is in 
power and forms the menu of contracts. Three types of regulators are under 
consideration, they differ by objective functions: the social maximizer, interested 
majority, or uninterested majority. One denotes by α∗  a frequency of “interested” in 
society in those periods when “interested” are in power; v is a frequency of firms of type 
θ  in economy. 
It is proved in Matveenko, 2010 that under some conditions interested majority 
in power ought to solve what mechanism to use: separating (a menu of contracts) or 
pooling (a uniting contract for both types of firms).  
In the present paper another situation is considered: the society defines a kind of 
mechanism, while the ruling majority makes solution under this mechanism. Under 
assumption of small θΔ , the mechanisms are compared from the point of view of social 
welfare. 
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We show that under conditions which seem to be typical for developing and 
transitional economies, namely for “small” K  (when firms-polluters of type θ  gain 
from extending their possibilities to pollute) and under condition 
1
1
v vλα α∗ ∗
−< + <  
(which means that firms of type θ  are usual in the economy), the pooling (that is non-
market) mechanism is preferable for society.  
It appears that if under similar conditions the choice of mechanism is executed 
not by the society but by the interested majority, the separating (i. e. in the more degree 
market) mechanism would be picked out.  
For “large” K  (when “green” firms are more effective, what is typical for 
developed countries) the separating (market) mechanism is preferable for society, and 
the interested majority picks out this mechanism as well.  
The model shows that even the “standard” regulation institutions, which proved 
to be good in developed countries, may give absolutely other, unexpected results in those 
economies, in which the firms producing relatively high direct or indirect ecological 
damage thanks to that possess large relatively economical effectiveness and occupy an 
essential part of economy. This case is typical for developing and transitional economies. 
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The talk is devoted to the bargaining models and the analysis of its design 
which satisfies some proofness conditions. The bargaining process is based on some 
definitions: must be determined 
– the participants (players) 
– the sequence of the moves 
– the payoffs of players 
– horizon of bargaining process 
– fairness principles. 
We start from the cake division problem and discuss different positional and 
rational models to solve it. We introduce the bargaining model of sequential random 
offers in which the arbitrator generates some variants of the decision and the players 
choose one of them. We consider different versions of this approach in cake division 
problem and related problems. 
Arbitration procedures also apply to Labor-Manager interactions in wage rate 
problem. We consider traditional and new arbitration procedures and compare the 
decisions of conventional, final-offer arbitration and their combination. Some of 
arbitration procedures use the multiple arbitration. In this case the solution is accepted 
via voting or lottery mechanism. 
Another popular bargaining model is the seller-buyer interactions. We 
formulate the multistep bargaining model in which the players use the Bayesian 
strategies and can change it in each step. The equilibrium is derived for different 
probability distributions for reservation prices. 
We discuss some new approaches to the construction of the tender's design. The 
players {1,2,..., }n  submit the projects which are characterized by vectors 1{ ,..., }nx x  
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from some feasible set S  in space mR . The arbitrator considers the bids and chooses 
one of the projects using a stochastic procedure. The winner k  receives a gain ( )kkh x  
which depends on the parameters of the project. So, the payoffs in this non-cooperative 
game are  
 1( ,..., ) = ( ) ( ), = 1,..., ,nk k k kH x x h x S k nμ  
where k kS∪  is the Voronoi diagram of set S . Nash equilibrium in the problem is 
derived. 
The bargaining process finally ends with an agreement. We analyze some 
conditions for stability of this agreement and time consistency for the dynamic systems. 
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We consider a non-cooperative zero-sum game in which two players L  and M  
(Labour and Manager) have a dispute on an improvement in the wage rate. Player L  
makes an offer x , and player M  - an offer y ; x  and y  are arbitrary real numbers. If 
x y≤ , there is no conflict, and the players agree on a payoff equal to ( ) / 2x y+ . If, 
otherwise, x y> , the parties call in the arbitrator A . He use the final offer arbitration 
procedure [1]. Denote the arbitration settlement by z . The payoff in this game has a 
form: ( , ) ( , )zH x y EH x y= , where 
( )
,
2
, ,,   
, ,
, , .
z
x y if x y
x if x y x z y zH x y
y if x y x z y z
z if x y x z y z
+⎧ ≤⎪⎪⎪ > − < −= ⎨⎪ > − > −⎪ > − = −⎪⎩
 (1) 
Let 0y x∞ ∞− < ≤ ≤ < +  and z  is a discrete random variable. In the papers 
[2]-[3] for the cases where z  is distributed with equal probabilities in the points 1−  and 
1  or 1,0−  and 1 , respectively, the equilibrium in the game is found among mixed 
strategies. Denote ( )f x  and ( )g y  the mixed strategies of the players L  and M , 
respectively. We have: 
0
0
( ) 0, ( ) 1,     ( ) 0, ( ) 1.f x f x dx g y g y dy
∞
∞
+
−
≥ = ≥ =∫ ∫  
By symmetry, it follows that the value of the game is equal to zero, and the 
optimum strategies must be symmetric in respect to axes of ordinate, i.e. ( ) ( )g y f y= − . 
It therefore suffice to build an optimal strategy for one of the players, e.g. L . 
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Let the arbitrator chooses one of three numbers: 1,1,0−  - with the probabilities 
1
2
p− , p , 1
2
p−  (0 1)p< < , respectively. The case 1p = , 0p =  and 1
3
p =  were 
analysed above. 
Theorem 1. If [ )0 ,1p p∈ , where p  is the root of the equation 
4 3 28 4 4 1 0p p p p+ + + − =  from the interval 13 2 2,
5
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , then for the player L  the 
optimal strategy is  
3
0, 0 ,
1( ) , 2,
4
0, 2 ,
if x c
p cf x if c x c
p x
if c x ∞
≤ <⎧⎪ +⎪= < < +⎨⎪⎪ + < < +⎩
   (2) 
where 
2(1 )
2
pc
p
−= . 
Let the arbitrator chooses one of four numbers: 3,1,1,3−  - with probabilities 
1 1, , ,
2 2
p p p p− − , respectively. It is obviouse, that 10
2
p≤ ≤ . The case 1
2
p =  was 
analysed above and the case 0p =  gives the same result. 
Theorem 2. If 0
1,
2
p p⎡ ⎞∈ ⎟⎢⎣ ⎠ , where p  is the root of the equation 
5 4 3 232 16 24 8 8 1 0p p p p p+ + + − + =  from the interval 1 1,
535
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , then for the player 
L  the optimal strategy is  
3
3
0, 0 ,
1 , 2,
4 ( 1)
( )
3 , 2 4,
4 ( 1)
0, 4 ,
if x c
c if c x c
p x
f x
c if c x c
p x
if c x ∞
≤ <⎧⎪ +⎪ < < +⎪ +⎪= ⎨ +⎪ + < < +⎪ −⎪⎪ + < < +⎩
 (3) 
where 
2 1
2
p
c
p
+= − . 
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Let the arbitrator chooses the number 0  with probability p , and chooses the 
numbers n−  and n  with equal probabilities 1
3
n
p
p
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 ( ,0 1)n N p∈ < < . We have:  
1
12 ﻿ 1.
3
n
n
pp
p
∞
=
⎛ ⎞−+ =⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠∑  
Theorem 3. If [ )0 ,1p p∈ , where p  is the root of the equation 
5 4 3 28 6 5 1 0p p p p p+ − − − + =  from the interval 1 1,
7 6
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , then for the player L  the 
optimal strategy is the strategy (2). 
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The zero-sum differential search game between pursuer P  and evader E  in the 
class of mixed strategies with finite spectrum is considered([1], [2], [3]). The dynamic of 
the game is described by the following differential equation  
2
0 0
2
0 0
:     , ,   (0) , , , ,
:     , ,   (0) , , , , ,
P x u u x x x r l x u R
E y v v y y y r y v R
α
β β α
= ≤ = = + ∈
= ≤ = ≤ ≤ ∈

  
where 0r >  is the radius of the uncertainty disk of the initial disposition of Player E  
and the quantities r , l , α , and β  are parameters of the game. The detection set S(x) of 
player P  is the disk of radius l  centered at the position of the pursuer. Each player has 
only a priory information on the initial position of the other. Player P  tries to maximize 
the probability of detection of the evader using mixed strategies. The mixed strategies of 
the pursuer determined with help of the an auxiliary game with a team of pursuers. In 
this paper for the game with a team of pursuers we construct the information set ([4], [5], 
[6]) for the position of the evader and study properties and numerical approximation 
problems of this information set. 
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This algorithm does not use linear programming, being its computational 
complexity analysis easier than the ones which use it. Moreover, the enumeration is 
made (pre-)ordering the complete games in a lattice structure, which may be interesting 
for the verification of other properties; for instance, the level of a game inside the lattice, 
its distance to the greatest and least element, or the distance between two different 
games. 
Finally, we also compare this algorithm with the used in [FM08], from the point 
of view of CPU time, and the maximum number of players for which is able to obtain in 
the practice all complete games. 
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games in which players have infinite type sets and infinite action sets. A finite 
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A TU–cooperative game with restricted cooperation is a quadruple ( , , , )N A c v , 
where N  is a finite set of agents, A  is a collection of coalitions of agents, c  is a 
positive real number (the amount of resourses to be divided by agents), = { ( )}T Av v T ∈ , 
where ( ) > 0v T  is a claim of coalition T . We assume that A  covers N . A solution F  
is a map that associates to any game ( , , , )N A c v  a subset of the set 
{{ } : 0, = }.i i N i ii Ny y y c∈ ∈≥ ∑  We denote ( ) = .ii Sy S y∈∑  
If = {{ } : }A i i N∈  then a claim problem arises. Claim methods and their 
axiomatic justifications are described in surveys [1] and [3]. 
In this paper we consider generalizations of the Proportional method for claim 
problems. 
Let nX R⊂ , 1, , kf f…  be functions defined on X . For z X∈ , let π  be a 
permutation of {1, , }n…  such that ( ) ( 1)( ) ( )i if z f zπ π +≤ , ( ) =1( ) = { ( )}ni iz f zπθ . Then 
y X∈  belongs to the nucleolus with respect to 1, , kf f…  on X  iff  
( ) ( ) .lexy z forall z Xθ θ≥ ∈  
We consider the following generalized methods. 
169 
 
1. A vector = { }i i Ny y ∈  belongs to the proportional solution of ( , , , )N A c v  iff 
there exists > 0α  such that ( ) = ( )y T v Tα  for all T A∈ , 0iy ≥  for all i N∈ , 
=ii Ny c∈∑ . 
2. A vector = { }i i Ny y ∈  belongs to the weakly proportional solution of 
( , , , )N A c v  iff 0iy ≥  for all i N∈ , =ii Ny c∈∑ , ( ) / ( ) = ( ) / ( )y S v S y Q v Q  for 
,S Q A∈  with =S Q∩ ∅ . 
3. A vector = { }i i Ny y ∈  belongs to the proportional nucleolus of ( , , , )N A c v  
iff y  belongs to the nucleolus w.r.t. { }T T Af ∈  with ( ) = ( ) / ( )Tf z z T v T  on the set 
{ = { } : 0, = }i i N i ii Nz z z z c∈ ∈≥ ∑ . 
4. Let G  be a class of strictly increasing continuos functions g  defined on 
(0, )+∞  such that (1) = 0g , ( )g t → +∞  as t → +∞ , and 
0
( ) <lim
x
x a
g t dt
→
+∞∫  for 
each > 0a . 
A vector = { }i i Ny y ∈  belongs to the g –solution of ( , , , )N A c v  if y  minimizes 
( )
( )
( / ( ))
z S
S Av S
g t v S dt
∈
∑ ∫  on the set { = { } : 0, = }i i N i ii Nz z z z c∈ ∈≥ ∑ . 
Examples. 
1.Let ( ) = lng t t , then 
( )
( )
( / ( )) = ( )(ln( ( ) / ( )) 1) ( )
z S
v S
g t v S dt z S z S v S v S− +∫  
and the g –solution is the weighted entropy solution [2]. 
2.Let ( ) = 1qg t t − , where > 0q , then we obtain the minimization problem 
for 
1( )
[ ( 1) ( )]
( )
q
q
S A
z S
q z S
v S
+
∈
− +∑  that was considered in [4]. 
For each A , > 0c , v  with ( ) > 0v T , the proportional nucleolus and the g –
solution of ( , , , )N A c v  are nonempty and define uniquely ( )y T  for each T A∈ . 
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The proportional solution of ( , , , )N A c v  is nonempty for all > 0c , v  with 
( ) > 0v T  iff A  is a minimal covering of N . 
Necessary and sufficient condition on A  that ensures nonemptyness of the A –
weakly proportional solution for all > 0c , v  with ( ) > 0v T  was obtained in [2]. 
The g –solution is contained in the proportional solution of ( , , , )N A c v  for all 
> 0c , v  with ( ) > 0v T  iff A  is a partition of N . 
For each i N∈ , denote = { : }iA T A i T∈ ∈ . 
Theorem 1. Let g G∈ . The g –solution of ( , , , )N A c v  is contained in the weakly 
proportional solution of ( , , , )N A c v  for all > 0c , v  iff =1=
k i
iA B∪ , where each iB  
is contained in a partition of N ; 
iQ B∈ , jS B∈ , and i j≠  imply Q S∩ ≠ ∅ ; 
for each i N∈ , iQ A∈  S A∈  with =Q S∩ ∅ , there exists j N∈  such that 
= { } \ { }j iA A S Q∪ . 
Theorem 2. The proportional nucleolus of ( , , , )N A c v  is contained in the weakly 
proportional solution of ( , , , )N A c v  for all > 0c , v  iff =1=
k i
iA B∪ , where each iB  
is contained in a partition of N ; 
iQ B∈ , jS B∈ , and i j≠  imply Q S∩ ≠ ∅ ; 
if {1, , }M k⊂ … , i M iS∈∩ ≠ ∅  for some iiS B∈ , then i M iQ∈∩ ≠ ∅  for all 
i
iQ B∈ , i M∈ . 
A collection of coalitions A  is totally mixed at N  if =1=
k i
iA P∪ , where iP  
are partitions of N  and for each collection =1{ }
k
i iS , 
i
iS P∈ , we have =1ki iS∩ ≠ ∅ . 
Theorem 3. Let g G∈ . The g –solution of ( , , , )N A c v  coincides with the weakly 
proportional solution of ( , , , )N A c v  for all > 0c , v  iff A  is totally mixed at N . 
Theorem 4. Let =1=
k i
iA B∪ , where 2k ≥ , 
each iB  is contained in a partition of N ; 
iQ B∈ , jS B∈ , and i j≠  imply Q S∩ ≠ ∅ ; 
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each i N∈  belongs to m  coalitions in A , 2 m k≤ ≤ ; 
if we take any m  collections 1jB ,... jmB , then for each collection =1{ }
m
j t
t
S  with 
jt
j
t
S B∈ , we have =1mt j
t
S∩ ≠ ∅ . 
Then the proportional nucleolus of ( , , , )N A c v  coincides with g –solution of 
( , , , )N A c v  for all g G∈ , > 0c , v  and is contained in the weakly proportional 
solution. 
 
References 
 
[1] Moulin, H., 2002. Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing. Handbook of Social Choice and 
Welfare, Volume 1, Chapter 6. Arrow K.J., Sen A.K. and Suzumura K. eds., 289-357. 
[2] Naumova, N., 2010. Claim problems with coalition demands. The fouth international 
conference Game Theory and Management GTM 2010 Abstracts, 157-159. 
[3] Thomson, W., 2003. Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation 
problems: a survey. Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 249-297. 
[4] Yanovskaya, E., Consistency for proportional solutions. International Game Theory Review, 
Volume 4, N3, 343-356.  
172 
 
The Dynamic Interaction between Entrepreneurship and 
the Public Sector Efficiency 
 
 
Gonzalo Olcina1, Luisa Escriche2 and Empar Pons3 
 
1,2,3University of Valencia 
Spain 
1gonzalo.olcina@uv.es 
2luisa.escriche@uv.es 
3amparo.pons@uv.es 
 
 
 
Keywords: Occupational Choice, Public Sector Efficiency, Entrepreneurship, Cultural 
Transmission, Social Preferences. 
 
 
Entrepreneurship is widely viewed as a key aspect of economic dynamism as it 
determines productivity, innovation and employment and, then, economic growth. In this 
paper we focus in two of the main determinants of the level of entrepreneurship in a 
society: the regulatory framework (related with the public sector performance) and the 
distribution of preferences in the society and its intergenerational transmission, what is 
also called the culture of a society. 
It is often suggested that there is a relationship between the public sector 
performance and the entrepreneurship level and it is many times argued that the best 
thing a Government can do to promote entrepreneurship is to create an efficient context 
in which entrepreneurship and other forms of individual initiative can flourish. As the 
OECD-Eurostat Entrepreneurship Indicator Programme (EIP 2009) indicates 
entrepreneurship requires a good, clear and enforceable regulatory framework, e.g. 
property rights, institutions for resolving disputes, protection of contractual partners, etc. 
Many authors have argued that the prevailing social norms, attitudes or culture 
of a particular region have played a critical role determining its development. Several 
institutional, political or economic outcomes are difficult to explain just in terms of 
economic incentives. Recent empirical research supports the theoretical proposition of a 
positive correlation between risk attitudes and the decision to become an entrepreneur 
(see, e.g., Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag, 2002; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 
2006). In addition, Domen, Falk, Fuman (2006), De la Paola (2010) and Leuermanm 
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Necker (2010) report evidence that a crucial determinant of entrepreneurship, 
willingness to take risk, is transmitted from parents to children. 
There exists also another strong indirect indicator of this parental transmission. 
Recent empirical work has shown that self-employment is correlated across generations, 
so that the children of the self-employed are themselves more likely to be self-employed 
(Colombier and Masclet 2008; Hundley 2006, among others). Therefore, not only 
preferences but also behaviour shows a high intergenerational correlation. 
In this context, the efficiency of the public sector as a key factor for 
entrepreneurship will influence not only the decision of risk takers to become 
entrepreneurs but also the incentives of parents to transmit risk-taking preferences. 
Therefore, there is a two-way feedback between changes in the preference distribution of 
the population and changes in the distribution of behaviour in the population. 
We present an overlapping generation model with intentional and costly cultural 
transmission of preferences in order to analyze the interaction between entrepreneurship 
and the efficiency of the public sector. Two important features of our model are that on 
the one hand, each adult makes an occupational choice between becoming an 
entrepreneur, a civil servant or a routine producer. And, on the other hand, all the adults´ 
population in each generation makes a decision on taxes by majority voting. This 
collective decision on a proportional tax affects the net profits obtained by the 
entrepreneurs and the wage of the civil servants. 
If an individual decides to become an entrepreneur and start a risky project, the 
expected results will depend crucially on the level of effort exerted by the civil servants. 
This level of effort captures in the model the level of efficiency of the public sector and 
can have other alternative interpretations as, for instance, the level of corruption in the 
public sector. If civil servants work hard (or alternatively there are low levels of 
corruption), the expected profits for the entrepreneur are the highest. Conversely, if they 
exert low effort (or there are high levels of corruption), the project may likely fail. 
We want to analyze in a dynamic setting this interaction when risk preferences 
are heterogeneous in the population and endogenous. In the initial condition of the 
society there are individuals with preferences for risk-taking that might choose to 
become entrepreneurs under the appropriate circumstances. But, there is also an initial 
proportion of risk averse individuals that will never choose to become an entrepreneur. 
Cultural (preference) transmission combines direct (parental) transmission and oblique 
transmission (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Each adult 
174 
 
has one offspring and has to make a costly decision regarding his/her child education. 
Parents are altruistic and care about their offspring's well-being. The expected utility 
their children will obtain in the labour market depends on their preferences. As a 
consequence, parents try to transmit the more valuable preferences through socialization 
process taking into account their own expectations (Bisin and Verdier, 1998, 2000, 
2001). If this parental transmission does not succeed then children acquire risk-taking 
preferences from the social environment. 
We characterize the long run behaviour of this society, that is, the stable steady 
states of the cultural transmission dynamics. Our framework shows how and why 
different cultures can arise in the long run. Namely, three very different cultures are 
possible. A first one with a large share of risk takers in the population, a high level of 
entrepreneurship and a level of taxes just enough to implement high effort by officials 
(that is, an efficient public sector). A second one in which there is a majority of risk 
averse individuals in the population. But, although there is a significant proportion of 
risk- taking individuals, there are no entrepreneurs at all because of the threat of 
confiscatory taxes on the entrepreneurs’ profits. In this society individuals work on the 
traditional (and less risky) sector and officials obtain a very low wage. And finally, there 
is a last equilibrium culture also with a majority of risk averse individuals and with a 
high share of officials and routine producers but still a low positive level of 
entrepreneurship. In this culture the majority votes for confiscatory taxes, which implies 
that the entrepreneurs' profits are just non-monetary and the wages paid to the officials 
are high. Our analysis shows how the culture that eventually prevails in the long run 
depends on the parameters of the model and also on the initial condition (the history) of 
the society. In this sense, our model can contribute to account for the differences 
observed among countries (Mediterranean vs. Nordic) or within countries (north vs. 
south of Italy or Spain) concerning the dynamics of the productive structure and the 
public sector efficiency. 
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Stochastic games [1] with the finite sets of players, game elements and the finite 
sets of players' strategies in each game element are considered in the work. The game 
element is defined by the game in the normal form. We use the mathematical expectation 
of the player's payoff as a measure of the player's payoff in the stochastic game. The 
duration of the game is a discrete random variable and it is supposed to have geometric 
distribution. The players are also supposed to use stationary strategies in the game, i.e. a 
player's choice of the strategy at each game stage does not depend on the stage number and 
history but depends on the game element which is realized at this stage. 
In the paper the cooperative version of the described above stochastic game is 
examined. We find the cooperative decision [2,3], i.e. such a strategy-profile (or 
strategy-profiles if there are more than one) in pure stationary strategies in a stochastic 
game when using them all players cooperating receive the maximal total expected payoff 
(in this strategy class). The characteristic function (maxmin in pure stationary strategies) 
is defined for imputation deriving. Before the game starts players can find the 
components of the chosen imputation (Shapley value, core, nucleolus, etc.) if they know 
the game parameters. Players know that if they want to receive the components of the 
chosen imputation they have to use the cooperative decision (some strategy-profile in 
pure stationary strategies). 
A stochastic game is a dynamic game. If during the game process players get 
into game elements at each stage and realizing the cooperative decision get the payoffs 
according to their payoff function determined within the game in the normal form of this 
stage then in most stochastic games the expected sum of player's payoffs is not equal to 
the expected value of the imputation component derived at the beginning of the game. It 
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means the breach of the first condition of stable cooperation, the breach of subgame 
consistency (time consistency) of the cooperative agreement. The failure of this 
condition can lead to the coalition breakup. In 1977 L.A. Petrosyan introduced the 
conception of time consistency for the class of differential games [4]. In 1979 he 
proposed the procedure of players' payoffs redistribution, i.e. payoff distribution 
procedure (PDP)[5]. Redistributing the players' payoffs at each game stage, i.e. in each 
game element realized in stochastic game it can be obtained that the expected payoff of 
any player in the game be equal to the expected value of the corresponding imputation 
component. Using PDP the regularization of the initial stochastic game is realized. 
The second principle of stable cooperation is strategic stability that guarantees 
the existence of Nash equilibrium in the regularized stochastic game in the class of 
behaviour strategies with the players' payoffs which they expect to receive as a result of 
the cooperative agreement (see [6]). 
The third principle of stable cooperation is irrational behaviour proof condition 
[7]. This condition guarantees that if cooperation breaks down for some reason at some 
game stage and after that the player plays independently then he will totally receive not 
less than if he has played independently from the beginning of the game. 
In the work three principles of stable cooperation (see [6]) are formulated for the 
defined above stochastic games. The procedure of stochastic game regularization is 
introduced and sufficient conditions for the second and third principles of stable cooperation 
are obtained. All theoretical results are demonstrated with the numerical example. 
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In (Pechersky, 2010) a proportional excess invariant solution (i.e. solution, 
which is invariant with respect to proportional excess) for NTU games was defined as a 
generalization of the proportional excess invariant value for positive TU defined by 
E.Yanovskaya (2004). We call this solution proportional invariant for short. 
Firstly recall the definition of the proportional excess for NTU games. It was 
defined axiomatically by author (see, for example, Pechersky, 2007). Let N  be a set of 
players. Let NCG+  denotes the space of NTU games possessing the following properties 
for every   S N⊆ , where N  is the finite set of players: 
(a) ( )V S  is positively generated, i.e.  ( )  ( ( )  ) –S SV S V S R R+ += ∩  and 
( )  ( ) SV S V S R+ += ∩  is a compact set, and every ray   {  : 0 }, xL xλ λ= ≥  
  (0, , 0)x O≠ = …  does not intersect the boundary of ( )V S  more than once; 
(b) O  is an interior point of the set  \^ ( ) ( ) N SV S V S R= × . 
(Of course, all ( )V S  are comprehensive). 
Let v  be a positive TU game, i. e. ( )  0v S >  for every S . Then the 
corresponding NTU game  NV CG+∈  can be defined by 
( )  {   : (  )  ( ) } – S SV S x R x S v S R+ += ∈ ≤  . 
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For   S N⊂  a set  ( ) SV S R⊂  will be called a game subset, if it satisfies (a) 
and (b). The space consisting of all game subsets satisfying (a) and (b) will be denoted 
by SNCG + .  
Let  NV CG+∈  be an arbitrary game. Then the proportional excess 
  :  S NS Nh CG R R+ +× →  is defined by  
( , )  1 / ( ( ), ),S Sh V x V S xγ=  
where ( , )   {   0 :    }W y inf y Wγ λ= > ∈  is the gauge (or Minkowski gauge) function. 
If  SNV CG +∈  corresponds to a positive TU game v , then 
( , )  ( ) / ( ).Sh V x v S x S=  
A solution ψ  (not necessarily single-valued) on NCG +  is called proportional 
invariant if for every two games ,  NV W CG +∈  and every ( ), ( )x V N y W N+ +∈ ∂ ∈ ∂ , 
the equalities  
( , )  ( , )S Sh V x h W y=  for every S N⊂  
imply  
ψ ψ∈ ⇔ ∈ ( , )  ( , )x N V y N W . 
Theorem 1 (Pechersky, 2010). There is a proportional invariant solution on NCG + . 
For every game NV CG +∈  it can be defined as the solution of the system  
( ),x V N+∈ ∂  
 
 : :
( , )  ( , ) S S
S S i S S j
h V x h V x=∑ ∑  for all ,i j N∈ .  (1) 
We call such a solution p.i.-solution. If we replace system (1) by the following 
one 
 
 : :
( ) ( , )  ( ) ( , )  S S
S S i S S j
c s h V x c s h V x=∑ ∑ for all  ,i j N∈  (2) 
for some non-negative numbers ≥ ≤ − =( ) 0,   1, | |c s s n n N , then the corresponding 
solution we shall call p.i.(c)-solution. 
The following properties follow immediately from the definition and the 
existence theorem.  
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1) If  NV CG +∈  corresponds to a positive TU game v , then ( ) 1Vψ = , and 
( )  ( )V vψ ψ= , where ψ  is the corresponding proportional invariant TU value.  
2) P.I.-solution ψ  (and p.i.(c)-solution, too) possesses efficiency, anonymity 
and positive homogeneity properties. 
Let us introduce an operation on .NCG +  We call it the directional addition, and 
define it as follows. Let ,  SNA B CG +∈ . Then for every  Sx R+∈  there are exactly two 
points y A∈ ∂  and z B∈ ∂  such that xy xλ=  and xz xμ=  for some positive 
numbers xλ  and xμ . Then the directional sum of A  and B , denoted by dA B⊗  , is 
defined as follows: 
( )   comp { }d x x xA B xλ μ⊗ = +∪ , 
where compF  denotes the comprehensive hull of a set F .  
Let now ,  NV W CG +∈  with ( ) ( )V N W N= . Define the game dV W⊗  as 
follows: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ), dV W N V N W N⊗ = =  
( )( ) ( ) ( )d dV W S V S W S⊗ = ⊗  for every ⊊  S N . 
Clearly  d NV W CG +⊗ ∈ . 
It is not difficult to prove that  
( , )  ( , )  ( , ) S d S Sh V W x h V x h W x⊗ = +  for every ⊊  S N . 
Proposition 1. Let , NV W CG +∈  with ( ) ( )V N W N= , and ( ) ( )x V Wψ ψ∈ ∩ . Then 
( )dx V Wψ∈ ⊗ . 
We call this property restricted directional linearity (similarly to restricted 
linearity in TU case). 
Theorem 2. A proportional excess invariant solution ψ  on NCG +  possesses efficiency, 
anonymity, positive homogeneity and restricted directional linearity if and only if there 
is a system of nonnegative numbers ≥ ≤ − =( ) 0,   1, | |c s s n n N  such that ψ  is 
p.i.(c)-solution. 
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We investigate necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of 
Bayesian-Nash equilibria that satisfy the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). In the 
Bayesian game nG  among n  jurors, we allow for arbitrary distribution on the types of 
jurors. In particular, any kind of dependency is possible. If each juror i has a “constant 
strategy”, iσ  (that is, a strategy that is independent of the size n i≥  of the jury), such 
that 1 2( , ,..., ...)nσ σ σ σ=  satisfies the CJT, then by McLennan (1998) there exists a 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that also satisfies the CJT. We translate the CJT condition on 
sequences of constant strategies into the following problem: 
 
(**) For a given sequence of binary random variables 1 2( , ,..., ,...)nX X X X=  with joint 
distribution P , does the distribution P  satisfy the asymptotic part of the CJT ? 
 
We provide sufficient conditions and two general (distinct) necessary conditions for 
(**) We give a complete solution to this problem when X is a sequence of exchangeable 
binary random variables. 
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Network game in which a finite number of players wish to reach the same point 
"A" but their paths cannot intersect is considered. Each edge of the network has its 
transportation cost. The main task of this game is to find the best way to reach point "A" 
for each player in case of full or partial cooperation of players. 
The algorithm is proposed for finding players paths, which lead to a situation 
where the total cost of transportation for all players will be close to minimum. 
On that basis the cooperative game model is constructed. The characteristic 
function is computed using the proposed algorithm. For some given networks the Shaply 
Value is calculated. It turns out that the proposed algorithm gives also transportation 
strategies which form a Nash equilibrium in corresponding noncooperative game. 
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Since more than fifteen years, countries have been engaged in a process of 
reduction of Greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in order to limit the extent of global 
warming. The first step to the international control of GHG has been reached with the 
signature of the Kyoto Protocol (1997). During theses negotiations, individual emission 
reduction targets, or put differently individual emission quotas, have been assigned to 41 
developed countries. (Targets were defined with respect to the reference year 1990 and 
had to be reached during the first period of commitment 2008-2012.) Moreover, the 
principle of the international trading of emission permits has been adopted.  
In spite of this attempt to solve the climate change problem, it is now clear that 
countries have not yet achieved full cooperation toward its resolution. Firstly, one of the 
two biggest GHG emitters, the United States, has not ratified the treaty. The second one, 
China, was not submitted to emission reduction during the first period of implementation 
and Russia has ratified the treaty at a later date (in 2004). In addition, participating 
countries have agreed on emission reduction targets that were far from matching 
scientific recommendations, because they were not stringent enough. More recently, the 
Copenhagen (2009) submit's objective was to bring all countries involved in the climate 
change problem – including the USA, China and developing countries – together around 
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a table and to decide on an international timetable for reducing further GHG emissions 
during the next decades. But, discussions did not lead to real progress. Actually, many 
countries were reluctant to accept individually constraining emission quotas. 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid the worst consequences of global warming, it seems that 
a common view has emerged about the necessity the limit the rise of temperature to 2 
degrees C at the horizon of 2050. In a sense, most countries have then agreed on a global 
emission reduction effort – or emission cap – but have failed to decide on how this 
global burden should be shared between countries. 
Motivated by this last observation, this paper raises the question of whether a 
system that would consist in setting a global emission cap and letting countries directly 
choose their emission levels (under this common constraint) can outperform, from a 
welfare perspective, an international cap and trade system where countries have to 
decide on national emission quotas. 
In the same vein as Helm (2003), we assume that national governments behave 
non cooperatively under any circumstances. This approach may be criticized since it 
looks a bit extreme but it does not seem to be at odd with what has been observed in 
successive climate negotiations. We therefore consider a static partial equilibrium model 
that has the following features. In each heterogeneous country (or group of countries), 
polluting firms use a technology that involves a single input, namely, emissions. 
Emissions generate profits at home but aggregate emissions are a public bad since they 
are damaging to all countries. In this context, two general scenarios are envisioned. First, 
countries directly and non cooperatively choose the amount of emissions (business as 
usual scenario, BAU). Next, we assume that an international cap and trade system (ICT), 
such as the one designed during the Kyoto protocol, is implemented. This system 
consists of the choice, by each country, of a national emission quota and of the 
possibility to trade emission permits on a competitive market. 
Comparing these two scenarios, Helm (2003) finds ambiguous results both in 
terms of aggregate emissions and welfare. He notably shows that the ICT system may 
fail to lower aggregate GHG emissions (with respect to the BAU scenario). In fact, some 
governments (the less concerned by the environment) have the incentive to choose an 
emission quota higher than the emission level they would have chosen in the absence of 
market. The reason is that they perceive their influence on the equilibrium market price. 
In this situation, emissions trading may be unanimously preferred by countries since the 
market allows for efficiency gains. In the opposite case where the ICT succeeds in 
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lowering emissions, some countries may lose from emission trading and consequently 
may not approve this system.  
This paper adds to this analysis the opportunity for countries – for now on 
players – to adopt a global emission cap (GEC) that puts a (potentially binding) ceiling 
on aggregate emissions. Thus we will have two different regimes in each scenario 
depending on whether the global cap is binding. Note that a priori, countries can choose 
between the two scenarios and between the two regimes. 
To start with, we consider a game with general quadratic payoffs functionals 
and only two players. The players differ with respect to both their environmental 
concerns and their technology. The first player, who is the most aware about 
environmental issues and who owns the most efficient technology, can be identified as a 
group of industrialized countries (such as the European Union). The second player thus 
represents a group of developing countries. 
The first part of the analysis is devoted to the calculation of non cooperative 
solutions in each scenario. In a social Nash equilibrium (also called coupled constraint 
Nash equilibrium, see for instance Krawczyk, 2005), each player chooses her emission 
level (BAU) – or her emission allowance (ICT) – taking as given the strategy of the 
other player and the constraint imposed by the global ceiling. When this ceiling is non 
binding, there exists a unique social Nash equilibrium. The aggregate welfare attained 
under the ICT is higher than the one obtained in the BAU whereas aggregate emissions 
are identical. When the emission cap is binding, there exist in general an infinity of Nash 
equilibria. We therefore proceed to a selection by the normalized equilibrium 
(introduced by Rosen, 1965, see also Krawczyk, 2005, who motivates the use of this 
selection in environmental games) and solve the problem using the quasi-variational 
inequalities theory (see notably Morgan and Romaniello, 2006). For any level of the 
emission cap, the normalized equilibrium is uniquely determined and both global and 
individual welfare can be defined as functions of the cap. 
Within both scenarios, the emphasis is then on the effect of the setting of the 
global ceiling on welfare. Since countries can choose between the two regimes, our first 
concern is with the acceptability of the GEC. In the BAU scenario, we can show that 
there exists a non-empty range of values for which setting a binding ceiling improves all 
players' welfare. Therefore, this regime allows the world economy to reduce GHG 
emissions and translates into welfare gains (by comparison with the other regime, 
without any pollution control). 
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When the trading of emission permits is allowed that is, in the ICT scenario, we 
can also find a non empty set of values such that imposing a binding emission cap is 
beneficial to the player representing developed countries. Developing countries' welfare 
may increase or decrease as a consequence of the introduction of the cap. Assuming that 
environmental concerns are low, even for the first player, then the other player also 
benefits from the GEC. 
More importantly, we can identify a non empty set of values, for the global 
ceiling, for which the GEC system alone allows the world economy to reach a level of 
aggregate welfare (respectively of aggregate emissions) higher than (respectively lower 
than) the level resulting from the ITC system alone. In other words, from an aggregate 
perspective, the GEC outperforms the ITC system. In addition, it is worth mentioning 
that the GEC has the advantage of circumventing the critical question of how the initial 
allocation of permits between countries should be determined (this difficulty explaining 
why international negotiations fail to achieve an efficient agreement) since countries 
only need to agree with each other on the global emission ceiling to be imposed. They do 
not have to engage in binding individual quota and can choose freely their emission level 
under the constraint imposed (but accepted) by the ceiling. This clearly echoes what has 
been observed in Copenhagen. 
An incoming development of this work consists in extending the analysis to a 
larger number of groups of countries. Considering at least three groups of countries 
allows us to capture the heterogeneity of countries that participate to international 
climate negotiations. For instance, it is interesting to introduce a third group, say Russia 
and the United States, who owns an efficient technology but has low environmental 
concerns and see how the results are modified in the extended framework. Another 
natural extension of this analysis is to account for the intertemporal dimension of the 
climate change problem. This can be done by assessing the issue raised by the present 
paper in a differential game. 
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One of cooperative game theory problems is the characterization of extreme 
directions of polyhedral cones of various classes of games and description the behavior 
of solution concepts defined on these cones ([4]). One of important is the cone of big 
boss games ([2]), which we denote by 1
NK . A game 
= { : 2 : ( ) = 0}N NG g Rν ν∈ → , where = {1, , }N n…  and 2n ≥ , is called a 
big boss game with player 1 as big boss if: ν  is monotonic, ( ) = 0Sν  if 1S ∋  (boss 
property), ( ) ( \ ) ( )ii SN N S Mν ν ν∈− ≥ ∑  for each \ 1S N⊆  (union property), 
where ( ) = ( ) ( \ )iM N N iν ν ν− . These games have been used for numerous 
applications and are extensively studied. Moreover, all results received for monotonic 
clan games ([3]) are applicable also to games in 1
NK . In some studies a big boss game is 
defined without the monotonicity condition. Since the most solution concepts satisfy on 
1
NK  the relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence, we will consider a big 
boss games in (0-1)-form. At normalization the cone 1
NK  will be transformed to 
1(2 2)n− − − dimensional polytope 1NP  which can be described by its extreme points. 
Denote 1 = { 2 : 1 | |= 1}.
N NS S or SΩ ∈ ∋  Next proposition provides the system of 
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non redundant conditions for 1
NP . Let NGν ∈ . Then 1NPν ∈  iff the following 
conditions hold 
(i) ( ) = 0Sν  for 1NS ∈ Ω , ( ) = 1Nν , 
(ii) 1 2( ) ( )S Sν ν≤  if 1 21 S S N∈ ⊂ ⊆ , 2 1| |=| | 1S S + , 2| | 1S n≠ − , 
(iii) 
\
( ) ( \ ) | | 1
i N S
S N i S nν ν∈− ≤ + −∑  if 1 S N∈ ⊂ , | | 2.S n≤ −  
None of these conditions is implied by the others.  
Denote by ( )ext P  a set of all extreme points of polytope P . Clearly, the 
simple games belonging to 1
NP  are its integer extreme points. In particular, 
1( )
N
Tu ext P∈ , where Tu  is unanimity game, = {1, }T i , \ 1i N∈ . Since players 1  
and i  are symmetric in Tν , we have the big boss game with two ''bosses''. For 4n ≤  
the set 1( )
next P  contains integer games only. We have calculated all extreme points of 
5
1P  and divided the non integers into seven equivalence classes. The extension of results 
for 51P  allowed us to receive the description of some types of extreme points of general 
polytope 1
NP  and explicit formulas for corresponding consensus and Shapley values, 
denoted by K  and Sh  respectively. Let n Nk Gν ∈  is determined for all 
{2, , 1}k n∈ −…  by  
 1( ) = 0 | | 1, ( ) = 1 .
n N n
k kS if S or S k S otherwiseν ν∈ Ω ≤ −  (1) 
Then 1( )
n N
k ext Pν ∈  and  
 1 1
2 1
( ) = , ( ) = ,
2
n n
k k
n k n k
K Sh
n n
ν ν− + − +  (2) 
 2 1( ) = , ( ) = \ 1.
2 ( 1) ( 1)
n n
i k i k
n k k
K Sh for i N
n n n n
ν ν+ − − ∈− −  (3) 
Similar results are received for some non integer games in 1( )
Next P . 
The core ( )C ν  of each game 1NPν ∈  is determined by marginal vector only 
([2]), so all games in 1
NP  having identical marginals have the same core. If ( )C ν  is a 
190 
 
singleton, i.e. ( ) = { }cC xν , then the bargaining set, kernel and lexicore coincide with 
cx . Moreover, cx  coincides with nucleolus, τ −value, AL −value and any core 
selector. Thus, cx  should reflect many principles of fairness. However, for games with 
zero ( )iM ν , \ 1i N∈ , we have = (1,0, , 0)cx … . According to cx  player 1 (boss) 
gets the whole surplus from cooperation that ignores the productive role of other players. 
Such games are in particular nkν  determined by (1) and all games in their convex hull 
and also all games in NG  having corresponding (0-1)-form. At the same time, by (2) 
and (3) we obtain different consensus and Shapley values. For example, 
6 6
2 5
1 1 1 1 3 3
( ) = ( , , , ), ( ) = ( , , , )
2 10 10 4 20 20
K Kν ν… … , 
6 6
2 5
5 1 1 1 2 2
( ) = ( , , , ), ( ) = ( , , , )
6 30 30 3 15 15
Sh Shν ν… … . 
Thus, for 1=2({ } )
n n
k kcoν ν −∈  the consensus and Shapley values prescribes a rather natural 
outcomes. 
We name a game 1
NPν ∈  l -symmetric if each pair of powerless players 
, \ 1i j N∈  is symmetric in ν . Let 1NLSP  be a set of all l -symmetric games. The set 
1( )
next LSP  can be described by means of binary vectors. Let NGν ∈  and let 
2 2= ( , , )nx x x −…  be 0,1-valued vector. Then 1( )Next LSPν ∈  iff it has one of 
following representations: 
(i) there is such {2, , 1}k n∈ −…  that = nkν ν , where nkν  determined by (1), 
(ii) ( ) = 0Sν  for 1NS ∈ Ω , ( ) = 1Nν , 2( \ ) = 1
n
N j
n
ν −−  for \ 1j N∈ , 
( ) = (| |)S f Sν  otherwise, where ( )f i  is determined for all {1, , 2}i n∈ −…  by  
1
(1) = 0, ( ) = ( 1) = 0 ( ) = = 1.
1i i
i
f f i f i if x and f i if x
n
−− −  
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The issue of the research 
Merger control is one of the ongoing issues of the competition policy. 
Nowadays merger control is exercised according to the “rule of reason”, that is the 
decision should be made taking into account both positive and negative consequences of 
the merger. In the last decade the reduction in the bans on mergers and simultaneous 
increasing of nominal approvals could be seen in this area of competition policy. It 
means that Competition Authority approves the merger on condition that the merging 
companies meet the requirements to reestablish the broken competitive conditions while 
retaining efficiency gains form the merger. Such requirements (conditions) were called 
remedies. 
These remedies could be divided into two groups: behavioral and structural. The 
former group comprises regulations which limit the behavior of the companies after the 
merger. The latter includes the requirements of the partial divesture of assets of the 
merging companies before the merger takes place. 
Competition Authorities of the USA and the EU prefer to impose structural 
remedies which are preferential for the number of reasons while in Russia Competition 
Authority mainly relies on behavioral remedies regardless of the fact that legislative 
framework for application of structural remedies was established in 2006. 
The growing number of situations where remedies were applied to mergers led 
to the necessity to increase efficiency of this competition policy tool. This is proved by 
publicizing both the results of empirical studies of competition policy and the findings of 
research papers based on formal methods of investigating interaction between 
competition authorities and merging companies when the remedy was applied. 
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Brief summary of academic context 
Researchers pay special attention to structural remedies due to the fact that 
Competition Authorities of the USA and the EU prefer to rely on them. Medvedev 
(2004) devises a model describing interaction between competition authorities which 
impose the requirements of the divesture of assets and the merging companies on the 
basis of Cournot model. Rey (2000), Gonzalez (2003) analyze the impact of information 
asymmetry on the efficiency of remedy applications. The notion of remedy design as an 
incentive contract is discussed by Werden, Froeb, Tschantz (2005). Special attention 
should be paid to the research of Cosnita, Tropeano, (2005) with the primary objective to 
work out an incentive contract which would make the companies to disclose information 
about actual efficiency gains form the merger. 
The aim of the research 
The aim of this research paper is to study the possible opportunist behavior of the 
merging companies under conditions when competition authorities can choose type of 
remedies with the help of game theory methods. 
The theoretical framework 
In order to devise a model the following concepts were used: static games, 
dynamic games, the theory of incentive contracts, oligopoly theory (Cournot model).  
Main findings 
This paper contributes to the economic analysis of merger control by taking into account 
the institutional features of the environment: 1) transparency, which determines the 
probability of punishment merged firms and 2) ability of the competition authority to 
enforcement requirements. The firms interact on the basis of Cournot model before and 
after merger. The objective of Competition Authority is consumer surplus. We propose a 
model that shows how these conditions can affect the choice between behavioral and 
structure remedy. The first stage we consider the case of symmetric information about 
the efficiency gains from merger. Further, we introduce the assumption that the merger's 
efficiency gains are private information of the merging partners and the competition 
authorities do not observe the magnitude of it. We analyze the probability of merger 
control error depending on options selected parametres. 
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Model with logarithmic payoffs  
Let n  players (countries or fishing firms) exploit the fish stock during infinite 
time horizon. The dynamics of the fishery is described by the equation  
1 0
=1
= ( ) , = ,
n
t t it
i
x x u x xαε+ −∑   (1) 
where 0tx ≥  – size of population at a time t , (0,1)ε ∈  – natural death rate, 
(0,1)α ∈  – natural birth rate, 0itu ≥  – the catch of player i , = 1, ,i n… . 
We suppose that the utility function of country i  is logarithmic. Then the 
players' net revenues over infinite time horizon are:  
=0
= ln( ),ti it
t
J uδ
∞∑   (2) 
where 0 < < 1δ  – the common discount factor for countries. 
The characteristic function for cooperative game is constructed in two unusual 
forms. In the first model players outside the coalition K  switch to their Nash strategies, 
which were determined for initial non-cooperative game. So it is the case when players 
have no information about coalition formation. In the second model players outside the 
coalition K  determine new Nash strategies in the game with \N K  players. This case 
corresponds to the situation when players know that coalition K  is formed. 
For both cases we constructed the Shapley value and time-consisted imputation 
distribution procedure. Also we proved that the Yeung's condition and each step rational 
behavior condition are fulfilled. 
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Liner programming problems  
First we show that the C -core in our problem is not empty for every 0t ≥ . 
And in addition the each step rational behavior condition is fulfilled  
1( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ).i i i t i tt t V x V xξ δξ δ +− + ≥ −  
The obtained solution gives the imputation distribution procedure identical for 
all players:  
 1
1
( ) = (ln ln ) .
1i t t i
t x x B B
a ξ
β δ +− + +−  (3) 
And if we want to move from the "center" of C -core, we can solve linear 
programming problem  
 
1
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ),
( ) = ( ),
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ).
i i t
i K t
i K
i N t
i N
i i i t i t
t V x
t V x
t V x
t xi t V x V x
ξ
ξ
ξ
ξ δ δ
∈
∈
+
⎧ ≥⎪⎪⎪⎪ ≥⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪ − + ≥ −⎪⎩
∑
∑  (4) 
subject to any functional depending on time. 
For example we consider the following functional  
1
=0
( ) max.
T
t
tβ →∑  
It can be interpreted as: among our homogeneous players there is a leader (player 1) 
whom should be payed the biggest share of the cooperative payoff. 
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The centipede game has become a benchmark both for the empirical adequacy 
and the theoretical consistency of game theoretic concepts. In any Nash equilibrium – 
and thus in every equilibrium refinement – the first player chooses `Down' immediately; 
in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium the players choose `Down' everywhere. 
Empirically, experimental evidence suggests that players do not act in this way 
(see, e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). Theoretically, subgame-perfection applies 
equilibrium arguments, that hold for rational players, off the equilibrium path. This is 
consistent only under the assumption that deviations from rational play are not evidence 
of non-rationality, e.g. because rational players might tremble (Selten1975). This aspect 
has led to a controversial debate about backward induction (see, e.g, Basu (1988), Reny 
(1993), Aumann (1995), Binmore (1996), Aumann (1996), Halpern (2001). 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) are able to interpret experimental evidence in the 
sense of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982, henceforth KMRW). In their 
model, the structure of the game is not mutual knowledge. Instead there is a small 
probability of being matched with an `altruistic' opponent who always plays `Across'. 
McKelvey and Palfreay show that, as a consequence, it is indeed rational to play 
`Across' early in the game. 
There are two arguments against this way of interpreting the experimental 
evidence. First, if taken as an explanation of evidence rather than an equilibrium effect, 
it relies on the actual existence of such altruists in the subject pool. The second, 
formulated by Selten (1991) in the context of the KMRW approach to the finitely 
repeated prisoner's dilemma, is that the analysis proceeds by changing the game, and not 
by analysing the same game in which the paradox arises. However, both criticisms do 
198 
 
not apply if the players are assumed to know the game, but lack mutual knowledge of 
rationality, as suggested by Milgrom and Roberts (1982, p. 303). If the rational players 
believe that non-rational opponents always play `Across', the analysis of McKelvey and 
Palfray is indeed an explanation of the actual evidence in the original game. 
Still, this approach to modelling lack of mutual knowledge of rationality leads 
to conceptual difficulties: 
First, there is no reason why rational players should hold this specific belief 
about opponents that they do not consider to be rational. If the Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium is identified with rational play, then any deviation must be considered non-
rational. Therefore, not only is the specification of the belief that non-rational players 
always play `Across' ad hoc, in the absence of a theory of non-rationality there is no 
basis for specifying any particular belief. 
Secondly, this also holds in particular for the uniform distribution as a model of 
complete ignorance. There is no reason why a non-rational player should be assumed to 
choose all his strategies with equal probability. In addition, there is the well-known 
problem that a uniform probability depends on the description of the space of uncertainty: 
For instance, if a state is split into two sub-states, the combined probability of the two sub-
states under the uniform distribution is higher than the probability of the original state. As a 
consequence, the description of the state space would be pivotal for the equilibrium. 
Thirdly, and more fundamentally, if the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is identified 
with rational play, then any deviation must be considered non-rational. This problem is 
related to, but different from the first: Not only need the players not have a particular 
belief about non-rational opponents, according to the rationality concept they must not 
have any particular belief. This consistency requirement follows from an identification 
of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with rational play, because this implicitly defines all other 
strategies as non-rational. 
Finally, the analysis of games under incomplete information on the basis of the 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium assumes that the types of a player correspond to a consistent 
hierarchy of beliefs about the underlying uncertainty (Harsanyi 1967). This leads to the 
usual infinite regress. Thus in this analysis the rational player not only believes that a 
`non-rational' opponent always plays `Across', but also believes that the non-rational 
opponent believes a rational player to believe this, ... ad infinitum. But this means that a 
rational player must believe that his non-rational opponent has an infinite and consistent 
hierarchy of beliefs. This, of course, is at odds with the interpretation of this opponent as 
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non-rational. It is for this reason that McKelvey and Palfrey refer to structural 
uncertainty and `altruistic' types. 
Nevertheless, the KMRW approach has been extremely useful in helping to 
understand strategic interaction, particularly in industrial organization (e.g. Kreps and 
Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and, as in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), in 
experimental game theory. 
Our model is in the same spirit as KMRW (1982) and McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1992). We postulate that rationality is not mutual knowledge, i.e. an opponent may or 
may not be rational. We replace the assumption that players have a specific belief about 
non-rational play with the assumption that players are genuinely uncertain about the way 
non-rational opponents play. When facing uncertainty, players maximise Choquet 
expected utility (Schmeidler1989, henceforth CEU). According to CEU, players act in 
face of uncertainty as if they maximise subjective expected utility. However, in contrast 
to a situation in which players face risk, players' beliefs do not have to be additive, i.e. 
the `probabilities' that the players use to weigh consequences do not have to add to 1. 
Our contribution is to define an equilibrium concept that extends subgame 
perfection to a game with genuine uncertainty due to lack of mutual knowledge of 
rationality. Thus we do not need to make any assumption about the behaviour of non-
rational players, and we can avoid modelling them as types. Instead, we can make an 
assumption about the rational players' attitude towards uncertainty. We assume that they 
are uncertainty averse, but only boundedly so. We show that this results in an 
equilibrium in the centipede game in which rational players play `Across' early in the 
game and `Down' late in the game, in spite of their uncertainty aversion. Moreover, it is 
subgame-perfect in the sense that decisions are optimal at every node in the game. 
Our result is due to an interaction between the game-theoretic definition of 
strategy as a contingent plan and the players' attitude towards uncertainty. In calculating 
expected utilities, a player who is uncertainty averse will use `probability weights' that 
do not add up to 1, and a `probability residual' (the difference between the sum of the 
weights and 1) that he will allocate to the worst outcome. As long as the degree of 
uncertainty aversion is bounded, however, every strategy of the non-rational opponent 
will enter the calculation with some positive weight, however small. Since a strategy is a 
contingent plan, it specifies an action – `Across' or `Down' – after every history of the 
game, even those that are excluded by the strategy itself (because it specifies `Down' 
very early). 
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Since such models have several chance mechanisms (mixed strategies in games 
in the normal form; chance moves in games on graphs; probability distributions on the 
set of states in games against nature etc.) then, to evaluate chosen strategies, we need to 
construct for given order relation its extension to the set of probability measures. In our 
work we use so called the canonical extension of order relation which was introduced by 
the author in 1976 (see [1]). The canonical extension is based on the fact that any order 
relation ω  on a set A  is approximated by the set ( )C ω  consisting of all isotonic 
functions from the ordered set ,A ω< >  into R , that is, the following equivalence 
holds: 
1 2 1 2( ( )) ( ) ( )a a f C f a f a
ω ω≤ ⇔ ∀ ∈ ≤ . 
We now define the canonical extension of ω  to the set of probability measures 
by the formula 
1 2 1 2( ( )) ( ) ( )f C f f
ωμ μ ω μ μ≤ ⇔ ∀ ∈ ≤ , 
where f  is the usual extension of the function f  to the set of probability measures: 
( ) ( , )f fμ μ=  (the right part is the standard scalar product). 
In our previous work [2, 3] conditions for existence of equilibrium points and 
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for games with ordered outcomes were indicated 
and also certain methods for their finding were proposed. In this report, we consider 
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analogous problems for games on graphs with chance moves and many-criterion 
optimization models with partial ordered set of criteria. 
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The question of why and how innovation can be pervasive in a given 
environment has already been addressed at different levels. For instance, in the field of 
marketing, deciding on when putting a new and innovative product on the market is a 
classical issue. Of course, reasons pertaining to price or to the degree of innovation are 
the first ones that need to be taken into account, but they may not be the only ones: thus 
the belief that the customer has about the added value of this new product, as well as his 
/ her belief that he / she will know how to use it, or the pressure of social norms like 
fashion may have an important impact.  
Likewise behavioral theories have been concerned already for a long time with 
the issue of organizational change within a company or an administration. The problem 
can turn out to be crucial if acceptance by those who are concerned by the change is a 
requirement for that change to be effective and efficient. 
Now the question is: what are the conditions for acceptance to prevail? 
Formulated in such terms, this question should ring a bell in the head of game 
theorists, for whom the possibly related issue of cooperation is a core entry point to 
Game Theory: indeed if all accept, change will prevail, while if a sufficient number of 
parties concerned do not accept the change, the latter will not occur. 
Several attempts have already been made to combine approaches based on 
Attribution Theory, beliefs and intentions with experiments of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(Kelley & Stahelski) to analyze how psychological factors can trigger, or on then 
opposite, prevent cooperation. 
In his Theory of Planned Behavior Ajzen analyzes behavioral intentions with 
respect to three parameters referring to a given individual: 
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- the effect of a given behavior on his / her personal position 
- the perception of social pressure 
- the perception of the ease or difficulty to adopt the behavior under consideration 
Focusing on organizational change requiring that a minimum of parties 
concerned accept such change, the present paper proposes to combine the Ajzen’s 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) with game theoretic tools, in order to analyze the 
conditions for which change can successfully prevail. 
More precisely, the paper will consider different assessments made by the 
individuals of the three TPB parameters defining behavioral intentions, i.e. attitude 
toward behavior, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control.  
In a first part, the paper will determine the conditions for change to prevail on 
the elementary case of static two player games associated with five types of group 
psychology: hostile, neutral or favorable to change, harmonious (i.e. in which consensus 
is what matters the most), and evolving. 
In a second part, through considering a group comprised of N individuals able 
change to their minds, the paper will propose an evolutionary game theoretic model that 
will determine the conditions under which the group psychological features can evolve 
toward acceptance of the proposed organizational change. 
Leaning on the results of this second part, and especially on the cases where 
evolution does not lead to a general acceptance of the organizational change, a third and 
last part will analyze how introduction of incentives may change the picture. 
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Let K  be a class of games with preference relations, K  be a class of games 
with payoff functions. We consider game KG ∈  in the form  
( ) ( )= , , ,i ii N i NG X A Fρ∈ ∈〈 〉  
where { }= 1, ,N n…  is a set of players, iX  is a set of strategies of player i , A  is a 
set of outcomes, 2i Aρ ⊆  is a preference relation of player ( )i i N∈  and realization 
function F  is a mapping of set of situations 1= nX X X× ×…  in set of outcomes A . 
Game KΓ ∈  is given in the normal form  
( ) ( )= ,i ii N i NX λ∈ ∈Γ 〈 〉  
where iλ  is a payoff function of player i . 
The concept of homomorphism from game G  into game Γ  is introduced by 
analogy with concept of homomorphism for games of class K  ([1]). 
Homomorphism from game G  into game Γ  can be define as a n -tuple of 
mappings ( )= i i Nf ψ ∈ , where R:i Aψ → , such that for each i N∈  the following 
condition  
11 2 1 2( ) ( )
i
i ia a a a
ρ
ψ ψ⇒ ≤  
holds; 
homomorphism will be strict if and only if for each i N∈  the condition  
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1 2 1 2< ( ) < ( )
i
i ia a a a
ρ
ψ ψ⇒  
is satisfied; 
homomorphism will be reciprocal if and only if for each i N∈  the following 
condition  
11 2 1 2( ) ( )
i
i ia a a a
ρ
ψ ψ⇔ ≤  
holds. 
Strict homomorphism f  from game G  into some game Γ  is called inclusion 
map of game G  into class K . 
Reciprocal homomorphism f  from game G  into some game Γ  is called 
isomorphic inclusion map of game G  into class K .  
Consider several elementary properties of inclusion map. 
1. If there exists isomorphic inclusion map of game G  into game Γ  then 
game G  is game with linear and transitive preference structure.  
2. Any inclusion map of game with linear preference structure into game 
with payoff functions is isomorphic.  
The main result of this paper is the following theorem. 
There exists inclusion map of finite game G  into class K  if and only if for 
each ( )i i N∈  preference relation iρ  is aciclic under its symmetric part siρ . 
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Corporate conflicts influence on the efficiency of personnel management at any 
level: the board of directors, top management, middle management, linear management 
and workers. This is explained by the existence of agency problems in the relationship as 
between owners and managers and between managers and their subordinates. There are 
various schemes of remuneration and bonuses of employees, allowing to solve this 
problem. Moreover, market for corporate control is a way to encourage managers to do 
their best for their shareholders. 
In modern literature on corporate governance and finance, the effect of agency 
problem on the business results is considered in several directions.  
On the basis of existing theoretical structures, a game-theory model was 
constructed. It allows to trace the relationship between shareholders, managers and other 
enterprenees of the company which is involved in the corporate conflict on the basis of 
the real Russian oil company example. Also it allows to estimate the possibility and 
costs of monitoring the work results, the incentive contracts effectiveness and 
shareholder wealth. 
The model is based on choosing between two premium plans that top-
management offer for their workers at the time of business reorganization: one of the 
plans depends on profit, the other does not. One department of the company is profitable, 
while the other is not. There are several plans of re-organization of non-profit business, 
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but financial crisis interferes in the affairs of the company. During this period top-
management begins to rebuild the system of staff motivation, both for managers and 
workers.  
The problem is very urgent, because scientists and businessmen discus the 
effectiveness of various remuneration schemes for several centuries and solve this 
problem in different ways. It is rather interesting to learn why are such companies as 
Shell, BP and others guided only by the quality of work and abandon the idea to put 
rewards of their workers in dependence on the profit?  
The model presented here demonstrates an attempt to answer this question. 
Consider its basic assumptions:  
1. game is played by 4 players: Nature, Managers, Workers and Shareholders;  
2. game is finite and lasts for 2 periods;  
3. all players maximize their outputs;  
4. it is a game with complete and imperfect information, players take desisions 
independently, without entering into an agreement with each other.  
Model can be briefly described as follows.  
In the zero-period nature decides whether business would be profitable or not. 
In our model, the success of business does not always depend on the efforts of managers 
and workers.  
In the first period, managers decide which bonus plan they could choose for 
their employees: a plan, which depends on profit or b plan which depends only on 
quality.  
The next move is made by workers: they can work well and as the result the 
company would get profit, but they may work badly, and the company would get losses. 
Workers themselves may be of two types, “good” and “bad”. Company’s profit does not 
always depend on their effort and performance.  
At last shareholders enter the game, they already know how much profit was 
earned during the period. They have 2 strategies:  
1. to pay annual bonuses to managers and workers, spending all earned profit;  
2. not to pay bonuses, to reinvest part of profit in business development with a 
promise to pay bonuses later.  
In this case we can consider two options: one with "fair" shareholders, who 
would fulfill their promise concerning bonuses and a model with shareholders who can 
cheat their employees.  
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In the second period game is repeated and ends with the progress of 
shareholders, but in the second period they may still dismiss the management team (3rd 
strategy). It is important to note that managers may not always be aware of what would 
be shareholders actions under certain circumstances.  
Ability to change the management team, which is a necessary condition for 
solving the agency problem from the viewpoint of shareholders, may limit the possibility 
of using incentive schemes for workers by managers. This effect must be taken into 
account as a constraint while developing and estimating different business strategies for 
the whole business and its parts including crisis times.  
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A competition model on airline market is considered. Each airline attracts 
passengers only by ticket price on flights which it operates between the cities from a 
given finite set. It is proposed two types of airlines behavior: noncooperative and 
cooperative scenarios. 
In noncooperative scenario each airline aims to maximize its profit in a route 
network, and as a solution concept both Nash equilibrium and Pareto solution are 
considered. 
In cooperative scenario also two cases are considered. In the first case two fixed 
airlines cooperate only on a route which connects their hubs to maximize their total 
profit on the route, and on other routes their behavior as well as behavior of other 
airlines remains noncooperative. The second case differs from the first only by objective 
function. In this case two fixed airlines maximize their total demand function on the 
route but such behavior may significantly reduce airline profits. Here we refer to 
cooperative theory and choose the solution concept (core, the Shapley value). 
All considered cases are illustrated with numerical examples. 
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Consider the logistics market with three firms transporting goods for the 
customers. Each firm define their own pricing scheme(let firms 1 and 3 service 
customers in turn, firm 2 services all customers together without queue). Customers 
choose firm trying to minimize net value of service casualties. The game-theoretic 
approach used to find optimal behavior of customers considered as players. 
Define the non-antagonistic game in normal form: 
=< ,{ } ,{ } >ji i N i i NN p H∈ ∈Γ , where 
= {1, , }N n…  - set of players, 
( ){ }ji i Np ∈  - set of strategies, 
( ) [0,1]jip ∈ , = 1,2, 3j , 
{ }i i NH ∈  - set of payoff functions.  
(1) (1) (3) (3) (1) (3)
1 2 3 1 2 3 2 2= ( (1 ) ) = ( ( ) ( ) ),i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iH p Q p p Q p Q p Q Q p Q Q Q− + − − + − − + − +  
where (1)ip  is the probability of player i  choose firm 1, 
(3)
ip  - is the probability of 
player i  choose firm 3, (2) (1) (3)= 1i i ip p p− −  - is the probability of player i  choose 
firm 2. We consider the casualty functions below: =i ih H− , = 1, ,i n… . 
Define customer specific loss of waiting service r . 
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(11) (12)
1 1= ( )i i iQ r t t c+ +  - player i  expected loss for firm 1's service, where 
(11)
it  - mean time of waiting service by firm 1, 
(12)
it  - mean time of service by firm 1, 1c  
- fixed cost of firm 1's customer order fulfillment. 
(22)
2 22 21= ( )i iQ r c t c+ +  - player i  expected loss for firm 2's service, where 
(22)
it  - mean time of service by firm 2, 21c  - fixed cost of firm 2's customer order 
fulfillment, 22c  - cost of firm 2's unit service time. 
(31) (32)
3 32= ( )i i iQ rt r c t+ +  - player i  expected loss for firm 3's service, 
where (31)it  - mean time of waiting service by firm 3, 
(32)
it  - mean time of service by 
firm 3, 32c  - cost of firm 3's unit service time. 
Firms' service times are independent exponential distributed random variables 
with density functions 11
1
1
1
( ) = ,
t
f t eμμ  
2
2
2
1
1
( ) = ,
t
f t eμμ  
3
3
2
1
1
( ) = ,
t
f t eμμ  ( > 0)t  
respectively. 
Customers choose only one of three logistic firms. There are 1k  customers on 
service in the firm 1( 1 1k −  of them are in the queue) and 3k  customers on service in 
the firm 3( 3 1k −  of them are in the queue). 
Theorem 1 There exists a unique point of equilibrium 1( , , )np p… , = 1, ,i n…  
in the game above defined as follows: 
1) = (1,0, 0)ip , = 1, ,i n… , if:  
1 1 1 2 22 21
1 1 1 3 3 32
1
(( 1) ( 1)) < ( )
2
1
(( 1) ( 1)) < ( ( 1) )
2
r k n c r c c
r k n c r k c
μ μ
μ μ
⎧⎪⎪ + + − + + +⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ + + − + + +⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
2) = (0,1, 0)ip , = 1, ,i n… , if:  
2 22 21 3 3 32
2 22 21 1 1 1
( ) < ( ( 1) )
( ) < ( ( 1))
r c c r k c
r c c r k c
μ μ
μ μ
⎧ + + + +⎪⎪⎨⎪ + + + +⎪⎩
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3) = (0,0,1)ip , = 1, ,i n… , if:  
3 3 32 1 1 1
3 3 32 2 22 21
1
( ( 1) ( 1) ) < ( ( 1))
2
1
( ( 1) ( 1) ) < ( )
2
r k r n c r k c
r k r n c r c c
μ μ
μ μ
⎧⎪⎪ + + − + + +⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ + + − + + +⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
4) 2 22 21 1 1 1 2 22 21 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1)
= ( ,1 , 0)
1 1
( 1) ( 1)
2 2
i
r c c r k c r c c r k c
p
r n r n
μ μ μ μ
μ μ
+ + − + − + + − + −−
− −
= 1, ,i n… , if:  
1 1 1 3 3 32
1 1 1 2 22 21 1 1 1
1
(( 1) ( 1)) ( ( 1) )
2
1
( ( 1)) ( ) (( 1) ( 1))
2
r k n c r k c
r k c r c c r k n c
μ μ
μ μ μ
⎧⎪⎪ + + − + ≤ + +⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ + + ≤ + + ≤ + + − +⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
5) 
2 22 21 3 3 32 2 22 21 3 3 3 32
3 3
( ) ( ( 1) ) ( ) ( ( 1) )
= (0,1 , )
1 1
( 1) ( 1)
2 2
i
r c c r k c r c c r k c
p
r n r n
μ μ μ μ
μ μ
+ + − + + + + − + +−
− −
 
= 1, ,i n… , if: 
3 3 32 1 1 1
3 3 32 2 22 21 3 3 32
1
( ( 1) ( 1) ) ( ( 1))
2
1
( ( 1) ) ( ) ( ( 1) ( 1) )
2
r k r n c r k c
r k c r c c r k r r n c
μ μ
μ μ μ
⎧⎪⎪ + + − + ≤ + +⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ + + ≤ + + ≤ + + − +⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
6) 
3 3 32 1 1 1
2 22 21 3 3 32
1 3 3
1
( ( 1) ( 1) ) ( 1) ( ) ( ( 1) )2= ( , 0,1 )
1 1
( 1)( ) ( 1)
2 2
pi
r k r n c r k c r c c r k c
n r r r n
μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ
+ + − + − + − + + − + +−
− + −
 
= 1, ,i n… , if: 
1 1 1 2 22 21
3 3 32 2 22 21
1 1 1 3 3 32
3 3 32 1 1 1
1
(( 1) ( 1)) ( )
2
1
( ( 2) ( 1) ) ( )
2
1
( ( 1)) ( ( 1) ( 1) )
2
1
( ( 1) ) (( 1) ( 1))
2
r k n c r c c
r k r n c r c c
r k c r k r n c
r k c r k n c
μ μ
μ μ
μ μ
μ μ
⎧ ⎡⎪⎪ ⎢ + + − + ≤ + +⎪ ⎢⎪⎪ ⎢⎪⎪ ⎢⎪ + + − + ≤ + +⎢⎪⎪ ⎣⎪⎪⎪ + + ≤ + + − +⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪ + + ≤ + + − +⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
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7) 
2 22 21 1 1 1 2 22 21 3 3 32
1 3
2 22 21 1 1 1 2 22 21 3 3 32
1 3
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ( 1) )
= ( , ,
1 1
( 1) ( 1)
2 2
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ( 1) )
1 )
1 1
( 1) ( 1)
2 2
i
r c c r k c r c c r k c
p
r n r n
r c c r k c r c c r k c
r n r n
μ μ μ μ
μ μ
μ μ μ μ
μ μ
+ + − + − + + − + +
− −
+ + − + − + + − + +− −
− −
 
= 1, ,i n… , if: 
1 1 1 2 22 21 1 1 1
3 3 32 2 22 21 3 3 32
1 1 1 3 3 32
3 3 32 1 1 1
1
( ( 1)) ( ) (( 1) ( 1)) )
2
1
( ( 1) ) ( ) ( ( 1) ( 1) )
2
1
( ( 1)) ( ( 1) ( 1) )
2
1
( ( 1) ) (( 1) ( 1))
2
r k c r c c r k n c
r k c r c c r k r n c
r k c r k r n c
r k c r k n c
μ μ μ
μ μ μ
μ μ
μ μ
⎧⎪⎪ + + ≤ + + ≤ + + − +⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪ + + ≤ + + ≤ + + − +⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ + + ≤ + + − +⎪⎪
+ + ≤ + + − +⎩
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪
 
Strategies of customers optimal behavior under competition in the logistics 
market are found. 
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We consider a non-cooperative n -person optimal stopping game related with 
the popular TV game "The price is right". In this game each of players in turn spins the 
wheel once or twice attaining some total score and then waits for the results of the 
succeeding players' spins. The object of the game is to have the highest score, from one 
or two spins, without going over a given upper limit. The variant of this game has been 
analyzed in ([1]), ([6]), ([2]) and in the article ([3]), where each player makes the 
decision without information about behavior of the other players. 
We consider a sequential variant of this game, in which each next player has 
information about the results and actions of the other players, who have chosen their 
actions before. As the upper limit is taken 1 , and the players observe the random 
numbers in [0,1] . Each player chooses one or two random numbers. After the first step a 
player decides to choose the number or to continue the game. The player makes his 
decision knowing what the previous players have done. The objective of a player is to 
get the maximal number of scores which is not exceeded the level 1 . If the scores of all 
players exceed 1  then the winner is the player whose score is closest to 1 . 
In the article ([3]) the method based on the dynamic programming theory wore 
used for the construction the optimal solution for the n -person game. The dynamic 
programming approach for optimal stopping problem have been considered in ([4]), 
([5]). 
We use the dynamic programming approach to construct the final formula 
allowing to find the optimal thresholds for the first player in the n -person game. The 
solution of the following equation gives the optimal threshold u  maximizing the 
probability of the winning for the first player in the n -person sequential game:  
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2 1
2 2 1 .
2 1
n
n uu
n
−− −= −  
Numerical results of the optimal strategies of the first player for different n  are 
also given. Additionally we describe the optimal behavior of the other players of the 
game. 
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Classical Hotelling’s duopoly model [Hotelling, 1929] studies players’ 
competitive behavior in a linear market. The price and distance from a customer to a 
market participant have an impact on customer decision which player’s product to buy. 
Hotelling found equilibrium prices for market participants. Since then a large number of 
researches have been made on Hotelling’s model and its different modifications mostly 
for the case of two players’ game. 
We study a case of n players on the plane with distance presented by euclidean 
metric. Multinomial logit analysis is applied to model customer demand. 
Let assume, that each customer i faces n alternatives and wants to maximize the 
utility received from buying a product of player j. Each alternative is characterized by 
price jp  and distance to a customer. The utility function depends on product 
characteristics and has a random part. 
Following multinomial logit model assumptions [McFadden, 1973], the 
probability of choosing player j by customer in ( ),x y  is equal to 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
1 2
2 2
1 2
1 2
1
, ,  , 0
j j j
i i i
p x x y y
j n
p x x y y
i
e
P x y
e
β β
β β
β β
− − − + −
− − − + −
=
= ≥
∑
. 
Player’s competitive behavior in the market is examined using Nash 
equilibrium. In that case, equilibrium in price satisfies conditions  
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1 1
1 1
0,  j 1 1
0
j j
j j
j j
n n
n i
i n
i in i
H S
S p n
p p
H S
S p
p p
π
− −
= =
⎧∂ ∂⎪⎪⎪ = + = = −⎪ ∂ ∂⎪⎪⎨⎪∂ ∂⎪⎪ = − + =⎪⎪ ∂ ∂⎪⎩ ∑ ∑
…
, 
where jS  is a market share for player j. 
We present computational results for modeling players competitive behavior in 
a real market with 4n =  and 16n = . 
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Let ( ) nPPz t ∈ R  and ( ) neez t ∈ R  obey the equations  
0
0
1
( ) = ( ( ), ( )), (0) = ,
( ) = ( ( ), ( )), (0) = , = { , , },
P p P P p p
e e e e e e NE
z t f z t u t z z
z t f z t u t z z e E E E∈

 …  (1) 
where 0t ≥ , ( ) U mPP Pu t ∈ ⊂ R , ( ) U mee eu t ∈ ⊂ R , UP  and Ue  are compact 
sets, : Un nP PP Pf × →R R  and : Un ne ee ef × →R R , 0Pz  and 0ez  are initial 
positions of the players. Let = ( , ) = NP Ez z z Z∈ R , 1= P E ENE
N n n n+ + +… , 
and  
0( ) = ( ( ), ( ), ( )), (0) = ,P Ez t f z t u t u t z z  (2) 
where 
1
= ( , , )E E ENE
u u u… , 
1 1 1
( , ) = ( ( , ), , ( , ))E E E E E E E E EN N NE E E
f z u f z u f z u… , 
0 0 0= ( , )P Ez z z , ( , , ) = ( ( , ), ( , ))P E P E P E E Ef z u u f z u f z u . We assume that f  is jointly 
continuous and locally Lipschitz with respect to z , and satisfies the extendability 
condition; see, e.g., [1]. 
Let : Z +→ RK  be a directionally differentiable function that evaluates a 
given state, and P  strive to get a lowest value of K  along trajectories of (1) by an 
instant 0τ ≥ . We define locally-optimizing strategies :lP PU Z U→  and 
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:le eU Z U→  as those functions that meet the following steepest descent/ascent 
conditions; see, e.g., [2,3,4],  
( , ( )) ( ),min
( ,U )
( , ( )) ( ), .max
( ,U )
A
A
l
P P P P
P P P P
l
e e e e
e e e e
f z U z z
f z
f z U z z e E
f z
rg
rg
υ
υ
υ
υ
∈ ∂
∈
∈ ∂ ∈
∈
K
K
 (3) 
For given duration, initial state 0z Z∈ , partition Δ  of [0, ]τ  and pursuit strategy lPU , 
consider a differential inclusion  
0( ) ( ( ),U ( ( )),U ), (0) = ,li P i Ez t f z t z t z z∈  (4) 
where 0 1= { , , }nt t tΔ … , 
1
U = (U , ,U )E E E
NE
… , 0 = 0t , =nt τ , 1<i it t t +≤ , 
= 0,1, , 1.i n −…  Let 0( , , )lP PZ z ΔU  be a set of continuous functions [0, ] Zτ →  that 
are absolutely continuous and meet (4) for almost all (0, )t τ∈ ; see, e.g., [1]. Let us 
evaluate K  by the instant = > 0t τ . Since K  is directionally differentiable,  
1( ( )) ( ( )) = ( ( )) ( )i i i i ii
z t z t z t t o tυ δ δ+ − ∂ +K K K  (5) 
where 1 =i i it t tδ+ + , 1( ) = ( ) ,i i i iz t z t tυ δ+ +  ( ( ), ( ( )), ),i i P i Ef z t z t Uυ ∈ U  
= 0,1, , 1.i n −…  From (5) we obtain that  
1
0
=0
( ( )) ( ( )) = ( ( )) (| |)
n
n i iii
z t z t z t t oυ δ
−
− ∂ + Δ∑K K K  (6) 
and ( ( )) ( ( ))i l ii i
z t z tυ υ∂ ≤ ∂K K  where = ( ( ), ( ( )), ( ( )))
l l l
i i P i E if z t z t z tυ U U , 
= 0,1, , 1.i n −…  Thus we have  
1
0
=0
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) (| |).
n
n l i i
ii
z t z t z t t oυ δ
−
− ≤ ∂ + Δ∑K K K  (7) 
Let lPU  and 
l
eU  be uniquely defined with use of (3), ( ) = ( ( ))( )
l l
lz
k t z t
t
∂  K , 
where  
0( ) = ( ( ), ( ( )), ( ( ))), (0) = .l l l l l l lP Ez t f z t z t z t z z U U  
Theorem 1 If lk  is continuous on [0, ]τ  and 
0
( ) < 0lk t dt
τ∫  then 0( ( )) < ( )lz zτK K .  
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Thus, under the assumptions of the theorem, P  guarantees a decrease of the initial value 
of K  by =t τ  with use of lPU . When τ  is not given, P  could terminate the game at 
the initial instant, or at an instant when lk  changes its sign from minus to plus. 
We apply the approach to several games with  
( ) = ( , )max z
e E
z e Pρ
∈
K  
and its smooth upper approximations, where ( , )z e Pρ  is Euclidian distance from P  to e  
at the state z , e E∈ . Plane kinematics of the players is described by transition 
equations for wheeled robots with less control variables than degrees of freedom; see, 
e.g. [5]. The conditions (3) do not allow to define lPU  and 
l
eU  properly even for those 
simple cases, and some additional assumptions are made. 
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The differential game of non-renewable resource extraction on the base of the 
classical cake-sharing model is examined. The main focus of the paper is an application 
of the stable cooperation concept which includes time-consistency of the cooperative 
agreement (Petrosyan, 1977), strategic stability (Petrosyan, Zenkevich, 2009) and 
irrational behavior proofness (Yeung, 2006) to the game of resource exploitation. At first 
I investigate the time-consistency, strategic stability and irrational behavior proofness for 
the classical model with n symmetric players. Then I consider one modification of the 
game with elements of stochastic framework, in the sense that the terminal time T is a 
random value in order to increase the realness of the modeling. I suggest modified 
concept of the time-consistency (Marin-Solano, Shevkoplyas, 2010) and Yeung’s 
condition which is suitable for the problem with random duration of the game. It is 
analytically proved that the results for games with random duration cover the results for 
deterministic games and games with constant discounting. Then the cooperative model 
of the resource extraction game is examined for time-consistency, strategic stability and 
irrational behavior proofness under condition of Weibull distribution for the random 
terminal time T (Shevkoplyas, 2009; Shevkoplyas, 2010b). Accordingly to Weibull 
distribution shape parameter, the life circle of the non-renewable resource extraction 
such as an "infant" stage, "adult" stage and "aged" stage is described. The egalitarian 
solution is given and analyzed on cooperative stability conditions for all three stages of 
the game.Finally, I consider another modifications of the differential game of resource 
extraction and research the time-consistency problem for new formulations. 
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A pursuit-evasion game with perfect state information, bounded controls and 
prescribed duration, representing the mathematical model of an aerial interception 
between two objects (a pursuer and an evader) is considered. The velocities and the 
bounds of the lateral acceleration commands of both objects are constant. The cost 
function of the game is the miss distance, to be minimized by the pursuer and maximized 
by the evader. The dynamics of each object is approximated by a first-order transfer 
function. Thus, their dynamic modes are defined at any time by the maximal lateral 
acceleration 
max max
( )p ea a  and the time constant ( )p eτ τ . The evader has two possible 
dynamic modes (e.g. aerodynamic and thrust vector controls). The aerodynamic control 
mode provides higher lateral acceleration, but the thrust vector control mode is faster. 
The pursuer has only a single dynamic mode.  
The game with fixed evader and pursuer dynamic modes was solved in [1]. This 
game has a saddle point solution in feedback strategies. The solution of the game is 
based on its scalarization by introducing a new state variable, called the zero-effort miss 
distance (ZEM). This leads to the decomposition of the game space into two regions of 
different optimal strategies. In the regular region, which can be covered by candidate 
optimal trajectories, both players use their maximal lateral acceleration with the sign of 
the ZEM and the value of the game depends on the initial conditions. In the other 
(singular) region, the optimal strategies are arbitrary, subject to the control constraints, 
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and the value of the game is constant. If the pursuer has advantage both in 
maneuverability and agility (acceleration rate), i.e.  
 max max
max max
( );
/ ( ) /
p e
p p e e
a a
a aτ τ
>
>  (1) 
the game value is zero and the closure of the singular zone becomes the capture zone, the 
set of all initial conditions, where by using optimal strategies point capture (zero miss 
distance) is guaranteed. Since most of the realistic initial conditions are in the singular 
zone, the capture zone size can serve as figure of merit. In the differential game with 
hybrid evader dynamics, it is assumed that for both evader dynamic modes, the capture 
conditions (1) are satisfied. During this game the evader can change its dynamics once. 
The order of the evader dynamic modes and the timing of the switch constitute the 
evader dynamics schedule, which becomes its additional control. The pursuer knows the 
two dynamic modes of the evader, but not the current one. In order to ensure this 
uncertainty, the initial lateral acceleration of the evader a_e0 has to satisfy the condition  
 
max max0 1 2
min{ , }e e ea a a<  (2) 
In earlier studies, one-sided robust optimal control problems, namely the robust 
pursuit of a hybrid evader [2, 3] and the robust evasion by a hybrid evader [4], were 
investigated separately. Moreover, in [2] and [4] it was assumed that the initial lateral 
acceleration of each player is zero. The present paper extends the investigation by 
solving a zero-sum differential game (a two-sided optimization problem) with non zero 
lateral acceleration of the evader. 
Not having information on the current dynamic mode of the evader, the pursuer 
selects the center of the convex hull of the uncertainty set as a new aiming point. This 
allows formulating a new game of lower dimension (two instead of four) with perfect 
knowledge of the aiming point. Based on the solution of this game, the upper value of 
the original game is obtained and. the respective capture conditions are established. 
Subject to these conditions, there exists a non-empty set of initial positions, for which 
the upper game value is zero. This set is the smallest capture zone guaranteed by the 
hybrid evader. 
In order to obtain the lower game value, an auxiliary game is introduced. This 
game is solved subject to the assumption of perfect information; i. e. the pursuer knows 
also the dynamic schedule of the hybrid evader, which is the worst case for the evader. 
Due to the hybrid evader dynamics, the auxiliary game has impulsive dynamics. Based 
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on the solution of this game, the largest capture zone guaranteed by an optimally 
controlled pursuer is obtained and the set of initial positions, for which the lower game 
value of the original game is non-zero, is constructed.  
It is shown that in the original differential game, the upper and the lower game 
values are, in general, different, meaning the game has no saddle point. As a rule, the 
reason of such phenomenon is the non-separability of a zero-sum game. In the game, 
considered in this presentation, the saddle point does not exist because of the non-
symmetric information structure: the evader knows perfectly both the state and the 
parameters of the game, while the pursuer does not know the current mode of the evader 
dynamics. Illustrative examples are presented. 
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In the modern world today, the survival of the fittest holds for general people, 
but the survival of the cunning is possible for intellectuals. Nowadays, with the 
development of society, every company faces more intense competition, especially for 
weaker and smaller enterprises. The situation applies to developing nations all over the 
world too. Every nation, every country, strong or weak, vies for a foothold in every 
arena of economy, sports, arts and so on. All aims to be the strongest and the best, but in 
actuality, the strong possesses much more advantages and better talents than the growing 
multitude of developing nations. 
Despite the fact, even the strongest of warriors has his Achilles’ heel. In such a 
competitive world whereby almost everything can be rivaled in, it is necessary to plan the 
order of engagement or competition to overcome the stronger or to claim a greater victory. 
In economics, companies and government agencies allocate resources according to the 
needs and requirements of the situation, often giving the minimum budget for the success 
of a project to maximize profit. In another way, it is a way of conserving resources to cope 
with greater threats. On a personal level, when playing a group game, leader must choose 
his players in sequence. The sequence of the group game should be calculated properly, 
especially to encounter a stronger competitor. This procedure is very similar to the Tian 
Ji’s horse racing strategy, an interesting legendary Chinese story. In this paper, the 
generalized Tian Ji’s horse racing strategy is analyzed mathematically with the aim of 
finding general clues which have the potential to be applied in the modern world today. 
In ancient China, there was an era known as “Warring States Period” (403 BC 
— 221 BC) during which China was not a unified empire but divided by independent 
Seven Warring States with conflicting interests, one of which was Qi State located in 
eastern China. From 356 BC to 320 BC, the ruler of Qi State was Tian Yin-Qi (378 BC 
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— 320 BC), King Wei of Qi. The story of the Tian Ji’s horse racing strategy, which is 
well-known and popular in China today, was originally recorded in the biography of Sun 
Bin (? — 316 BC), as a military strategist in Qi State ruled by King Wei of Qi: 
General Tian Ji, a high-ranked army commander in Qi State, frequently bet 
heavily on horse races with King Wei of Qi. Observing that their horses, divided into 
three different speed classes, were well-matched, Sun Bin then advised Tian Ji, “Go 
ahead and stake heavily! I shall see that you win.” Taking Sun Bin at his word, Tian Ji 
bet a thousand gold pieces with the King. Just as the race was to start, Sun Bin 
counseled Tian Ji, “Pit your slow horse against the King’s fast horse, your fast horse 
against the King’s medium horse, and your medium horse against the King’s slow 
horse.” When all three horse races were finished, although Tian Ji lost the first race, his 
horses prevailed in the next two, in the end getting a thousand gold pieces from the King. 
Amazedly, the victorious strategy (as did Tian Ji after following Sun Bin’s 
advice) was remarkable to be solved 2300 years long before operations research and game 
theory were invented. This was only one way that Tian Ji could claim a victory over the 
King. All other ways would present Tian Ji with loss. Naturally, the Sun Bin’s victorious 
advice, named the Tian Ji’s horse racing strategy, may be extended to the scenario that 
Tian Ji and the King would race horses with arbitrary N  different speed classes. 
This paper discusses the formulation of determining the winning, drawing and 
losing probabilities of the generalized Tian Ji’s horse racing strategy for any given 
racing horse numbers. Based on the Eulerian number, the way of calculating the 
combination of having M  wins in N -horse racing is so straightforward, thereby 
enabling us to find the probability of winning an entire game by having more wins than 
losses. It is worth to mention to this end that that the larger N  results in the higher 
winning probability. Philosophically, it is typically the epitome of winning in numbers. 
The Tian Ji’s horse racing strategy is an interesting legendary Chinese story, 
which gives valuable insights to intellectuals that nothing is absolutely certain and 
thus nothing is impossible. Studying the theory of the Tian Ji’s horse racing strategy is 
very beneficial to society. In sports, this could be used in matching competitors in 
group games, such as, tennis, football, table tennis, badminton, etc. In economics, it 
could be used to allocate minimum resources to suitable tasks for optimizing profits. 
In engineering logistics, the results could be applied to arrange and transport goods 
with limited vehicles or manpower. 
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In our work we describe a new solution concept of a cooperative TU-game, 
called the [0,1]-nucleolus. It is based on the ideas of the nucleolus and the simplified 
modified nucleolus. The [0,1]-nucleolus takes into account both the constructive power 
and the blocking power of a coalition with all possible ratios between the powers. 
In the paper we show that this solution satisfies the following properties: 
nonemptiness (NE), covariance property (COV), anonymity (AN), Pareto optimality 
(PO), reasonableness (RE) and dummy player (DUM). Moreover, the [0,1]-nucleolus 
satisfies the individual rationality property (IR) for a class of 0-monotonic games and the 
single valued property (SIVA) for the class of constant-sum games. 
Also in the paper we investigate connection between the [0,1]-nucleolus and 
some well-known solutions of cooperative TU-games such as the Shapley value, the 
prenucleolus, the simplified modified nucleolus, the modiclus. 
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At the moment all the software users are choosing between the three options: to 
buy licenses and use the commercial proprietary software (e. g. Microsoft Windows as 
an operating system, Microsoft Office as an office suite, etc.); to use free or open source 
software (e. g. Linux, OpenOffice, etc.); and to use illegal (pirated) copies of proprietary 
software without buying licenses. These three options correspond to the following three 
types of software market players: profit-maximizers (for example, Microsoft); non-for-
profit players (for example, Linux team); pirates. 
Correspondingly, software developers try to determine the optimal way of value 
capture: to sell the licenses for the use of their products or to distribute the products for 
free and to collect income from sales of complementary products or additional services. 
Such a market structure requires new approaches to research methodology as 
well as to business development methodology.  
In this work we explain the equilibrium structure of the market of hardware, 
proprietary and free software, and illegal copies of proprietary software. We propose a 
simple model of market interactions between hardware vendors, proprietary and free 
software developers, and pirates. We consider two hardware suppliers, Intel and AMD, 
both maximizing profits forming a traditional duopoly, while proprietary software 
supplier, Microsoft (which sells licenses for Windows operating system), pirates (they 
sell illegal copies of Windows operating system), and the community of free software 
developers (distributing Linux operating system), form a mixed oligopoly, in which only 
the first two parties maximize their profits. 
The model is used to calculate the optimal pricing strategies and market shares 
for all the products. 
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We consider that the bundle of hardware (a PC) with operating system is sold in 
the market. There are Intel-based and AMD-based PCs in the market, both of which can 
be sold with legal or illegal Windows, or Linux. 
Thus, the user selects one of 6 products: Intel / AMD-based PC running legal / 
illegal Windows or Linux.  
A user appraises legal Windows greater than illegal Windows, and illegal 
Windows greater than Linux. A consumer values Intel-based PC greater than AMD-
based PC.  
The demand functions for the combined products are linear, and the user will 
buy the bundled product (a PC with an operating system) if and only if the consumer 
value of this product for the given user exceeds its price. 
Pirates have no fixed costs, and all the variable costs (for all the market players) 
are close to zero. 
Hardware and software manufacturers do not conspire and do not co-operate in 
other ways. Each manufacturer makes pricing decisions based on available market 
information on the prices of other players’ products (i. e., Cournot situation is 
considered). 
When making pricing decisions each manufacturer considers that other players 
do not react to the change of the price by this manufacturer, i.e. cross price elasticities 
are equal to zero. 
PC assemblers and sellers form the market of a perfect competition, and do not 
affect the price of the bundled product (a PC with operating system), unlike 
manufacturers of CPUs and the proprietary software. 
We use the following designations: qmax – PC market capacity; PI and PA – the 
maximal possible prices for Intel / AMD-based PC; PI+W, PI+PW, PA+W+M, PA+W, and PA+PW 
– maximal possible prices for Intel / AMD-based PC running legal / illegal Windows; pI 
and pA – prices for Intel and AMD CPUs set by manufacturers; pW – Windows license 
price set by Microsoft; pPW – price for illegal copy of Windows set by the integrated 
pirating agent; qI+W, qI+PW, qI+L, qA+W, qA+PW, and qA+L – demand on the products; fI ; fA 
and fM – fixed costs; πI, πA, πM and πP – profits of Intel, AMD, Microsoft and the 
integrated pirating agent. 
In the formulated assumptions the model of hardware and software 
manufacturers’ interactions looks as follows: 
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max( ) 1 , { , , , , , };j
j
p
q p q j I L A L I W A W I PW A PW
P
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟= − ∈ + + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
, ;I I W I PW I L A A W A PW A Lq q q q q q q q+ + + + + += + + = + +  
, , .W I W A W L I L A L PW I PW A PWq q q q q q q q q+ + + + + += + = + = +  
, , , .I I I I A A A A M W W W PW PW PWq p f q p f q p f q pπ π π π= − = − = − =  
Writing the first-order conditions of profit maximum for each seller, we can 
easily find the reaction functions, and if we consider Cournot situation where eaach 
market player makes pricing decisions assuming the prices of other players’ products are 
constant, and all cross price elasticities are equal to zero. Thus at the Cournot 
equilibrium (CE) we have (assuming all the Pj = P): 
8 / 40, 4 / 40, 18 / 40, 9 / 40,CE CE CE CEI A W PWp P p P p P p P= = = =  
max max14 / 40, 4 / 40,
CE CE CE CE
I W A W A PW A Lq q q q q q+ + + += = = =  
π πmax max max5 / 40, 192 / 1600 , 48 / 1600 ,
CE CE CE CE
I PW I L I I A Aq q q Pq f Pq f+ += = = − = −
π πmax max324 / 1600 , 81 / 1600.
CE CE
M I PPq f Pq= − =  
We can see that the price of the most expensive product (legal copy of 
Windows operating system) at the Cournot equilibrium is 4.5 times greater than the price 
of the cheapest product (AMD CPU), illegal copies of proprietary software are two times 
cheaper than legal copies of the same software, the profit of Microsoft is approximately 
70% greater than the profit of Intel, and nearly 7.5 times greater than the profit of AMD, 
while integrated profit of pirates is approximately 70% greater than the profit of AMD. 
The number of Intel users is two times greater than the number of AMD users, and 33% 
greater than the number of Windows users; the market share of Windows illegal copies 
is two times smaller than the market share of corresponding legal copies; the market 
share of Linux is the same as of illegal Windows. 
If we compare this model with the model of the hardware / software market 
without piracy presented in [13] where the user could select Intel / AMD-based PC 
running legal Windows or Linux and the market players have the following profits: 
π πmax max8 / 49 , 2 / 49 ,
CE CE
I I A APq f Pq f= − = −  
π max9 / 49 ,
CE
M IPq f= −  
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we can see the strong network effect of piracy which tends to the increase of all the 
market players’ incomes: the income of Intel increases by 16%, the income of AMD 
increases by 4%, and the income of Microsoft increases by 36%. 
According to IDC, at the moment in the USA the software market is divided 
between proprietary, free and pirated software (45, 22,5, 22,5% correspondingly), and it 
shows that the US software market is at the equilibrium state while the other regional 
market are not. 
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Macroeconomic models of production are under consideration. Statistic data for 
gross product and production costs are given in discrete instants on a period of time. 
Macroeconomic models have the form of two ordinary differential equations depending 
on an investment policy and a cost policy. Rates of taxation, refunding rates and the 
currency exchange course imply some natural restrictions on velocities of investments 
and production costs. The restrictions are unknown. We consider parameterized 
restrictions at the same discrete instants as the given statistical data. 
The problem of reconstructions of motions of the model closest to the statistic 
data is solved. The parallel computations are applied to study sensitivity of 
macroeconomic models to the parameterized restrictions.  
Consider macroeconomic models with dynamics of the form  
1 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2= ( , , ), = ( , , ),
dx dx
f x x u f x x u
dt dt
 (1) 
where [0, ]t T∈ , 1x  and 2x  denote the gross product and the production cost, 
respectively; the investment policy 1( )u t  and production cost policy 2( )u t  can be 
considered as controls; 1( )f ⋅ , 2()f ⋅  are given functions. 
                                                 
1 Supported by RFBR (grant 08-01-00410), the Program of the Government RF on Support of 
Leading Scientific Schools (grant NSh–64508.2010.1) and the Program of Presidium RAS 
"Mathematical Control Theory"(No. 29). 
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The statistic data for the gross product and the production costs are known for 
discrete instants 0 10 = < < < =Nt t t T… :  
* * * * * *
1 0 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 2( ( ), ( )), ( ( ), ( )), , ( ( ), ( )).N Nx t x t x t x t x t x t…  (2) 
Economical reasons provide restrictions on values of the controls:  
1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ,u t U t U u t U t U∈ ⊂ ∈ ⊂  (3) 
the symbols 1U R⊂ , 2U R⊂  denote unknown compact sets. 
The problem is to reconstruct motions 1 2( ), ( )x t x t  of (1) closest to the statistic 
data (2). 
We consider the following optimal control problem for the macroeconomic 
system (1), (3). We assume that the admissible controls 1( )u t , 2( )u t  are elements of the 
set  
1 2 1 2= { () = ( (), ( )) : [0, ] are measurable}.u u u T U U∀ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ×TU 6  
The pay-off functional  
1 2 1 2
2 2
* 2 * 2 1 2
1 1 2 2
0
( (), ( ), ( ), ()) =
( ) () ( ) ()
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
2
T
I x x u u
u u
x t x t x t x t dtε
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⎡ ⎤⋅ + ⋅⎢ ⎥− + − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫
 (4) 
is to minimize on the set TU  and (3). Here 
*
1 ( )x t , 
*
2( )x t  are linear interpolations of the 
statistic data (2), > 0ε  is a regularizing parameter. 
We introduce parameters 1 2 1 2{ < , < }
i i i ia a b b R∈ , = 0, , 1i N −…  and 
consider the sets 1( )U t  and 2( )U t  of the form:  
1 1 2 2 1 2 1( ) = [ , ], ( ) = [ , ], [ , ], = 0, , 1.
i i i i
i iU t a a U t b b t t t i N+∈ −…  (5) 
Optimal trajectories 1 2(), ()x x⋅ ⋅  of the optimal control problem (1), (3), (4) ,(5):  
1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2( ) = ( ; ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )), ( ) = ( ; (), ( ), ( ), ( ))x t x t a a b b x t x t a a b b⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
solve the best reconstruction problem for fixed parameters 1 2 1 2{ < , < }
i i i ia a b b . 
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Varying parameters 1 2 1 2{ < , < }
i i i ia a b b , we can provide evaluation the optimal 
result (4), (5) and estimate the sensitivity of the macroeconomic model to the 
parameterized restrictions. 
To study the influence of restrictions on solution of the best reconstruction 
problem we apply new effective tools of parallel computations and the numerical 
methods for solving optimal control problems [1]. 
Results of simulations are presented. We nave compared the obtained solutions 
with results of the previous researches [2], [3]. 
 
References  
 
[1] Subbotina N.N., Tokmantsev T.B. Classical characteristics of the Bellman equation to 
constructions of the grid optimal synthesis. //Proceedings of the Steklov Institute of 
Mathematics, vol.271, pp. 1-19, 2010. 
[2] Subbotina N.N., Tokmantsev T.B. The Method of Characteristics in Macroeconomic 
Modeling. //Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Collected Papers Edited 
by Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. Zenkevich, St. Petersburg: Graduated School of 
Management, vol.3, pp.399-408, 2010. 
[3] Al'brekht E.G. Methods of construction and identification of mathematical models for 
macroeconomic processes. // electronic journal ``Investigated in Russia'' 
(http:://zhurnal.ape.relarn.ru/articles/2002/005.pdf) (in Russian). 
236 
 
Applications of Stochastic Hybrid Systems in Finance 
 
 
Büşra Zeynep Temoçin1, Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber2, 
Nuno Azevedo3 and Diogo Pinheiro4 
 
1,2Institute of Applied Mathematics, METU 
Turkey 
1busra.yilmaz@metu.edu.tr 
2gweber@metu.edu.tr 
 
3,4CEMAPRE, ISEG – Technical University of Lisbon 
Portugal 
3nazevedo@iseg.utl.pt 
4dpinheiro@iseg.utl.pt 
 
 
 
Keywords: Hybrid Systems, Financial Modelling, Lévy process, Bubbles management.  
 
 
Introduction: stochastic hybrid systems 
A general construction of a hybrid system is based on stochastic differential 
equations driven by Brownian motions and Poisson random measures [1, 2]. Therefore a 
hybrid system can be considered as an extension of a classical time-driven system with 
discrete events causing a change in its dynamic behavior. A time-driven system may be 
defined by a differential equation 
( ), , ,x f x u t=  
where Rnx ∈  denotes the state variable Rmu ∈  is a parameter, t  denotes the time 
and R R R R: n mf × × →  is a smooth enough map. A stochastic hybrid system can 
be constructed from the time driven systems by letting the map f  depend on a stochastic 
process on a discrete state space M  representing the switching between the distinct 
qualitative behaviors or distinct time-drive systems. A Markov chain on M  provides a 
clear example of a stochastic process modeling such switching. The random fluctuations 
in the evaluation of the asset prices may be a consequence of uncertainty regarding the 
initial condition, as well as of the noise generated by either a Brownian motion or a Lévy 
process. [3] Using recent techniques from Optimal Control of such dynamic systems, 
one proposes tools for the determination of thresholds enabling bubble detection and 
management. Furthermore, such techniques can also be used in the context of portfolio 
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optimization, where the quantity to be optimized can be taken as, among other examples, 
the agent’s utility from such portfolio or the transaction costs involved on its 
management. 
An extension of Merton’s consumption-investment problem 
Optimal consumption investment decision consists of determining the 
proportion to consume and the amount of wealth to allocate between stocks and a risk-
free asset so as to maximize expected lifetime utility. The consumption-investment rules 
of Merton serve to determine the amounts tc  that will be consumed and the fraction of 
wealth  tπ that will be invested in a stock portfolio. The objective is 
( )
0
max ( ) ,
T
s T
s TE e u c ds e u V
δ δ− −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫  
where  u  is a known utility function,  δ is the subjective discount rate and tV  is the 
wealth at time t  that wealth evolves according to the following stochastic differential 
equation 
( )( )  ,t t t t t t tdV r r V c dt V dVπ μ π σ⎡ ⎤= + − − +⎣ ⎦  
where r  is the risk-free rate, ( ),μ σ  are the expected return and volatility of the stock 
market and  tdV  is the increment of the Brownian motion, i.e., the stochastic term of the 
SDE. Many variations of the problem have been explored, but most do not lead to a 
simple closed-form solution, hence some research has continued to extend and 
generalize the model. In this study we aim to extend the problem by modeling the 
evolution of the wealth with a Stochastic Hybrid System. 
Management of financial bubbles  
A financial bubble is a period of rapid expansion in which the prices of 
securities rise far above their intrinsic value followed by a market slowdown [4]. It is 
very important to detect and manage the progress of such bubbles to be able to avoid 
extreme bursts. An interesting point of view involves the concept of homotopy, i.e., 
finding conditions for a bubble, formalized on a appropriate topological space, to be 
homotopic to another. We use the jump component in the Lévy process to model sudden 
decreases in the price process, just after a bubble burst. Using Stochastic Hybrid Systems 
our goal is to model financial bubbles and to developing a method to contract a bubble to 
one point (or shrink them) as soon as possible. 
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We consider n -person non-zero sum game. The players {1,2,..., }n  present the 
projects which are characterized by vectors 1{ ,..., }nx x  from some feasible set S  in 
space mR . The members of Jury consider the bids and choose one of the projects using a 
stochastic procedure. Let ma R∈  is a random vector with some distribution function 
1( ,..., )mx xμ  which is known to the bidders. The Jury chooses the project kx  which is 
closest to the point a . The winner k  receives a gain ( )kkh x  which depends on the 
parameters of the project. The components of vector a  can be independent or correlated 
random variables. Independent case corresponds the model when the members of the 
Jury are independent experts. The game-theoretic model of the problem is presented and 
the equilibrium in two-dimensional models is derived. 
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An application of the author´s systemic concept of strategic-equilibrium for n-
person cooperative games is made to construct strategic-stability outcomes for the 3-
person general sum cooperative game with transferable utility. No appeals are made to 
von Neumann and Morgenstern( vN-M) domination concept. The constructive approach 
is initially focused on triangular games. This allows us to illustrate the gradual 
emergence of stages that require specific strategic responses from the players and the 
coalitions. It shows also a gradual process with increasing levels of player´s 
understanding of the game structure and its possible outcomes. 
In a first stage, previous to considering the formation of the grand coalition, the 
players make claims and demand admissible utility transfers from each other, based on 
their bargaining alternatives. The strategic-equilibrium of the game is given in generic 
form, to be readily computed in specific cases. This is a conditional systemic equilibrium 
that allows us to see as “one”, different mutually exclusive but interrelated possible 
realities. It anticipates possible developments of interrelated subsystems of game 
outcomes. It may be given as an extended-imputation associated with a covering 
collection of subsets of N or as a matrix of payoffs conditioned to the formation of the 
corresponding covering coalitions. 
In a second stage, players in the coalitions of the cover collection realize they 
can use and accept their maximum sustainable claims, given by the extended imputation 
that defines the strategic equilibrium of the games, as payoffs taken after a cooperative 
division agreement is made; and then, as disagreement payoffs or “dividends” if they 
conformed into a syndicate. If a syndicate forms, the members may divide the 
corresponding characteristic function value of the coalition, according to those 
prescribed by the strategic equilibrium. Subsequently, once the cooperative coalitional 
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agreement is accepted, they may become a syndicate to dispute with the excluded player 
his incremental contribution if the grand coalition is to form. A syndicate internal 
division rate β specifies how the syndicated members are going to split the amount they 
will possibly get in bargaining with the excluded player. The amount to be gained from 
the marginal contribution of the excluded player depends on a syndicate external 
division rate α that must be agreed with. Thus, the conditional strategic-equilibrium 
evolves into a conditional equilibrium system of possible outcomes. Since all the 
variables and parameters are constructed explicitly, a general strategic-equilibrium 
solution is tentatively given. 
The explicit formulas for the possible outcomes allow us to obtain graphs to be 
analyzed. A remarkable result emerges: In developing the binding agreements on 
splitting rates, if the internal division parameter β is agreed previous to initiate the 
process of bargaining with the excluded player, the resulting outcomes of our strategic-
equilibrium description conform a vN-M “objective“ non-discriminatory solution. If on 
the contrary the internal division rate β is defined after the external bargaining takes 
place (always a source of conflict, and disagreement that eventually may require 
arbitration: Like asking for the price of an already consumed commodity and considering 
it to be excessively high). These resulting outcomes do not constitute a vN-M solution. 
Such findings point out the importance of the sequential order in which binding 
agreements may develop and the remarkable characteristic of vN-M solutions to be 
sensible to such sources of instability. 
The vN-M non-discriminatory solutions emerge naturally as omniscient views 
of alternative realities. These again, allow us to see as “one “several mutually exclusive 
but interrelated possibilities. Furthermore, for all non-symmetric games, an even-more 
surprising result emerges: of the alternative developments of the game, departing from 
the strategic-equilibrium based description of possible outcomes and in all vN-M non-
discriminatory solutions for the general sum-3-person cooperative game, one of the three 
possible directions the game may develop, (under the same behavior standards) 
dominates the other two. 
The dominating branch of the vN-M solutions corresponds to the conformation 
of the syndicate of the weaker players against the stronger one (at the coalitional 
bargaining level): After reaching a bargaining equilibrium, the players realize that the 
largest incremental contribution is made by the stronger player. So, there is more to be 
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divided between the syndicate and the excluded player, and consequently the weaker 
players if syndicated enter a scenario where there is more to be gained. This 
characteristic condition inherent to vN-M non-discriminatory solutions of non-
symmetric general sum games, here is referred to as THE STRONGER PLAYER 
PARADOX. 
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This paper, a fundamental strategic equilibrium is identified and mathematically 
characterized for all n-person cooperative games with transferable utility. Based on von 
Neumann and Morgenstern´s (vN-M) detached extended imputations role in relation to 
the stable set solution of a cooperative game, necessary and sufficient conditions 
establishing existence of structural and strategic equilibriums are given. These 
equilibriums generalize the symmetric (objective) vN-M solutions for all general-sum n-
person cooperative games. The mathematical characterization of the equilibriums for 
these games is accomplished in terms of linearly-balanced covering collection structures, 
admissible utility transfers, strategic independence of players and two basic theorems of 
the alternative for matrices: The Fredholm alternative form of the fundamental theorem 
of linear algebra, and the Farkas lemma. Among the many possible strategic 
equilibriums identified for the general cooperative game, the existence of a fundamental 
coalitionally rational strategic equilibrium for every game is established. It is shown to 
always exist and to constitute a von Neumann and Morgenstern un-dominated system of 
interrelated extended imputations. The fundamental strategic equilibrium is also shown 
to be not necessarily a solution but an attractor-like system from which all rational 
solutions to the cooperative game may emerge. Heuristic procedures based on the linear 
programming characterization of the strategic equilibrium of a game are given for its 
computation and also as key tool to generate, among several, vN-M non-discriminatory 
solutions. Examples are given to show the explicative capacity for other existing solution 
concepts and the implications for sharpening existing and developing new ones such as 
the here introduced as the strategic-equilibrium core of the cooperative game. 
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Introduction  
Robust optimization is a specific methodology for handling uncertain data. 
Kouvelis and Yu define robustness as “an effective way to structure uncertainty and 
make decision in the presence of it". There are several ways of incorporating robustness 
into a problem. Among them we use the minimax approach -also known as absolute 
robust decision- formalized by Nilim and El Ghaoui and Iyengar for robust dynamic 
programming problems. The minimax approach defines a game between the controller 
and Nature. In the context of inventory management, the controller's aim is to maximize 
the expected profit, whereas Nature tries is to minimize this objective function and acts 
upon observing the controller choice. The optimal robust solution designates the solution 
which has the highest result after minimization by Nature and is referred as the robust 
counterpart of the classical problem. Nilim and El Ghaoui and Iyengar simultaneously 
studied robust stochastic dynamic programs and showed some important properties. In 
both models, nature selects the transition probability distribution within an uncertainty 
set defined for every state, stage and the controller's action pair. Under certain 
assumptions, they both established that the robust counterparts of classical dynamic 
programming problems satisfies the Bellman equation and therefore can be solved 
within nearly the same (polynomial) time if the uncertainty set has some particular 
optimization properties. Later several authors proposed robust policies that are more 
moderate and experimentally more adaptive to perturbations. Paschalidis showed that 
introducing a subset of the uncertainty set into the model rather than the whole 
246 
 
uncertainty set performs better than the absolute robust approach, whereas Xu and 
Mannor modelled and investigated nested uncertainty sets. 
Model  
We study robust counterparts of general control problems from queueing and 
inventory theory in this paper and investigate certain properties of optimal policies. The 
problems we consider are a set of discrete-time expected revenue maximization 
problems. As an inventory example, we use the single-resource multiple class inventory 
problem (also known as single-leg airline revenue management, Lautenbacher and 
Stidham). This is a prototype example where a specified amount of inventory is sold 
within a fixed horizon to different classes of customers. The dynamic programming 
solution of the problem maximizes the expected total profit by considering the remaining 
inventory for each stage and decides whether to admit or reject an arriving demand 
depending on the customer class. When a class-  customer is admitted to the system the 
total inventory is decreased by one and a reward  is obtained. Our main model is based 
on the absolute robust approach but later we extend the results to other robust 
approaches proposed in the literature (Xu and Mannor). 
Main Results  
We show that a set of structural results for the value function such as 
increasingness, concavity and supermodularity propagates to the robust counterpart of 
the classical problem. The main conclusion of our work is that the optimal policy is still 
threshold type. Moreover, we also show that the monotonicity properties that establish 
how the optimal thresholds change over time continue to hold. Our approach is general 
enough to cover a number of well-known models from the literature (Lautenbacher and 
Stidham, Lippman) and we discuss the impacts of robustness for these examples. 
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Forward market is a known instrument for reduction of large producers’ market 
power. This opportunity is of special interest in context of electricity markets 
development. Bushnell (2005) considers a symmetric oligopoly and a two-stage market 
with Cournot competition at the spot market and no arbitrage condition. For a constant 
marginal cost, he shows that introduction of the forward market with known forward 
positions reduces the market power as well as increasing of the number of producers 
from n  to 2n . His model assumes a special order of consumption (individuals with 
higher reservation prices buy at the forward market) and equal forward and spot prices. 
However, the real markets do not meet these assumptions. The actual spot prices are 
typically less than the forward prices, but sometimes essentially exceed them. 
The present paper aims to study a dynamic oligopoly model with a random 
outcome at the spot market. In this case no arbitrage condition means that forward price 
fp  is equal to the mathematical expectation of spot price sp . At the first stage 
producers a A∈  set volumes faq  supplied at the forward market, 
def
f f
a
a A
q q
∈
=∑ . At the 
second stage those consumers who decide to bid at the forward market determine 
demand function ( )fD p . Each consumer b  is characterized by reserve price br  and 
risk-aversion parameter min max min max[ , ], 0bλ λ λ λ λ∈ < < , and aims to maximize his 
utility function ( , )b bU U λ= Δ , where br pΔ = − , 
' '
(ln ( , )) 0U
λ
λ
Δ
Δ ≤ . The forward 
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price fp  proceeds from the balance ( )f f fq D p= . At the third stage the producers 
meet the residual demand at the Cournot auction using correlated mixed strategies 
dependent on an observable random factor. Price 1p  occurs with probability w , and 
price 2p  - with probability 1 w− . We determine rational strategies of the agents in this 
game according to the subgame perfect equilibrium concept. 
Proposition 1. a) Consumers with reserve prices 1
f
bp r p< < , as well as risk 
neutral ( 0bλ = ) or preferring ( 0bλ < ) consumers with 2f bp r p< < , buy the good 
only at the spot market under low price 1p . b) For 2
f
bp r p< <  there is a threshold 
( )rλ  such that consumers with ( )b rλ λ>  buy the good at the forward market, and 
those with ( )b rλ λ<  act as in case a); ( )rλ  decreases from maxλ  till 0 in this interval. 
c) For 2br p> , risk preferring consumers buy the good at the spot market and risk 
averse consumers – at the forward market. 
Proposition 2. Consider a symmetric oligopoly with n  firms and fixed marginal 
cost c . Let the share α  of risk preferring consumers be fixed for 2br p> .Then the SPE 
prices and production volumes meet the following relations: *1 ( 1)
fq
p p
d n
= − + , 
1 *
1( ) ( )( 1)
f
s qq nd p c nd
d n
= − = Δ − + ,
*
2 1p p p= > , 2 * 1s sq n d qα= Δ < , 
*
2
( 1)( 1 2 )
( 1)
f nd n n wq
w n
Δ + + −= +  , where 
*p  is a Cournot price for one-stage auction, 
* *p cΔ = − , ( )fD p D dp= − . 
The ratio 
*
fp c
p c
−
−  is very close to Bushnell’s value 2
1
1
n
n
+
+ . The SPE exists iff 
1 2[ ( , ), ( , )]w w n w nα α∈ , the bounds of the interval for different n  and α  are as 
follows: 
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
  1w  2w  1w  2w  1w  2w  1w  2w  1w  2w  
2 0.667 0.667 0.74 0.772 0.81 0.837 0.874 0.9 0.944 0.963 
3 0.75 0.75 0.828 0.864 0.909 0.941 0.987 1 - - 
4 0.8 0.8 0.88 0.917 0.968 1 - - - - 
5 0.833 0.833 0.92 0.94 - - - - - - 
6 0.857 0.857 0.948 0.976 - - - - - - 
7 0.875 0.875 0.966 0.995 - - - - - - 
8 0.889 0.889 0.984 1 - - - - - - 
9 0.9 0.9 0.99 1 - - - - - - 
10 0.909 0.909 - - - - - - - - 
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Two firms compete for demand from the same group of customers, as they 
provide a homogeneous market with substitutable products (goods or services). The two 
manufacturers want to maximize their profits. Each firm may advertise its brand, 
obtaining a double effect: positive on its own brand and negative on the competitor’s 
one. The manufacturers decide their advertising strategies simultaneously and know the 
consequences of their actions on their products demands, and finally on their profits.  
We set the analysis in the natural framework of non-cooperative game theory 
under complete information, where Nash equilibria are the most important descriptions 
of the firms’ behaviors. 
A fundamental feature of the model is the assumption that the advertising effect 
on demand is mediated by the goodwill variable, similarly as in the dynamic model 
proposed by Nerlove and Arrow [5] which has been the basis for an important stream of 
literature (see [2, Section 3.5]). We believe that the idea of using the intermediate 
variable goodwill is particularly useful when representing the effect on the demand of 
several and simultaneous advertising actions, as is the case here and has been in [8].  
In various known models (see e.g. [3, 6]), interference of one manufacturer is 
represented as a negative term added to the competitor’s advertising effect on goodwill. 
Here we assume a different viewpoint and represent interference as a damping factor 
multiplied to the competitor’s virtual goodwill; this representation is analogous to the 
interference term in the dynamic model of Leitmann and Schmitendorf [4], but recalls 
also some multiplicative representations of joint advertising actions (see [1, 7]).  
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The multiplicative interference representation of the present model is essentially 
different from the additive one, because here the interference effect of one 
manufacturer’s action is modulated by the other manufacturer’s action, whereas in the 
additive model the interference effect of one manufacturer’s action is invariant with 
respect to the other manufacturer’s action. Therefore, we present a stronger form of 
interaction between manufacturers, which seems more realistic. 
We discuss the existence and features of the Nash equilibria of the game. 
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The motivation for this contribution is the following result in [1] for a 
homogeneous Cournot oligopoly game: 
Theorem 1. Consider a homogeneous Cournot oligopoly game where: 
a. no oligopolist has a capacity constraint; 
b. p is decreasing and continuous; 
c. ]0, [v ∈ +∞ ; 
d. ( )  0 ( )p y y v= ≥ ; 
e. b  [0, [p v  is twice continuously differentiable; 
f. every ic  is twice continuously differentiable; 
g. for every :  ( ) 0( 0)i i ii Dc x x> > ; 
h. for every i  and [0, [y v∈  there exists  0α <  such that 
2( ) D c (x 0)iDp y α− ≤ ≥ ; 
i. for each Cournot equilibrium n  
 
2
2
{ | 0}
( ) ( )
1.
( ) ( )j
l l l
l l
l k k
k j n l
D p n n Dp n
Dp n D c n∈ >
Σ + Σ− <Σ −∑  (1) 
Then: 
1. There exists at most one Cournot equilibrium. 
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2. If for every i  and ( , ) [0, [i ix y X v∈ ×  with ix y<  also 
2 ( ) ( ) 0
ix D p y Dp y+ ≤  holds, then there exists a unique Cournot 
equilibrium.◊ 
We are especially interested in statement 1, i.e. in semi-uniqueness as proving 
existence in 2 is routine. The proof of 1 in [1] is based on a detailed analysis of the 
global properties of the marginal reductions R    R: [0, [it v+ × → , defined by 
( , ) : ( ) ( ) ( ),i i i i it x y Dp y x p y Dc x= + −  
by means of the virtual backward best reply correspondences RS: [0, [ib v  defined by 
( ) : { | ( , ) 0}.i i i i ib y x X t x y= ∈ =  
Concerning the nominator and denominator of (1) note that 
2 2
1 2( ) ( ) ( , ), ( ) ( ) ( , ).
i i i i i i iDp y D c x D t x y D p y x Dp y D t x y− = + =  
As far as we know, Theorem 1(1) still is a strongest to date in the sense that 
there is no other result in the literature that not only implies but also substantially 
improves it. Theorem 1 improves upon a similar result in [2] by not excluding 
degenerate equilibria.2 The proof given in [1] is much more elementary than the proof in 
[2] which deals with Cournot equilibria as the solution of a complementarity problem to 
which differential topological fixed point index theory is applied. In fact the approach in 
[1] is a refinement of that in [3]. 
We not only will generalize Theorem 1 to a class of aggregative games, but also 
will obtain results that substantially improve this theorem intrinsically. 
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Game theory has transformed economics and greatly influenced other social and 
behavioral sciences. The central solution concept used in applications is that of Nash 
equilibrium. Yet Nash equilibria can be fragile and Nash equilibrium play does not 
generally follow from assumptions of rationality or of evolution. It is here argued that an 
exploration of methods for robust set-valued prediction in games is called for, and some 
such approaches and avenues for future research are discussed. 
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This paper is motivated by recent advances in gene-environment networks 
under uncertainty, the collaboration of Kyoto Protocol being one example here. In fact, 
the genes and further items in these regulatory networks and related dynamical systems 
are regarded in a generalized way and viewed as actors (players). 
In this study, we present a new model class of cooperative games under 
ellipsoidal uncertainty, a class of transferable utility games where the worth of each 
coalition is an ellipsoid instead of a real number. The important issue of whether and 
why individuals and organizations choose to cooperate (or not) when faced with 
uncertainty on outcomes or costs has generated a productive line of research in recent 
years. Crises in the world and the need that players act in the directed manner of, e.g., 
the joint implemention of the Kyoto Protocol, has brought the necessity of collaboration 
into public awareness.  
Cooperative game theory has been enriched in the last recent years with several 
models which provide decision-making support in collaborative situations under 
uncertainty. Such models are generalizations of the classical model regarding the type of 
coalition values. Thus, the characteristic functions are not real-valued as in classical case 
- meaning that payoffs to coalitions of players are known with certainty - but they 
capture the uncertainty on the outcome of cooperation in its different forms: stochastic 
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uncertainty, fuzzy uncertainty, interval uncertainty, ellipsoidal uncertainty. Involving of 
certainty into cooperative games is motivated by the real world where noise in 
observation and experimental design, incomplete information and further vagueness in 
preference structures and decision making play an important role. This causes a great 
mathematical challenge which was first approached and well understood in the case of 
interval-valued uncertainty. Since the interval calculus is not able to represent the 
player's mutual dependencies, similarities and possible affinities to collaborate, we 
introduce ellipsoids associated with clusters of players which are considered to share 
such kinds of correlations. We briefly explain the background in clustering theory. For 
an example, we look an economic situation leading to an “ellipsoid glove game”. We 
present benefits and difficulties of the ellipsoidal concepts, ways of how to reduce it to 
the interval concept, we discuss structural frontiers and challenges.  
The ellipsoidal core has been recently introduced by Weber, Branzei and 
Alparslan Gök to answer the important question “How to deal with reward/cost sharing 
problems under ellipsoidal uncertainty?”. Further, we deal with the ellipsoidal core for 
cooperative ellipsoidal games. Here, we study properties of this solution concept, relate 
it with the interval core for cooperative games. 
In the aforementioned studies, the research started with fully deterministic 
models, in the form of networks, their dynamics and optimization. Since, however, the 
real world is characterized by uncertainty in the form of noise in the observations and a 
lack of knowledge about how the items of the models interact, the authors left the 
deterministic real-valuedness of the models and turn to interval-valued models. In fact, 
the given (data) and predicted values of the biological and entire environmental 
information can hardly be identified by single scalar numbers, but they can be easily 
hosted in some confidence intervals. The same can be said for the levels of interactions 
of all these items. When aggregating all the intervals of data vectors, state vectors or 
vectors of parameters using Cartesian products, we obtain (confidence) parallelepipeds. 
Those parallelepipeds and intervals usually come from a perspective where functional 
dependencies among any two of the errors made in the measurements of the gene-
environmental levels are not taken into account explicitly.  
Ellipsoids are a suitable data structure whenever data are affected by 
uncertainty and there are some correlations between the items under consideration. In the 
real world, noise in observation and experimental design, incomplete information, 
vagueness in preference structures and decision making are common sources of 
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uncertainty, besides technological and market uncertainty. It is often easy to forecast 
ranges of values for uncertain data. Nevertheless, the representation of data uncertainty 
in terms of ellipsoids is more suitable than the error intervals of single variables since 
ellipsoids are directly related to covariance matrices whose characteristic functions are 
interval-valued, and present conditions for the nonemptiness of the elipsoidal core of a 
cooperative ellipsoidal game. 
The ellipsoidal core catches the ellipsoidal uncertainty on coalition values with 
the players' individual payoffs, i.e., the payoffs for each player belongs to an ellipsoid. 
Ellipsoids go beyond intervals and their Cartesian products such as cubes or 
parallelepipeds. Specifically, intervals mean parallelism with no correlations included, 
while ellipsoids allow including correlations among players from the financial 
(monetary) viewpoint. Since the inclusion of correlations inserts more information into 
the model of ellipsoidal games and into the ellipsoidal core concept we could call it a 
regularization plus an increase of accuracy.  
As our examples, we study the Ellipsoid Glove Game, the Ellipsoid Police 
Game and the Ellipsoid Kyoto Game. 
Finally, we indicate some topics for further research regarding the ellipsoidal 
core such as: to find conditions guaranteeing the non-emptiness of the interval core of a 
cooperative ellipsoidal game, to design efficient algorithms for determining ellipsoidal 
core elements, to characterize the ellipsoidal core on suitable classes of cooperative 
ellipsoidal games. We invite the interested reader to participate in this exciting new 
research programme and its modern applications. 
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In the paper we examine discrete time dynamic games in which the state 
variable changes in response to players' decisions via a certain statistic of a profile of 
players decisions while the players form some expectations about the future values of 
these two global variables based on their history. 
It is not assumed, that a player knows the actual game – the other players' 
strategy sets, payoff functions, or even the number of players (and, consequently, his 
own marginal influence on the global variables). Beliefs are either set theoretic (regarded 
as possible realizations) or probabilistic. 
In such a case Nash equilibrium is not an obvious solution and the concept of 
belief distorted Nash equilibrium (BDNE) is introduced to replace it. 
First, we assume that instead of maximizing their actual payoffs given strategies 
of the other players, at each stage players maximize their anticipated or expected payoffs 
given beliefs about influence of their current decision on the global variables (pre-
BDNE). To complete the notion of BDNE, we add an assumption that along the profile it 
is impossible to falsify beliefs. 
Note that along a BDNE the future behaviour of the global variables is caused 
mainly by players' beliefs that they are going to behave this way. 
 The most illustrative for the phenomenon we want to focus on is the ozone 
hole problem caused by emission of fluorocarbonates (CFCs). After discovering the 
problem, ecologists suggested to decrease the emission of CFCs, among others by 
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stopping using deodorants containing them. Making such a decision seemed highly 
unreasonable for each player since his influence on the global emission of CFCs and, 
consequently, the ozone layer is negligible. However, ecologists made people believe 
that they are not negligible. People reduced, among others, usage of deodorants 
containing CFCs, which decreased the global emission and the ozone hole stopped 
expanding and, as it is claimed now, it started to shrink. Whatever the mechanism is, the 
belief ''my decision not to use deodorants containing freones will cause the ozone hole to 
shrink'' can be verified by the empirical evidence. 
 The concepts introduced in this paper will be presented and compared with 
different concepts of equilibria – Nash and subjective equilibria – using the following 
examples. 
1. A simple ecosystem constituting a common property of its users. We assume 
that the number of users is large and that every player may have problems with assessing 
his/her marginal influence on the aggregate extraction and, consequently, the future 
trajectory of the state of the resource. 
2. A repeated minority game being a modification of the El Farol problem. 
There are players who choose each time whether to stay at home or to go to the bar. If 
the bar is overcrowded, then it is better to stay at home, the less it is crowded the better it 
is to go. 
3. A model of a market describing either Cournot oligopoly or competitive 
market (considering these two cases as one model is not a coincidence). Players may 
have problems with assessing their actual share in the market and, therefore, their actual 
influence on prices. 
4. A repeated prisoners dilemma. At each stage each of two players assesses 
possible future reactions of the other player to his/her decision to cooperate or defect at 
this stage. 
5. A simplified model of a stock exchange with real price formation system. At 
each stage players form some expectations about future prices and possibility to buy or 
sell at those prices. 
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We consider a stable (not necessarily stationary) age-structured population 
modeled by the McKendrick partial differential equation. In constrast to the resource 
extraction model of Jorgensen and Yeung (1999), where new generations appear at 
discrete time steps, we assume that at each instant in time a new generation enters the 
game. Further the mortality as well as the fertility rate of the model are constant over 
time and exogenous (implying a stable population). The maximal length of life of one 
cohort equals omega (can be assured by an assumption, see e.g. Anita (2000)). 
The cohorts maximize their lifetime utility by chosing the optimal emission rate 
(i.e. age- and time-dependent control) over their life time. The emissions are aggregated 
over time and cohorts (i.e. time-dependent state). The objective functions then consists 
of three components. (i) Utility from the emissions (e.g. production), (ii) disutility from 
emissions (e.g. pollution), (iii) altruism. (i) and (ii) are standard in economics. (iii) goes 
back to Barro and Becker (1989) and includes the idea that also the utility of the 
progenies has to be included in the objective functional. The last motive is very 
important since otherwise all players behave without any care about the time after the 
own life. 
The resulting model looks quite similar to Shevkoplyas and Kostyunin (2010) 
(see also Breton et al. (2005)), but works considerably different and has a different 
interpretation. The duration of the game is no longer random, the differential game 
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evolves over time, but includes overlapping generations and an altruistic motive is 
included. 
We calculate the open-loop Nash equilibrium for the differential game and 
provide economic interpretations for the derived expressions. On the other hand we deal 
with the cooperative solution for the differential game resulting in an age-specific 
optimal control model (solved by the corresponding maximum principle presented in 
Brokate (1985) or Feichtinger et al. (2003)). By comparing the outcome of both 
solutions we are able to figure out the relevant differences and provide important 
economic interpretations. Finally numerical simulations show the solution for both 
outcomes over time and over the life-time of different cohorts. We are able to illustrate 
the difference in the long-term behavior of the model compared to the model without an 
altruistic motive. 
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The least core, a well-known solution concept in TU game setting, satisfies 
many properties used in axiomatizations of TU games solutions: it is efficient, 
anonymous, covariant, possesses shift-invariance, max-invariance, and the 
reconfirmation property. However it is not consistent. In view of the prenucleolus – a 
consistent solution – is contained in the least core, the latter may contain other consistent 
subsolutions. Since on the class of two-person games the least core coincides with the 
prekernel, any such a consistent subsolution is a subsolution of the intersection of the 
least core (LC) with the prekernel (PK) as well. We present and characterize the largest 
consistent subsolution of the least core. Denote it by .consLC  
Its axiomatic characterization is obtained with the help of that for the 
intersection of the core with the prekernel for the class of balanced games, and with the 
shift-invariance property of both the least core and the prekernel.  
Theorem 1 The consLC  solution is the maximal under inclusion solution for 
the class of all TU games that satisfies efficiency, the equal treatment property, 
covariance, shift-invariance, and consistency on the class of balanced games.  
Let us give a representation of solution consLC  for every game ( , ).N v  For this 
give some notation. For an arbitrary TU game ( , )N v  and its efficient payoff vector x  
denote  
1( , ) argmax ( ( ) ( ))S Nv x v S x S⊂= −S ; 
{ }′ ′ ′ ′∈= =1 , ,( , ) ( , ) | ( ) max ( )ij i j N i jI v x i j s x s x ,  
where 
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: ,
( ) max ( ( ) ( ))
ij S i S j S
s x v S x S
∈ ∉
= − . 
For 1j >  
1
1
( )
( , ( ))
( , ) ( , ) | ( ) max
j
ll
j ij i j x
i j I x
I v x i j s x s
−
=
′ ′′ ′∉
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= =⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∪
; 
: ,
( , ) arg max ( ( ) ( ))ij
S i S j S
v x v S x S
∈ ∉
= −S ; 
 
k
ij
k
i j I v x
v x v x
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
∈
= ∪E S ; (1) 
Evidently, 
1 1
( , ) ( , )v x v x=E S . 
( , )
k
v xT – the partition of N , generated by ( , )
k
N vE , 1,...,k l= . 
Theorem 2 A payoff vector ( , )
cons
x LC N v∈  if and only if the collections 
( , )
j
v xE  are weakly balanced on 
1
( , )
j
T v x−∈ T , for 1,...,j l= . 
With the help of Theorem 2 it is easy to show that the lexicographic prekernel 
( )lexPK  [1], another subsolution of the intersection of the least core with the prekernel, 
is contained in the .consLC  
The consLC  contains other consistent subsolutions. The solutions 
, = 1,2, 3...k kσ  are not consistent. Denote by 2, ,...,cons kLC η η  their largest consistent 
subsolutions. It is clear that for every game ( , )N v   
2( , ) ( , ) ... ( , ).consLC N v N v PN N vη⊃ ⊃ ⊃  
The sequence of consistent solutions 2 2, ,..., ,...consLC η η  possesses the same properties 
as the sequence of k -prekernels 2 3 4= = ..PK PK PK PK PN⊃ ⊃ ⊃  except for 
maximality under inclusion [2]. Therefore, the last result is the inclusion  
η +⊂ 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ).k kN v PK N v for every N v  
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Cooperative games suggest the possibility of socially optimal and group 
efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic action. In cooperative 
dynamic games, a stringent condition – that of subgame consistency – is required for a 
dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, under a subgame consistent 
cooperative solution an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later 
time with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior will remain optimal. Dynamic 
consistency ensures that as the game proceeds players are guided by the same optimality 
principle at each instant of time, and hence do not possess incentives to deviate from the 
previously adopted optimal behavior. A rigorous framework for the study of subgame-
consistent solutions in cooperative stochastic differential games (which are in 
continuous-time) was established in Yeung and Petrosyan (2004 and 2006). A 
generalized theorem was developed for the derivation of an analytically tractable “payoff 
distribution procedure” leading to dynamically consistent solutions.  
In this paper, we extend subgame consistent solutions to discrete-time dynamic 
cooperative games with random horizon. 
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In this paper I analyze the effects of candidate risk preference on equilibrium in the 
probabilistic voting model. It is assumed that the candidates have preferences other than 
the maximization of the expected number of votes or the probability of win 
maximization. I derive the comparative statics for two voters and one-dimensional policy 
space. Each voter cares about both the policy platform and the identity of the candidate. 
It is shown that an increase in the value of exactly one vote causes each candidate to 
choose a position closer to that of its partisan voter. Numeric computation of equilibria 
show that these results can be generalized to three or more voters. 
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